


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
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
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MEDITATION ON THE ISĀVĀSYOPANISAD

By K. C. VARADACHARI

I have always felt that Upaniṣads should be read as instructions in *Sādhana* rather than metaphysical statements about the Nature of Reality, though it must be well understood that no *sādhana* can proceed without a reality-view. Every Upaniṣad is a *Vidyā* and should be meditated upon as the Ancients used to do, rather than discussed about for the mere purposes of objective knowledge. This meditation leads to inward understanding, occult and profound of the subject matter however difficult of comprehension it may appear to be at the beginning. Meditation is also silent prayer, inward and deep and communion, a communion with reality in its depths rather than on its surface forms, merely, and as such it is something that passes into knowledge or con-sciring, or *śeṃuṣī bhakti-rūpa* (knowledge of the form of devotion). It is well-known that there is no Upaniṣad which enfolds so much of value and synthesis in the briefest compass other than the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad*. In meditating upon its meditable portion that is the final four verses (mantras—15 to 18) which is asked to be meditated upon, or used as Prayer-formula, I was singularly struck by the remarkable series of impressions registered in my consciousness. I am trying to share these medita-

tations on the Supreme Being, the 'I' of all beings and things, with all.

I. The first prayer : HIRAṆMAYENA PĀTREṆA SATYA-
SYĀPIHITAM MUKHAM.

TAT TVAMPŪṢANAPĀVRṆU SATYADHARMĀYA DRṢṬA-
YE.

clearly reveals that the individual soul covered over by Ignorance, here described as the Passion-coloured (Golden) lid, is unable to see the Lord in everything outward. The earlier instructions in the sixth and seventh verses : *sarvabhūteṣu ca ātmānam* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmani tiṣṭhan* and *sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūt* : 'the self in all beings,' 'all beings in the Self' and 'the Self as that which has become all beings,' are incapable of being realized or experienced through the senses, and even as the *Kenopaniṣad* has beautifully stated : *Yad vācā nabhyuditam yena vāgabhilyudyate ; Yan manasā na manute yenābur mano matam ; yacchakṣuṣā na paśyati yena cakṣūmsi paśyati : yacchrotreṇa na śrṇoti yena śrotram idam śrutam : yat prāṇena na prāṇīti yena prāṇaḥ praṇīyate* : it is through the Self we see, hear, think, breathe, speak.

Thus the subject of all experiences is the Self, not only in respect of each individual but also in respect of all individuals. This Self is in all beings and it is this Self-nature that is to be known. It could only be known when the passion-coloured lid is removed. It is the Truth-Nature. Man aspires for the removal of this lid that prevents the realisation of truth-function or truth-nature. Every other function of the self, such as sensing, thinking, breathing and speaking is not the real function since they cannot intimate the original truth of the self. Thus it is that this Being, unseeable by the senses, is capable of being seen in a mind that is absolutely quiet and calm. A strong and impregnable calm is the necessity of the soul ; this may mean that there is much reserve strength of faith in the

truth nature to sustain any loss that the loss of passions might have caused. More fully this calm must be conceived as very difficult of arriving by means of any ignorant move or passion or will that is egoistic, and it must therefore appear that it would be incapable of being achieved by the individual out of his own ignorant volition or ideation or emotion. The mental peace or *prasāda*¹ that is stated to be possible to a soul that has got rid of all outward desires and crushed out all emotive and mental movements of the *citta*, is something attained through the practice of inhibition of the same constantly through *abhyāsa* and discrimination. It is true here that though the soul possesses all this practice and discrimination and has attained the necessary peace too and calm, contentless existence, there survives yet the egoism, the true lid, golden as it is stated, attractive and beautiful, and yet it is something that has to be removed. This removal is stated to be possible only by or, through the Grace of God, Pūṣan, the Nourisher—Protector, the Supreme Godhead who is the One of whom the sages speak variously, because of different functions that He simultaneously discharges spontaneously, felicitously and through puissant Grace. This luminous Peace is a Presence of the Divine, different in kind in a sense from the preliminary unstable peace attained through one's own will and contra-will. This peace is a revelatory Peace, a permanent and abiding true peace-nature that is the foundational nature of the individual soul in its unity with the Divine.

It is interesting always to find a myth in keeping with or corresponding to this discovery of a depth that is essentially to be probed, for it is the problem of the nature of the individual self as to whether it can only arrive at a golden

¹ I have found many excellent writers feel chary of accepting the doctrine of Grace or Benevolence in the Upaniṣads, and who feel *Prasāda* to be merely mental calmness, illumined consciousness at best. But what is the necessity of Prayer or Hymn in Veda or Upaniṣad?

peace, impermanent and capable of being defeated, or a true peace permanent and incapable of any disturbances despite all these occurring. The paurāṇic analogue here is the story of Hiranyakaśipu, the golden-bedded² or gold-vestured or gold-coated being, a vital being (titan), mighty and dark with passion, who searched as no man or God did for the omnipervader Viṣṇu, who, he had heard, was the enemy of all egoedness, egoed-eyedness (Hiranyākṣa) greedy-eyed or greed-covered soul, of thieves or usurper-robbers of what really belongs to the Omnipervasive Īśvarā. He, Hiranyakaśipu, even like his brother Hiranyākṣa, was an ectype of the Arch-demon dragon Vṛtra, the serpent-symbolized being who encompassed all the worlds, even as the other Vedic figures like Vala, Pāṇis were, and the Purāṇic Naraka, Tāraka, Rāvaṇa were. They made it impossible for the true nature to flow out. They sequestered Truth, confined it, penned it in the Cave (of the Heart) making it impossible for it to emerge out of it. In the Heart is hidden the soul and Deity of the size of the thumb, brilliant and eternal the self of all beings. It was His lid of passion or egoism that was hindering the perception of the Omnipervader whom his son, Prahlāda, his own higher Buddhi, despite all the tortures and punishments was proclaiming to be everywhere; it was this that was prayed for to be removed. Perhaps it is as well that we should remember that there are differences between souls,—divisions that cut across our prejudices and castes perhaps;—and souls are marked either Āsura, Mānuṣa and Daiva (Man being bi-valent either inclining to the Asura or Deva) or sattva, rājasa and tāmasa. It is even possible to hold that each of the former may have three divisions as shewn in the latter; thus Asuras may belong to the sattva

² In Egypt or Babylon, the temple of Bāl was provided with a huge golden-bedstead on which the God was laid even as in temples in South India at Nights-Śayana Sevā. Is it a worship of Hiranyakaśipu? Or is it a symbol of the Doomed City and civilization?

or rājasa or tāmasa kinds even as the Gods may. So Vibhiṣaṇa and Trijaṭā among the Asuras were considered to be sātत्वika asuras even as Prahlāda and Mahābali have belonged to the sātत्वika Asura-jāti. The prayer then is addressed to the Divine as the One Lord of all creatures, Prajāpati, the father and parent not only of Gods and men but even of the Asuras. The prayer is necessitated by the ardent fury of the frustrated passion-governed soul which thought of itself as the Self.

It is in one sense true that what man has made by ignorance man may unmake by means of knowledge. But ego is not merely a nucleus of the divine effulgence but also a constellation of habits of thought and sense and volition and sentiment. It is this latter that is usually called the self or soul by many and it is this which modern psychology recognizes as the self or personality even as the purely rationalistic Buddhist schools conceived it to be, and therefore rightly denied its permanence. There is yet a truth in individuality which is not egoism which is entirely fundamentally a centre of Divine Being, a secret manyness of the Divine. It is this that is unreachable by thought and sense and volition because it is the universal that is uniquely individualised but that is egoed as a possessive Being. This secret could be wrested only by the Self, that is, the Divine. As we have already pointed out the truth becomes clear when we agree to consider that there are supramental or divinised beings, mental beings and effulgent vital beings. The first is a class by itself and has never probably suffered from this disaster of separation from the centre, the Truth, *Satya-dharma*, a separation resulting from the covering by the lid. It is only the human mental and the asuraic vital beings who are in need of this removal of the passionate separating lid, the lid of disjunctive diversity, the lid that makes it impossible to enter the inner being of itself. Confronted by the mystic truth that Prahlāda, the buddhi-awakened, buddha, the child of

manas, has brought, the joyful tidings of the Ever-present Omnipresent Reality of Spirit, Immortal and Consummate, (Puruṣa) the Asura, his vital egoistic father of great austerity, Hiranyakaśipu engages upon a severe test of the nature of the Ātman, which has been stated to be *aśnāvīram, śud-dham, avraṇam, akāyam* (*Īśā. Up.* 8) all attributes which reveal That Spirit, Īśa, to be other than the body and other than the Ego of Hiranyakaśipu, which he has been proclaiming aloud and affirming with insolence as the Highest Being. It is thus that we have to read the prayer of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* as the prayer of the illumined understanding, Buddhi of Prahlāda (Or is it the truth-seeking, experimenting ego of Hiranyakaśipu?) to the Real Nourisher, to remove³ the golden (glittering) lid of passion, even if it be by force as indeed it has to be done—for it is the *Rudragranthi*, the knot of final death, dissolution of the egoism or the ego that releases therefore the self from the bondage to the material congeries, namely a private body. It ceases thereafter to be a separated entity with a separate being. It becomes illumined, luminously conscious of its central self in the Divine, and knows its true self to be the Supreme who is the Self of the Gods and all creatures, high and low. It is then that the Lord in the form of the wonderful Narasiṃha (indeed a play on the word Puruṣottama), the lionine quality being shewn to illustrate the mystic symbol of the destruction of the elephant⁴ (*gaja*)—soul, by the lion the higher or superconscient vitality of the Seer⁵ emerges as the Purāṇa says with the *Om-kāra* (*Om* being the word that

³ The original contains the word *apāvṛṇu*=un-cover, which may well be done in any manner gently or rudely tear it off; there is a *dhvani* as to *Vṛṇan*=to hurt or injure.

⁴ *Bhāgavata* VII. 20. 47 indeed uses this imagery of elephant to the soul and the lionine form is undoubtedly the āścarya Puruṣa, the Yakṣa of the *Kena*.

⁵ This vitality is *Vīryam* of the *kena*, : *ātmanā vindate vīryam vidyayā vindate amṛtam*.

is Brahman as the *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka* and *Māṇḍūkya* say and as the *Bhagavad-Gītā* proclaims, and even as the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* equates it latter in the 17th mantra with the *Kratu*—Viṣṇu, the Lord of Sacrifice)—out of the Pillar, *śhāntu*, (a *Kaṭhopaniṣad*-symbol which denotes the Pillar of Fire within, which, being aroused, destroys the Heart-knot) and tears apart the bowels and entrails of Hiraṇyakaśipu which stand for or reveal the coils of desire and worldliness and possessive existence for the private self. It is thus only that the heart-knot could be broken and all doubts dispelled about the individual congeries being the most ultimate unity of being or permanent existence. Thus it is that once for all the doubts could be removed or extinguished and the truth-being known and understood and entered as Lord Kṛṣṇa has stated. This break up of the heart-knot, this break up of the utter consecration to the material well-being and food-desire-enjoyment group leads to the Joyful Wisdom, the revelational immediacy of the Divine Illumination—Presence, which makes the Father of Prahlāda (or indeed thus may Prāhlāda on behalf of his own deceased or rather released Spirit of his Father) pray to Narasiṃha, Puruṣottama “O Nourshier! O Sole Seer! O Yama (Death)! Sūrya! O Prajāpati!: Withdraw thy hot rays, gather up thy beneficent rays so that I may behold thy Most auspicious Form,⁶ and know through that that the thumb-sized Puruṣa indwelling as Self in the heart (of all) is identical with the Self in the Sun. This is the Āditya Hṛdaya, the secret of oneness in multiplicity, resolved in and by and through the experience of the Prahlādic-buddhi:—the Joyful Wisdom is this much alone.

The most important impediment to self-realization is, as any one who is acquainted with the experience of the

⁶ It is the *Tad Vana*, the *Tad Jalan*, the *Ānanda*, the *Madhu*,

spiritual knows, the delusion that the body is the soul. Materialism (in modern terminology Behaviourism) can never accept the reality of spirit or soul. According to its reading the soul is but a congeries of impressions, feelings, affects, volitions and ideations and these are all referable to the interactions between the several chemical and physical processes within the physiological organism. Consciousness is an epiphenomenon, a resultant of these interactions within the organism. Or else it is a sort of energy that throws light on the processes backwards and forwards and thus a purposive instrument of the organism. It is a biological evolute. Whatever else it may be, according to Behaviourism it is not a permanent spiritual entity nor should it be construed as having a spiritual substance as its source or basis of which it is a quality or function. It is a bye-product, a useful bye-product. There is absolutely no evidence to show that there is any other substance than the perceived unity of sense or matter. This being the reading of materialism the question about the existence of the soul or spiritual essence becomes all important for any system of spiritual philosophy (Vedānta) or Religion.

Idealism no doubt has done yeoman service in the cause of establishing the priority of mind (consciousness) and its indispensability and the omni-effectiveness of Mind. But these conclusions it has arrived at through the abstract activity of thought or reason or intellection which distinguishes or extracts the principles or laws of thought or axioms or categories of experience from the mass of presented sensations, feelings, dispositions and instincts belonging to the changing flux which is characteristic of the universe of matter (sensory world). These ideas or reals or essences or principles or axioms or values that it has extracted or analysed from the '*A priori Synthesis*' (of Kant's Metaphysics) it has sought to unify or integrate or systematize into a universe with the

help of the principles of coherence and non-self-contradiction as between themselves. A reality so built up of these 'ideas' does indeed confer a permanence to the unity of thought, and may even be, in a truer measure, a reality of the mind—for really every thinking being feels himself to be a mind. But then this unity of reality in which the rational alone is real has been accepted to be just a "bloodless ballet of impalpable categories," whilst it did deliver the mind from the sensations, feelings and fleeting existence, it did not liberate the mind from itself, that is to say from its own structure, in order to permit activity or search or realization of that in the world. It could not satisfy the structure of experience which constantly overflows the categories of both abstract thinking and sensory being. Philosophy secured a permanence and even a type of peace but not that which satisfies even its own inward drive towards all-round acceptance of integral being. The absolute of the idealist certainly could not be called a self or a soul. Reactions in the shapes of radical empiricism, positivism, pragmatism and realisms of the critical and neo-varieties had indeed intervened as anticipated. But what was needed was not more materialism, but more of idealism and an acceptance of the fact that real progress should lead to a deeper and profounder truth of the self or spirit or mind than was made possible by intellectual idealism. The abstract activity of the intellect only protested against the sensory fleeting experiences, little knowing or discerning that the intellect itself is but a habit of being, and only the manufacturer of the permanent structure of matter against its own fleeting structure.

The mystic always attempted a higher type of abstraction through a process that combined the intellectual type of abstraction or negation with the process of psychological renunciation of the sensory. This *nivṛtti* or abstraction that is two-pronged enabled his Yoga to go beyond the

F. 2

intellect itself to a state of being that might be called *nirvāṇa*—*vāna*-less, that is, without any type of *citta-vṛtti*. This further made it possible for him to discover the utter duality between the soul and its body, and therefore helped 'death' or 'psychical death'. This psychical death is not a mere symbolic or mimetic act of dying but a real dying to the body so as to live to the soul, and incidentally making the body an instrument awakened to its soul's real and ultimate destiny, as against the present tendency of making the soul awakened to the destiny of the body. It is a death in a deeper and more intensive form than the physical death (civil or municipal death) which is but the termination of one's body, a biological death. The delusion that the body is the soul can never be got over unless or until the individual can release the soul from the tentacles of matter and the body that is physically understood as the configuration of instincts, desires and ideations and purposes or cravings, and make it move out of and into the latter at will. No doubt the greatest assertion of the Mīmāṃsakas and others has been that unless we accept that there is a fundamental distinction between the body and the soul and predicate immortality or at least indestructibility to it, the injunctions of the Vedas that promise experiences in the heaven, world etc., will have no validity, a situation that is intolerable. But this is not enough. At least the Veda does intimate this 'unsheathing' as something devoutly to be wished for, for it speaks about a state of being of the Ṛṣis who knew fully and in experience of this absolute difference between the body and its soul or rather the soul and its bodies. This 'unsheathing' is an experience that is got in the state of ecstasy or integral absorption or concentric meditation and is explained as a siddhi (or to use the Buddhist phrase 'iddhi') in Yoga (Hindu as well as

The sacrifice is a 'correspondential' death, surrender to God is a 'psychic death'—and one can die but once!

as Jaina). The jīvanmukta is one who at least knows and experiences the freedom of the soul in the body and this experience is not one merely of absolute control over the organs of sense and action and antaḥkaraṇa but a radical disjunction that is only short of a total abandonment. I do not hold that this is desirable or all that Yoga is aiming at, but this radical otherness of these components of the Organic is a thing that must first be learnt, and from this alone can arise knowledge and a being that entails a further step on the evolutionary unfoldment. This abstraction of the real psychic being not merely on the level of thought and mind but also on the Jāgrat level of waking consciousness and physical being is indeed very difficult. Many hold that this is dangerous. (So at least the ancient occult literatures hold). Without the guidance and grace of God or the Divine powers it will mean lot of pain and even death, that entails a new effort in another life. But without this knowledge being achieved and realized fully with the help of reason and emotion, and a dynamic awareness, the illusion of body-soul (dehātma-bhrama) is incapable of being finally and utterly rooted out. Till then we shall continue to be helpless against the onslaughts of radical empiricism and scientific materialism. Biological death does not and cannot perform this act for us, for it can only liberate us from the outer shell or coat of perceptible existence outworn by experience, but not the subtle sheath which is stated to carry forward our *sañcita-karma*. That is precisely the reason why we have to choose the 'psychic death,' the death that means the business of realization of our 'otherness' out of love of true liberation. This is achieved by knowledge that even transcends abstract reason⁸ and is gnostic or supramental, or at least intuitive.

⁸ Rationalistic philosophizing is a necessary training in abstract thinking, even like mathematics. But on that necessity devolves another necessity, the necessity of execution or application of the truths.

Thus the primary necessity emerges, in whatever way we may think, for a definite and complete vindication of the principle of the difference between the individual soul and its body, and any attempt to refer it to any *pramāṇa* is almost to deny to the self what is promised to the mind. It breeds always the fear of a possibility of fall or illusion. The promise of divine knowledge that from that there is no fall or regress (*acyuta*-knowledge or *anāvṛtti*-ascent) can never be kept. The siddhas have always taken the view that truths of vedic experience ought to be experienced and ought to be taken seriously.

Thus we come to an important point in our meditation when we find that the primary test visualised by the seeking vital soul (*Hiraṇyakaśipu*) was the invocation to Death⁹ and even may we say a willingness to see the truth through, whether indeed the Divine is in oneself, a fact that would settle two things at one stroke. What the enlightened Soul, *Prahlāda*, knew and experienced through his own sufferings at the hands of the Egoistic matter-ridden being, is now being questioned radically by the latter.

so learnt and experienced in the rarified atmosphere of pure intellection. The need is great especially in a materialist age. And all great applications have had happened in the ages of materialism. Abstract thinking does double-duty. It does duty to materialism as well as to spiritual evolution. In an age of materialism it discovers the principles of physical or biologic existence, and in an age of mysticism it discovers the principles of spiritual being. In the one case it helps the general ascent to the deep and fundamental core of reality submerged by materialistic emphasis and in the other case it helps the application of the higher principles in order to discover the secret depths of matter. It is thus a mediator. But in so doing it also generally undergoes transformation and appears to have ascended to the highest limits of its possibilities in concrete thinking. For the truth of abstraction lies in its effective appreciation of unities that link up the two domains, the heaven and the earth in Vedic terminology, by belonging to neither absolutely. Its is a thankless task. Its own goal will always fall short of experience or the superamental being, the Synthesis where in the Soul and matter are the real to each other and are found even to display a close integrality or togetherness in every respect.

⁹ It is well-known that the mantras 16-18 of the *Iṣa* are recited at the time of cremation, or after death. So is the *Nāciketa* mantras "Tripāciketa..."

This is the cult of the intrepid warrior. A warrior in battle is prepared to die for some duty, or principle or loyalty. This preparedness to die is an actual asset in the solution of the problem of soul-body delusion. The 'psychical death' is effected at the very moment of the will to die in order to live. That it is a crude method and even a violent method does not vitiate the fact that it is a method. In the second chapter of the *Gītā*, Bhagavān Śrī Kṛṣṇa teaches the most important truth that the soul is unborn and that the body is perishable and is a coat that is worn and cast off when it has served the purpose, and even if the soul were but perishable it is better to die for a cause that is ultimate or for the sake of ordained kṣātradharmā. The metaphysical implication underlying this counsel is to get over the *bhrama* that visits even very advanced souls, like Śrī Arjuna, not only in respect of oneself but also in respect of other selves or souls. Further it is necessary to experiment with truth for the sake of absolute knowledge. Thus the kṣatriya-dharma prepares for the brāhmaṇa-dharma of total and absolute consecration that is not vitiated in the least by the delusion that the body is the soul. Wherefore the brāhmaṇa is a sacrificer and lives in the spiritual universe in all its manifold planes of creatures, men, elements, fathers, gods and the One Divine whose these are, in Whom all these exist and Who dwells in each and every one of these. The kṣatriya-solution is a rājasic and vital pronouncement and experiment whereas the brāhmaṇic-solution is a mental and intuitive pronouncement of the same truth because if we understand the truth we shall see that not until one had been a kṣatriya could such a one become a brāhmaṇa. This is also the reason why in the earliest literature the Veda and Upaniṣads, the problem of the spiritual universe was solved by the great kṣatriya kings and taught by them, for they were fully cognizant of this fundamental need to know the relationship between the body and soul.

and the One Spirit. That is also the reason why they became breeders of the true knowledge of Sāṅkhya, discrimination. That this truth was not the only prerogative of the kṣatriyas can well be shewn, but that is not to our purpose. Spiritual knowledge starts with the discrimination of the soul as different from the body, and this is something that is to be learnt integrally by the will to perish and to dare and for the sake of the knowledge of spirit or self. The dehātmabhrama cannot be liquidated in any other way. Tapasyā, (mortification) suffering, crucifixion, brahmacarya and others all indicate the stages of this unsheathing that takes place gradually in Yoga. That is also the reason why Hiranya-kaśipu was an Emperor, and why it was his business to solve once for all the truth about the self and even the nature of the supreme soul or Divine Godhead. The fifteenth Mantra clearly indicates the prayer to the Nourishing Lord of all, and the soul, to tear away this veil of delusion, the delusion that prevents the realization of the true nature of the Spirit. That this spirit is immortal, moving and capable of tenanting many kinds of bodies is all intimated by the verse seventeen : vayuranilam amṛtam. That it is śukram, avraṇam, aśnāvīram, śuddham, apāpavidham, etc. is shewn earlier in the eighth mantra. But all these do not reveal much. Siddhis even may appear to reveal the possibilities of the material existence only rather than the nature of the Spirit that is other than it. Obviously then when the search for the Divine took place He could not be caught any where by Hiranyakaśipu, for it is naïvely remarked by the Purāṇa that the Divine entered into His nose. Is it not as the *Kenopaniṣad* states by the Divine that one smells or knows or hears? The psychic death was sure to come, but not until one is prepared for the worst does it pass off lightly, or joyously illuminating the interiors and revealing the separateness by dismissing or subverting the delusion. Otherwise the worst must be

faced many times. The truth of intelligence is that it is 'ekasantagrāhi,' whereas ignorance is 'anekasantagrāhi'. The former requires no repetition the latter does. Prahlāda did not need repetition for he was buddhi, Hiranyakaśipu was instinct and needed all the violence of the spiritual to overcome its inward resistance. It is true that modern mystics and other generous souls who think that theoretical philosophizing and acceptance of idealism or absolutism insufficient will find that all that has been written above merely clarifies the mystic sincerity and will scare away only drawing-room philosophers. For others it is a welcome adventure in the spaces of spirit which will resolve the many controversies of philosophers and make for honest experience and practical spirituality. That does not mean that we need to bid good-bye to philosophizing. As already pointed out it is the business of this dynamic experiment in Vedāntic knowing (Sāṅkhya-Yoga in the language of Śrī Kṛṣṇa), to lift up the understanding from the barren constructs of superficial abstractions. We can then proceed to see in the next two mantras the same illumined consciousness that has beheld the One Unity of all Godheads and its own self, now resolves to offer up itself in utter consecration for the sake of an integral transformation. The self or soul is immortal, an immortal portion of the Divine, a truth, which has no fixed habitation nor are its bodies permanent. The truth has been learnt that the self is other than the body (Śarīra). For it is a truth that a body is an instrument of a self which exists by reason of the soul or self within, which utilises it and enjoys it for some occult purpose or secret delight; and there is no particular reason to hope that these purposes are either eternal or permanent delights, though delight be the very nature of the Self-delight that enjoys the Oneness as well as secret manyness, or manyness and its secret oneness, being as well as becoming, which are just the conceptual representations of this two-

fold delight of Transcendent Being. Now the sacrifice of the self or one of its manynesses is sometimes held to be a necessity, a necessity of the truth of the former occult knowledge. Sacrifice or the Rite of Sacrifice is a total consecration to the Divine Lord of all Enjoyments and offering and not, as is usually held, a renunciatory act, an act that merely breathes the air of denudation however free from inward sorrow at non-possession of that which was possessed. The Body it is that is to be offered along with the inward self to the Supreme One Being, the Omnipervader *Īśa*. It is by this act, apparently of a total surrender of all possessions (as is intimated in the very first mantra of the *Īśa*: *tyaktena bluṇjīthā*), that the fullest riches of the transcendent kind (*rāyi*) (*Śreyas* of the *Kaṭha* and the *Gītā*) are attained. Thus it is that the awakened soul, seeking the fullest sovereignty and empire resolves upon the Great Rite and conquest of the *Viśva* through sacrifice. This sacrifice is sometimes called the *Viśvajit* sacrifice or the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice. In these sacrifices the gifts or *dakṣiṇā* are to be one's fullest possessions. The *Viśvajit* sacrifice of *Vājaśravas* father of *Naciketas*, or the *Aśvamedha* of *Mahā Bali* is the greatest sacrifice, in this sense that it has a great mystic meaning: He who would possess (the) All must lose all or give or give away all other possessions and not "give up all." to others. This was the *pratijñā*, the resolution or resolve of the sacrificer who had awakened to the Joyful Wisdom (*Prahlāda*). And it is clear that it would not have been a complete sacrifice but for the coming of *Vāmana*, the Dwarf-brāhmaṇa, who claimed the three feet by His measure, as Lord of the Three Feet being the Fourth as *OM* (*A U M*) interpreted as *Earth* (*Vaiśvānara*) as *Midatmosphere* (*Taijasa*) (the subliminal abode of the *rajas*) and the *Heaven* (the *Prajña* the individual soul of *Bali*).¹⁰ The name *Vāmana* is used in

¹⁰ cf. *MĀNDUKYA*; *MUNDAKA*, etc. Upaniṣads, *Bh. Gītā. Mund.* instructs that the *OM* should be made the bow and the target, the Brah-

the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* in respect of the indwelling Dweller in the Heart-Cave, He who is the knower of past and present and future; He who is the Lightning corresponding to the Heart, of the *Kenōpaniṣad* and the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. Thus come forth the wonderful words of the Mantra 17: OM *Krato* (Viṣṇu, Vāmana, Lord of Sacrifice) *smara* Kṛtagam *smara* (Remember, remember that which was done); that is, says Sri Venkatanātha, "Please fulfil or complete this my sacrifice by acceptance of my surrender, by thyself coming and establishing thy Feet within me and making me thine own, even as Āṭvar Śaṭhakopa has stated by making me his sandlals." That is, "Lead me thyself O Immortal Flame of Sacrifice! Thou knower of the Occult Paths! Chief of Gods! Agni! by cutting out all the devious ways of sin and ignorance," even as the next Mantra (which is found in all the Vedas) runs.

The self is offered to its natural Lord—the Īśa, now known as Sacrifice, *Kratu*, now Vāmana, the Brāhmaṇa-dwarf who is indeed He who has as His eyes the Sun and Moon, and is the internal Ruler as Antaryāmi, and is the Death which is the Gate to fullest plenitude of Being. Thus we find that the last verse: *Agne naya supathā rāye . . .* really is a fulfilment of the Sacrifice of man's ego which has three steps, involving a triple transformation as Sri Aurobindo states of the Vital, mental and the material represented by the great asuras, who belong to One single family¹¹, Hiranyakaśipu-Hiranyākṣa, Prahlāda and Mahābali, from which results an awakened sense of union (identity) with Truth, Satya, next a revelation of the Oneness of the self

man and the soul as the arrow. By whom should it be released or aimed? Surely by the mind or the Divine who comes out with Omkāra—Narasimha came out with Omkāra and aimed the soul of Hiranyakaśipu.

¹¹ Hiranyakaśipu's son is Prahlāda, his son is Virocana (the disciple of Prajapati of the *Upa.*) and his son is Mahābali. Virocana held Annam to be Brahman and was satisfied with that truth according to the Upaniṣads.

of each and the self of every thing else and all, and finally (thirdly) a quiet separation from the transitory which entails the sacrifice, the unique sacrifice that has as its aim the conquest of the Viśva (the waking consciousness, the *Jāgrat*), for the spiritual transcendent existence which has been separated by three steps of the deep subconscious, unconscious and subliminal. It is only through such precarious filtrations that our actions are being governed by the Superconscious to our knowledge. It is the conquest of the Vaiśvānara, (the Nāciketa-fire of the *Kaṭhopanishad* and the Agni of the *Agnirābasyopanishad* of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*) which is invariably completed by the Divine's acceptance in person of the intimate identity that is the reality-function between the indwelling seer and the super-conscious Universal. It is this utter and total acceptance that is usually spoken of as the realization of the establishment of the Seat of Brahman in the Heart, the achievement of the Ānanda, the Rasātala of Mahābali. It is this beatitude that has been stated to be the result of a complete surrender. It is as it were the shifting of the centre of action from the individual ego to the Universal Person, the Cosmic and supraconscious supracosmic Divine. It is not without significance that the Seer Priest who officiates at the sacrifice of Mahābali is Śukra¹² (*Īśa.* 8) for on the path of real and fundamental divine evolution the Leader, the Sacrificer, Priest, every part of the process of ascension, passing on, transformation is achieved by the Divine for the Divine and in the Divine, the individual soul playing the part of a quiet aspiring flame, fed and lifted up unto union.

¹² Śukram, Śukra is stated to be the Priest—Teacher of the Asuras and Uśanas is stated to have been the first priest who new the art of resuscitation of the Dead. In another sense He is the Deity himself, the Pure Radiant Being who as it were speaks a double voice but correctly leads all the same, for in man is the flame of true freedom and in freedom should man seek the Divine, for therein alone is available the true delight of the many consummating in Oneness—there primal secret reality.

Surrender or Śaraṇāgati Vidyā is stated to have six steps : ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpa (willing the helpful to ascent); Prātikūlyasya Varjanam (renouncing the obstructive); goptṛtva-varaṇam (electing the Goal); Mahāviśvāsa (radical faith in the Divine); Ātmanikṣepa (placing of the self at the feet of God); and Kārpaṇya (complete dependence involving a feeling of helplessness without the Divine). We can see in these four mantras of the *Īsāvāsyopaniṣad* (15-18) these six in some form : in the 15th verse—‘Satyadharmāya dṛṣṭaye’ refers to this willing of the helpful (i); whereas the prayer to the Divine Nourisher (Pūṣan) to uncover the golden lid that covers the face of Truth is the renunciation of the obstructing forces (ii); the 16th mantra in its first part “Tat te rūpam kalyāṇatamam paśyāmi” is the wish of the votary to see the Divine auspicious form and thus forms the third step (iii); whereas the belief that the self of the worshipper and that of the Solar Orb is the expression of the great faith in the Omni-selfness of God, the mahāviśvāsa (iv); in the 17th verse we have the expression of the Ātmanikṣepa, surrender (Kṛtam) or sacrifice of the immortal soul (vāyur anilam amṛtam), so that its body of karma is turned to ashes (bhasmāntam śarīram) and it is uplifted by the Divine as Om and Sacrifice (Kratu) or Divine Will, and the repetition of the words Kṛtam smara merely affirms the total dependence on the Divine to help, a state of extreme helplessness of a soul that has given up all its being and existence to the Divine, whose only prayer is ‘Na-maḥ’ (Not I but Thee) (18th verse). This is the state of Kārpaṇya (ekānta-bhakti, akiñcanyatva, avyabhicāra-bhakti). All these six states of the soul are but deepening stages in the Soul’s entry into the Divine but at every stage of the Divine’s help it is that is being sought and not that of the limited and restricted and ignorant ego. Here too we find that knowledge of the Divine Oneness and All-ness it is that governs from the first actions of sacrifice of the self.

Thus Śaraṇāgati is a dynamic Sacrifice¹³ and in it is comprised the aśvamedha, the puruṣamedha and the Brahmamedha, sacrifice of the senses, out-ward-moving and extravert; sacrifice of the ego as a circumscribed and limited or private being apart from and in conflict with the All, a possessive and egoistic entity; and the realisation of the Leadership of God the Omnipervasive Super-conscient Being in every fibre.

To conclude this meditation I may point out in the first instance how the integral mind works with respect to the spiritual universe. The spiritual universe is the eternal universe in a sense, for, from it proceeds all types of presentation in space-time-events. The whole literature of the Hindu, or for that matter of any true religious community or philosophy is to be interpreted correspondentially as my friend Dr. Mohan Singh states from multiple stand-points, that is, from the ādhibhautika, ādhyātmika and ādhidaiva aspects. Each of these divisions may find further sub-divisions. And they may be called the Vedic, Brāhmaṇic, Upaniṣadic, Aitihāsic, Paurāṇic and Āgamic. The failure of modern philosophers to go behind to the bed-rock of spiritual experience is so clearly patent in their writings which despite their learning and scholarship (on which they pride themselves) that we are likely to miss the truth of the spiritual universe. There is an eternity streaming through the temporal, and a temporal

¹³ It is a very strange coincidence that Mahāyāna Buddhism pitched upon the name Vairocana (son of Virocana? Viṣṇu) as the name of the ĀdiBuddha, since Vairocana is the name of Mahābali, the mahāprājña, the sole enjoyer of the Divine Bliss-nature, as a consequence of the Great Sacrifice which not merely concluded with the physical rite but the psychological surrender. It is because rites have a tendency to become severed from the psychological that all objectifications have a tendency to limit, pervert and derealise the meaning, the psychological. Thus it is necessary to rescue the meaning which alone can help the movement upward and form the basis of any true endeavour. It must however be all the time understood that the fact of this occurrence of disruption or disunity cannot be the cause for a wholesale condemnation of all objectivity and expression of the psychological truths.

that reveals the eternal, and this intermingling in the process of civilization, through poetry, art, sculpture, dance and philosophy and sciences, clearly portends so simple intellectual understanding. On the contrary rationalism has tended to be dogmatic and has ceased to see the confusion into which its own analyses have landed it. Spiritual understanding or gnostic being will clearly interleave the historical with that which is suprahistorical and grant meanings not available in the one or the other exclusively. The fundamental manner of interpretation was long ago envisaged in the Brāhmaṇic literature, but we have grown so much intellectual these days that we have been for a long time unaccustomed to see more than one aspect at a time and this seeing of one aspect did the trick of depriving us of the fruits and visions of the entire reality : To quote the *Īsā.* (9.) again "Andham tamaḥ pravisanti Ye'vidyām upāsate tato bhūya iva te tamo ya u vidyāyām ratāḥ (See also the 12th mantra). Thus it is necessary to interpret the whole body of literature as an organic whole. This is undoubtedly difficult and may lead to lot of confusion and may be called Research in the strict and literal sense of the term, but this is not the research that will get the applause of the savants and scholars of the present day. It means the seeing of things temporal and eternal in one sweep and this one is forced to say 'sadly' is possible only to one supramentally awakened to the deep and foundational unity of the two by a radical experience.





INDIAN MARTIAL TRADITION

By V. R. RAMACHANDRA DIKSHITAR

Introductory

THE late lamented Maxmüller did a distinct service to the cause of indology by the translations of the Sacred Books of the Hindus and by his own original contributions on Indian History, culture and civilisation. But at the same time most accidentally he committed one or two mistakes for which we are at present paying rather a heavy price. He was the first to propound a theory of Aryan race,¹ surely a pigment of his imagination. It caught like wild fire and various ingenious theories of race, and race origins, superiority of the Aryan or inferiority of the Dravidian or *vice versa* cropped up in the horizon of indological fields with the result that we are now fighting endlessly by bringing unnecessarily the imaginary race theory to the forefront. The fact is there were no races, Aryan or Dravidian, unhappily confused with the rich streams of Aryan and Dravidian cultures. A happy parallel is afforded by the fact that we can speak of an Anglo-saxon or Latin culture but not of Anglo-saxon or Latin races.

• The other mistake more germane to our subject is that the Hindus did not believe in the reality of this world, looked upon things including our very existence as unreal, illusory, whatever may mean that significant expression *Māyā* in Sanskrit. This idea of the world and its activities being

¹ Max Müller—*Chips from a German Workshop* (new edition) Vol. I Preface p. IX; *Biography of words and Home of the Aryans*, Appendix IV. p. 245.

Māyā, or a snare and a delusion belongs to the region of philosophy and not even religion. The intellectuals of the Hindu community who spent their time in the forests speculating on the life here and hereafter evolved systems of philosophy which find expression in the numerous Upaniṣads and literature of the post-Upaniṣadic period. From the vast ocean of literature reflecting philosophical ideas and doctrines, our scholar Maxmüller wrote that the Hindus were mainly a community of philosophers whose mind was bent towards the other world, and who did not attach any importance to things mundane.

This is unfortunately incorrect. The term Hindus is a mysterious term. The ancient lawgivers distinguished four major castes and a number of minor castes framed mainly after their respective occupations. The philosophical school was the monopoly of the few, catering to the intellectual community which was designated the Brahmana community. Even here a choice few gave themselves to a reflection of such theories while others who shared with the king, the weal or woe of the kingdom, were worldly-wise. What about the families which were hereditary Purohitas to different rulers and what about the families whose members served the state as councillors, ministers, judges and even commanders like Droṇācārya of epic fame is an interrogation for answer. The philosophy did not affect the life and career of members of the ruling caste, trading caste, or peoples caste consisting of agriculturists, carpenters, masons, barbers, washermen, and so forth. These formed the bulk of the community through the ages. They never worried about one god or a multiplicity of gods. They knew their duties and adhered to them irrespective of consequences. The Hindu ideal was known svadharma *i.e.*, each person in his station. This prevented two things—competition and survival of the fittest. That is the beauty of Hindu civilisation.

A Military Caste

Yet another characteristic of the Hindu civilisation was setting apart a whole caste for military duties.² This was the Kṣatriya caste. It was the ruling caste. Only a Kṣatriya could be a ruler and none else. If any member of other communities became a King, this could be only due to very peculiar circumstances, and he was to be given Kṣatriyahood and consecrated then as a ruler. Ever since man was born, he was a fighter, born of psychological impulses.³ It is true of all tribes and of all nations. It is also true of India. As I shall show in the sequel Indian martial tradition begins with the Vedic period and has a continuous history to the present day. While intellectuals were speculating in the realm of philosophy in forests and caves, life went on in the cities and towns, in capitals and forts, in the plains and on the river banks. Life included a warrior's life. The element of permanence and endurance in Hindu culture is their genius to set apart a whole community for warfare. It was itself a standing army of the country. Every Kṣatriya was a Knight by himself. He fought and fought relentlessly to save his country and religion. By having a separate warrior caste, the peace of the country or communities engaged in other pursuits of life was not affected. The normal life went on.⁴ There was no disturbance of the economic equilibrium. There was no want of food. There was no necessity for planning a new world order. For the old order was not affected in the least. It was not a peoples' war.⁵ It was certainly a war in which the King representing the whole nation plunged. Its defeat or victory affected the state as a whole. By a peculiar social device the nation's represent-

² See Dikshitar, *War in Ancient India*, ch. II, sec I.

³ *Ibid.* ch. I.

⁴ For example, see Megasthenes' *India*. Mecrindle Fig. 1.

⁵ This I have dealt in greater detail in my paper to the *Aryan Path*, *Some Concepts of War in Ancient India*.

atiyes who were the great Kṣatriya community went to the field of battle to decide the nation's destiny. That is why Megasthenes who was an ambassador to the court of Pataliputra, the capital of Candragupta Maurya about 320 B.C. has left a valuable record : "Nor would an enemy coming upon a husbandman at work on his land do him any harm, for men of this class being regarded as public benefactors are protected from all injury."

While it is largely true that only the warrior caste fought our battles, sometimes soldiers were recruited from other communities also. If a war is of a prolonged character and if the resources in men and material were diminishing, then recourse was had to enlist soldiers from the people-caste. These were mercenary soldiers in the sense they were hired for a particular purpose and disbanded afterwards. In those days the success of the army depended on its numerical strength. Hence the levy. But there is no evidence that there was a general conscription at all; though there is some evidence of conscription of wealth⁶ from wealthy communities for war purposes.

If we approach India's martial tradition with this background, then we can get a correct perspective of the whole. In the Vedic age the King was a member of the warrior caste and he was helped in his military functions by members of his caste, who enjoyed the rank of nobility. Their main duty was readiness for war. The bow is the main weapon of this age. Every noble was instructed in the art of war which was then the science of the bow.⁷ One feature of these Hindu wars was that the King led the host to the field. He was in the front rank and inspired his troops by his magnetic personality to fight to the end. Sudās⁸ a powerful Vedic monarch had to fight a confederacy of ten

⁶ *Mbb. Śānti.* 71-72 : 87. 35-39.

⁷ *Vedic Index* : I. pp. 388-89.

⁸ *Rg. Veda* : VII 18. 8. 9.

- kings. We can well nigh imagine the nature of such a conflict. We meet here and there with battle hymns in Vedic literature, for instance, the *Rg Veda*. VII. 18.

• *Laws of War*

But it was in the epic age that the foundations of Indian martial tradition were truly laid. It was now the morale of the Indian army that was exhibited to the utmost possible extent. There are several quotations in the *Mahābhārata* which indicate the high sense of discipline and keenness of spirit pervading the Hindu army. Every soldier elected duty and glory at the cost of life.⁹ His duty was to fight and die in battle. A coward only die of sickness in his house. Nothing is nobler than enter the field when challenged to fight, unmindful of the consequences. It made no difference with the epic warrior whether he killed or was killed in the battle.¹⁰ To retreat is to bring ignominy to his family and country. Fight to the death or to the complete victory brought glory to the family and country. Further glory was to find a place in India's heaven. Whatever be the caste or status of the enemy he must be attacked. It is the veritable law of warfare. If a soldier who goes to a battle dies fighting he was accorded the funeral service due to a warrior. But the death of such a hero should not be mourned or lamented. On the other hand one should be glad of it and proud of it.

The epic soldier was not the indiscriminate mercenary warrior recruited for the moment, disbanded afterwards. Every soldier had his fixed salary and a permanent employee of the state. When there was a call for arms, he went out in all glee. In peace time he enjoyed life with his family drawing the same salary. Adequate compensation amount-

⁹ See, for instance, *Mbb.* V. 74. 23.

¹⁰ *Mbb.* *Udyoga*: 72.4.

ing to pension was given to the family of the soldier who fell in the field with his boots,¹¹ to use the modern phrase. The wounded and disabled were taken to the camp and treated by expert physicians and surgeons.¹²

Notwithstanding his enthusiasm and love of glory the epic soldier did not indulge in indiscriminate and reckless fighting. Even here he had a plan. His camp which looked like a city was self-sufficient. There were certain rules which he observed even when the action was hottest. There was no fighting during nights.¹³ Every morn opened with music and the chiefs met to decide the particular array and its commander for the day. At sunset the arms were down and all returned for rest. Though there are examples where these rules were not strictly observed, still the rule was there and ordinarily followed. Some of the laws of war were :—

- (1) Non-combatants were not to be molested.
- (2) The disabled and those who ask for mercy were not to be attacked.
- (3) The weaponless and defenceless should not be molested.
- (4) The retreating should not be attacked.
- (5) Barbed and poisoned arrows should not be used.
- (6) The subdued soldier to be reinstated and the conquered people should not be disturbed from the observance of their own laws and customs.
- (7) There was to be fighting between equals.
- (8) Women, children, ambassadors and cows were not to be touched.

¹¹ *Mbb. Śānti.* 86. 24-5.

¹² *Ibid.* 95. 17-18.

¹³ See Dikshitar, *War in Ancient India* p. 75.

(9) Corn fields, fruit and flower gardens were left unmolested.

(10) Incendiarism is to be condemned.

Viewing this code of war as a whole, we find that wars generally did not affect the progressive and civilised elements of the state. Wars were certainly fought at any cost but not with any method. These principles were the governing motives of wars indulged by the Mauryan and Gupta emperors. Aśoka regretted his action at Kalinga where thousands of innocents were slaughtered in the unrighteous war which he engaged. In fact Kauṭalya the celebrated author of the *Arthaśāstra*,¹⁵ a rare work on polity, postulates three kinds of war—Dharma vijaya (righteous warfare), Asura vijaya (unrighteous warfare with no regard to the laws of war), and lobha vijaya (due to greed of territory, women and property). The last two are condemned in unequivocal terms. Samudragupta's and Harṣa's wars were actuated by a sense of glory and pride, the object of which was to win the heaven.¹⁶ It was something religious in character and spiritual in outlook.

South Indian Tradition

If this were true of the North Indian tradition, the tradition of the south is much more vivid and awe inspiring. Our principal authority for South Indian tradition is the Śāṅgam literature of the Tamils. The classics are full of warfare. The ancient Tamils were much more fierce, chivalrous and valorous. As we shall see even their womenfolk were animated by martial spirit and helped their kith and kin in winning battles. There is a technical term Tumbaittinai.¹⁷ According to this concept when a chief or

¹⁴ *Ibid.* Ch. II. sec. ii.

¹⁵ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk II. 1.

¹⁶ See the legends in the coins of Samudragupta.

¹⁷ *Puṣṭapattai Venṇamālai*. VII Paṭalam.

a warrior was attacked from all sides by the throwing of darts and spears at him, still he remained undaunted. The weapons would have pierced the different parts of his body and still he went on fighting. A certain weapon had cut his body twain. Even then the cut body did not fall on the ground but it was still in heroic action and movement. This state is called technically *aṭṭai āḍutal*.¹⁸ In Kannada the cut body is called *aṭṭe* and Telugu *aṭṭa*. In Tamil it is *aṭṭai*.

The old tradition was that the king himself fought the enemy and when it was found that the chief was declining in strength then a commander rushed to his aid and carried on the battle much more vigorously. If during the course of the fight, the enemy king who rode an elephant, fell down with his elephant, the warriors killed the fallen foe and engaged themselves, in a dance called *amalai*.¹⁹ This is to do honour to the dead chief and to celebrate also their victory. When once the chief fell dead, the army generally retreated but the conquering king recklessly attacked the soldiers in retreat and slew them (*nūlilāṭṭu*).²⁰

There were warriors again who being wounded either on the face or chest would deem it derogatory to survive that feat and would further ulcerate the wound and end their lives. This is called *marakkānji*.²¹ After the battle was over, it was a custom for the wives of heroic soldiers to enter the field in search of their husbands. When once she saw her husband in a pool of blood with darts struck on his breast, and about to die, she drew back the weapon and drove it into her body so that she may not survive him. Still another custom was for the woman to closely embrace the dying head of her husband to her breasts and

¹⁸ *Tol. Porul sūtram* 71. Naccinār Kīniyar gloss.

¹⁹ *Tol. Porul sūtram* 72.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Tolkāppiyam*: Puṇa Hiṇaiyiyal.

forehead and continue in that state of sadness until the last breath of her life went out.

Tamil land could boast of not only heroic housewives but also of heroic mothers. They have disproved the appellation weaker sex given to them. In the Tamil work *Puṛaṇānūṟu*, a composition of about two centuries before Christian era, there are passages²² which go to prove to the hilt the heroism and glory of Tamil Warrior-women. Ōkkūrmāsāttiyār, a poetess, is all praise to a noble woman who was the mother of only one son and who sent that son to the field of battle in response to a call. The lady dresses his hair which was a tuft and presented him with all armour. Her parting words were "Your father and grand-father fell heroically in battle. My hope and prayer is that you should follow their example. Go and fight to the end as befits a youngman."

Another poem says that when a heroic mother heard the heart-rending news that her son lost his courage in action and had retreated, her blood boiled with indignation. She vowed that if that were a fact, she should cut off her breasts with which she suckled him. With this determination she went out to meet the retreating son, with a sword in hand; she could not meet him. So she made a search in the field and found her son's body cut in twain. At this her happiness was greater than that she had at his birth.²³

Instances of this may be multiplied. We may refer to one other sample of the Tamil heroism. That is what one calls head offering.²⁴ It was a practice in those days to invoke the aid of the war goddess on the eve of an expedition. The goddess was pleased, according to the belief of the times, with sacrifices of goats, buffaloes and even

²² *Puṛam*, 279.

²³ *Puṛam*, 277.

human beings. But one curious practice of the Tamil soldiers was to go to the altar, stand before the deity, cut their heads themselves with swords, place the cut heads at the altar, when the cut trunk stands firm raising both hands in prayer. This sentiment may be crude and all the same it indicates the intense feeling on the part of the Tamil soldier, his courage and boldness without caring in the least for his life.

Side by side with humane treatment meted to the enemy, the Tamil kings more often showed themselves inhumane. For there are instances where the bloodthirsty warriors quenched their thirst of vengeance by ploughing the roads and streets with asses and donkeys and sowing seeds of castor, cotton and other cereals. It is said even the houses of gods were not spared.²⁵ The use of fire to buildings and looting of the property were also not uncommon. Sometimes the defeated king was captured and put to death. These soldiers went by the name of *maṛavar*, who were fierce-looking, and full of martial spirit and valour. There is still a *maṛavar* tribe in the present Ramnad district and these are perhaps the descendants of the old martial tribe.

The Rajput Tradition

The Hindu warriors who are from A.D. 800 known as Rajputs had to fight for another eight hundred years more against the invading Mohammedans. These Rajputs were the lineal descendants of the ancient Kṣatriya stock and endeavoured their best not to give a holding to the new invader. When Mahomed Kasim invaded Sind, Raja Dahir of Sind collected a large force and marched to oppose him. Though he received a severe arrow wound, still he charged in the most gallant manner

²⁵ *Kāṭīya Hupparani*, 15, 392.

into the midst of the Arabian horse where he died like a hero.²⁶ Again when Mohamed Ghori led his expedition, he was attacked by as many as one hundred and fifty Rajput princes who rallied under the banner of Prithvi Raj "having sworn by the water of the Ganges, that they would conquer their enemies, or die martyrs to their faith." In the course of a letter addressed to Mahomed they said : "it were better, then, you should repent in time of the rash resolution you have taken, and we shall permit you to retreat in safety ; but if you have determined to brave your evil destiny, we have sworn by our gods to advance upon you with our rank-breaking elephants, our plain-trampling horses, and blood-thirsting soldiers, early in the morning to crush the army which your ambition has led to ruin²⁷."

There were two battles at Taraori, near Karnal. In the first Ghori was beaten. But in the second battle Prithvi Raja was defeated and captured and put to death.²⁸ Then later when Baber came to establish the Mughal empire, Rana Sangha of Mewar²⁹ offered a heroic resistance as his descendant Pratapa Singh later fought against the great Akbar. Though Akbar and Shah Jahan were diplomatic enough to enlist these gallant soldiers in their army and use them to fight against their enemy, there were Rajputs who would not suffer the disgraceful deeds of the foreigner. They attacked Aurangzeb though not with much success. In the meantime in Mahārāṣṭra, Śivājī rose to power. He saw how Hindu religion was in danger and his country almost a lost dominion. His tactics were too much for the Mughal Emperor. All his plans to capture this great leader failed. The Mahrattas made a last effort and

²⁶ Briggs : *History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power*, Vol. IV, pp. 406-409.

²⁷ Briggs : *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 174-179.

²⁸ C. H. I. III, p. 40.

²⁹ C. H. I. IV, pp. 16-17.

a bold bid in the 18th century for the dominion of India fired by martial qualities. But it was too late. The tottering Mughal empire passed on slowly but surely to the hands of the East India Company.

Military Races of Modern India

The Mutiny of 1857 has been called the Great Indian Mutiny, but really speaking it was an unfortunate circumstance in certain parts of the country, while other parts rallied to the standard of the British to put it down with all their might. A serious outbreak took place only in Delhi and Oudh, Cawnpore and Central India.³⁰ In other provinces it was more an incident of a negligible character. Whatever it was, it did a disservice to our country. It made the great Bengal Army disappear³¹ with a few exceptions. It made the British to lose the confidence of the Indian to some extent. By loyal and faithful service after the mutiny our soldiers all over India have earned the gratitude of army officers and commanders. That is why today large numbers are being recruited. For trust alone begets trust.

Let me take up the Punjab. From the Mutiny down to the present day the hardy races of the Punjab—the Rajput Dogra, the Punjabi Mohamedans, the Sikhs and the Jats have been associated with the British Army and have displayed wonderful skill and splendid enthusiasm. The Dogras are, according to Major G. F. MacMunn, the most valued of all soldiers. They are Brahmins, Rajputs, Jats and the like who retain the old Aryan religious faith and habits.³² They are also enlisted to the Imperial Service Troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pathāns in the Indian Army come mostly from within the British border or

³⁰ Thompson and Garratt: *Rise and fulfilment of British rule in India*, pp. 435-446 and Macmunn: *Armies of India*. Ch; III,

³¹ *Ibid.* 449-450.

³² *The Armies of India* p. 143.

between the administered border and the Afghan frontier. Also the Duranis come to our ranks especially the cavalry. To these may be added the Hazaras enlisted chiefly in the Baluchistan regiments, besides the Baluchis themselves.

The military services of the Sikhs are too widely known. Whether raised before the Mutiny or after, the Sikh regiments are equally famous. What is said of the Sikhs is also true of the Jats. Major MacMunn writes "As a fighting man, his slow wit and dogged courage give him many of the characteristics of the British soldier at his best."³³

During the Great War I more than one half of the Indian army was drawn from the Punjab, and their achievement was very remarkable. The Lahore and Meerut Divisions which were sent to France in the Autumn of 1914 played an heroic part. True to their traditions of loyalty and self-sacrifice the Indian soldiers felt as they feel today that that war was their war. The strongest appeal to a Punjabi (this is true of every Indian also) is, it is said, one to his *izzat* (honour), especially in protecting their hearths and homes. The warrior is easily roused. To this may be added the splendid war services of the Punjab Native States during the Great War and in the last Global War. This gallant record which keeps Indian martial tradition unimpaired has earned for the Punjab as the shield, spearhead and sword-hand of India.³⁴ The same military bearing and dash and daring of a fighting caste are noticed in other Rajputs who hold practically all the great States of Rajputana, Kathiawar and a great part of Central India. This is equally true of the Muhammedans of Rajputana and as well as of the descendants of Maratha conquerors—Scindia, Gaikwar, Holkar and others in the West and central India. The Mahrattas claim to be Rajputs of the Agnikula persuasion. "They

³³ *Ibid.* p. 139-40.

³⁴ *India as I knew it* by Sir Michael O'Dwyer (1925) (Ch. X).

have long served with credit and distinction in the Bombay Army." They are famous for their wiriness and endurance.

The next military race of importance are the Gurkhas of Nepal and the Garhwali (a hill tribe) west of Nepal. There are many battalions of Gurkhas in the service, the enlistment dating from the Nepal War. Among the many good qualities of the Gurkhas is the intensity of cameraderie that exists between them and their officers as also between them and the British troops. The Gurkhas are born soldiers. The Garhwalis dress themselves in Gurkha style of rifle uniform with kilmarnock cap. They are deemed to be of "considerable fighting value."

Races of the Carnatic

Madras is generally put down as an "Unmilitary" province with a few exceptions like the men of the Coorg hills and Moplahs of Malabar. But the army of the Madras Presidency otherwise named the Coast Army had done its services in the most satisfactory manner. The Tamils like the Kallar and Maravar and the Muhammedans of Tamil districts, the Velamas and Rachewars of Andhradeśa are also enlisted. The value and history of the Madras sepoy require a special treatment. It was the French who recruited originally Indian sepoys and gave them a quasi-European training. Then the English began to use this valuable material. The sepoys were at first termed peons. The First Commander-in-Chief of the Company's army in our Presidency, Major Stringer Lawrence was struck by the efficiency and valour of Madras sepoys in the battle at Cuddalore in 1748 against the French, the siege of Arcot 1751 and the battle at the Golden Rock near Trichinopoly 1753.³⁵ So with the reorganisation of the Madras Army in 1765 the number of the sepoy battalions

³⁵ H. H. Dodwell : *Sepoy Recruitment in the Old Madras Army* Ch. II.

was increased. The sepoy's were promoted as Naiks, Havildars and Jamadars.

One of the battalions known as Baillie-Ki-Paltan³⁶ (1759-1930) named after Lt. William Baillie who commanded it from 1765 to 1771, showed their gallantry at Chengamah with Hyder Ali in 1767. Whether at the battle of Assaye (1803) or in China (1840-41) the Madras troops showed spirited behaviour and won great credit, let alone the First and Second Mysore Wars. In the Great War (1914-18) South India's contribution was no less important. The 88th Carnatic Infantry and the 83rd Wallajabad Infantry along with others won great distinction.³⁷

If we only turn to the recent world war we have a brilliant record of achievements. In North Africa it was the Indian Army that smashed the enemy completely and won world-wide distinction. Our army won glory in the fields of Italy advancing against great odds. Thus the sum total of Indian martial tradition is to fight to the end, and even to sacrifice one's life, if need be, for the cause of the crown and the country.

³⁶ Baillie-Ki-Paltan by Lt. Col. H. F. Murland, Higginbothams, 3932.

³⁷ C. S. Srinivasachari, *New Review* 1941, pp. 367-385.



STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN COSMETICS AND PERFUMERY—THE GANDHAYUKTI SECTION OF THE VIṢṆUDHARMOTTARA AND ITS RELATION TO OTHER TEXTS ON THE GANDHAŚĀSTRA

By P. K. GODE

IN my studies in the History of Indian Cosmetics and Perfumery (*Gandhaśāstra*) so far published, I have analysed and made use of the following Sanskrit texts on the *Gandhaśāstra* :—

- (1) Two special treatises on the *Gandhaśāstra* (composed between c.A.D. 1300 and 1600) discovered by me, viz. (i) *Gandhasāra* of Gaṅgādhara and (ii) *Gandhanāda* with Marathi Commentary.¹
- (2) The chapter called “*Gandbādhikāra*” of a work on erotics called the *Nāgarasarvasva* by a Buddhist author Padmaśrī (About A.D. 1000).²
- (3) The *Gandhayukti* section of the *Agnipurāṇa* (Between A.D. 800 and 900).³
- (4) The *Gandhayukti* section of the *Bṛhatsambitā* of Varāhamihira (c.500 A.D.).⁴

The above sources prove beyond challenge the history of the *Gandhaśāstra* literature for more than 1500 years, though unfortunately the texts on this subject which have come down to us are few and fragmentary. It should, therefore, be our endeavour to link up every new source with the texts referred to above to enable us to have

¹ Vide *Journal of the Bombay University*, Sept. 1945, pp. 44-52; *New Indian Antiquary* Feb-March, 1945, 185-193.

² *Ibid*, pp. 51-52.

³ *Adyar Library Bulletin* Vol. IX. (Part 4.) 1945, pp. 143-151.

⁴ *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, July-August, 1945, pp. 149-156.

a. connected view of the history of the *Gandhasāstra* from the remotest antiquity to the present day.

I propose here to deal with the *Gandhayukti* section of the *Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa* (Khaṇḍa II, chap. 64—pp. 220—221 of Venkatesvar Press Edition, Bombay). This section reads as follows :—

“॥ पुष्करउवाच ॥

A 20 शोधनं वसनं चैव तथैव च विरेचनम् ।

भावना चैव पाकश्च बोधनं धूपनं तथा ॥ १ ॥

A 21 वासनं चैव निर्दिष्टं कर्माष्टकमिदं शुभम्⁵ ।

कपित्थविल्वजम्बाम्रबीजपूरकपल्लवैः ॥ २ ॥

A 22 कृत्वोदकं तु यद्द्रव्यं शोधितं शौचितं तु तत् ।

तेषामभावे शौचं तु मृतदर्शम्भसा भवेत् ॥ ३ ॥

तदभावे तु कर्तव्यं तदा मुस्ताम्भसा द्विज ।

शुष्कं शुष्कं पुनर्द्रव्यं पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ॥ ४ ॥

प्रक्षालितं चाप्यसकृद्वसितं तत्प्रकीर्तितम् ।

पञ्चपल्लवतोयेन क्वाथयित्वा पुनः पुनः ॥ ५ ॥

⁵ Compare the *Six* processes of manufacturing cosmetics mentioned in the परिभाषाप्रकरण of the गन्धसार of गङ्गाधर in the following verse :—

भावनं पाचनं बोधो वेधो धूपनवासने ।

एवं षडत्र कर्माणि द्रव्येषूक्तानि कोविदैः ॥ ६ ॥

Here I shall compare the verses on गन्धयुक्ति in the विष्णुधर्मोत्तर with those found in the अग्निपुराण (Venkateswar Press, Bombay). Chapter 224 (verses 19-42). [A 20=*Agnipurāṇa* Chap. 224 verse 20 and so on] :—

A 20—शौचंमाचमनं राम तथैव च विरेचनम् ।

भावनं चैव पाकश्च बोधनं धूपनं तथा ॥ २० ॥

A 21—वासनं चैव निर्दिष्टं कर्माष्टकमिदं स्मृतम् ।

कपित्थविल्वजम्बाम्रकरवीरकपल्लवैः ॥ २१ ॥

A 22—कृत्वोदकं तु यद्द्रव्यं शोधितं शोधनं तु तत् ।

तेषामभावे शौचं तु मृगदर्शम्भसा भवेत् ॥ २२ ॥

द्रव्यं संशोषितं कृत्वा चूर्णं तस्य तु कारयेत् ।
हरीतकीं ततः पिष्ट्वा पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ॥ ६ ॥
तेन पथ्याकषायेण तच्चूर्णं भावयेत्सकृत् ।
शोषितं शोधयेदेतद्विरेकं तत्प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ ७ ॥
ततस्तु गन्धद्रव्येण यथेष्टं कुङ्कुमादिना ।
भावयेत्तेन तद्द्रव्यं भावना सा प्रकीर्तिता ॥ ८ ॥
तेनैव भावयेद्द्रव्यं पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ।
आश्वत्थेनैव तेनाथ द्रव्यं राम तथास्तु तत् ॥ ९ ॥
मृदा पिहितसत्त्वौ तु मृण्मये भाजनद्वये ।
विपचेत्तु विधूमाग्नावतं धूमः पुनः पुनः ॥ १० ॥⁶
तावेव क्वाथयेत्तावत्तत्रैवानुगतो रसः ।
एतत्पाकविधानं ते पञ्चमं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ ११ ॥
ततस्तु भावनाद्रव्यं कल्कपिष्टं नियोजयत् ।
कल्कपिष्टे तथा द्रव्ये बोधनं परिकीर्तितम् ॥ १२ ॥
ततस्तु पूजयेद्द्रव्यं⁷ पूर्वमेव तु पथ्यया ।
ततस्तु गुरुशुक्तिभ्यां चन्दनागरुभिस्ततः ॥ १३ ॥

⁶ The *Gandhasāra* mentions different varieties of पाक such as—(1), पुटपाक, (2) गर्तपाक, (3) वेणुपाक, (4) दोलापाक, (5) खर्परपाक, (6) वैजयूरपाक, (7) कालपाक (See verses 8-17 of परिभाषाप्रकरण of गन्धसार—B.O.R. Institute MS in the Radḍi Collection). The पुटपाक and गर्तपाक are described in the गन्धसार as follows :—

“पंचपत्रपुटावद्धं मृल्लिप्तं चांगुलौन्नतम् ॥ ८ ॥
पचेत्क्वारीशके वह्नी पुटपाकोऽयमीरितः ।
गर्ते पात्रं गंधगर्भं कृत्वा पूर्य मृदावटम् ॥ ९ ॥
प्रज्वाल्योग्निस्तदुपरि गर्तपाको भवेदयम् ।”

⁷ The aromatic ingredients (गन्धद्रव्य) mentioned by Varāhamihira in the गन्धयुक्ति section of the बृहत्संहिता (c. A. D. 500) are :—“पत्र तुरुष्क वालतगरैः”, बकुल, चम्पक, जाती, त्वक्, अतिमुक्तक, कुस्तुभुर, शतपुष्पा, कुन्दरुक्, नख, प्रियङ्गु, गुडनख, गुग्गुलु, वालक, लाक्षा, मुरता, मांसी, चन्दन, हरीतकी, शङ्खधनद्रव, शैलक, श्रीसर्ज, उशीर, सूदमैला, “मृगकपूर”, कपूर, व्याघ्रनख, स्थक्का, अगुरु, दमनीक, तगर, चोरी, मलय, कस्तूरिका, शैलेय, सर्जरस, श्रीवासक, रोध्र, हिङ्गुल, केसर, गला, मरिच, जातीफल, ताम्बूल, पूगफल, कङ्कोल, लवलीफल,—I note here articles in the *Hobson-Jobson* (1903) on a few of the above ingredients :—Pages 152-153—CAMPHOR,

कर्पूरमृगदर्पाभ्यां ततश्चैनं धूपयेत् ।

इत्येतद्वासनं नाम कर्म तद्विहितं मया ॥ १४ ॥

ततस्तु गुलिकां कृत्वा यथाकाममतन्द्रितः ।

पुष्पैर्वकुलजातीनां तथान्येषां सुगन्धिभिः ॥ १४ ॥

छायासु शोष्यमाणस्य वासना क्रियते तु या ।

वासना सा विनिदिष्टा कर्मतच्चाष्टमं शुभम् ॥ १६ ॥

कर्माष्टकमिदं कृत्वा वचां पिण्डनिभां तथा ।

मुस्तं शैलेयकं वापि सेव्यं वा द्विजसत्तम ॥ १७ ॥

शोधयेद्गान्धिको विद्याद्यथावत्कर्म सेत्स्यति ।

निर्यासानां च पुष्पाणां कर्माष्टकमिदं शुभम् ॥ १८ ॥

विदुषा नैव कर्तव्यं कार्यमन्यत्र भार्गव ।

अशोधितैस्तथा धूपाः⁸ कार्या द्रव्यैर्यथाविधि ॥ १९ ॥

अतः परं तु ते योगान्काञ्चिद्वक्ष्यामि ताञ्छृणु ।

A 23 नखं कुष्ठं धनं मांसी स्पृक्त्वा शैलेयकं जलम् ॥ २० ॥

तथैव कुंकुमं लाक्षा चन्दनागुरुणी नतम् ।

A 24 सरला देवकाष्ठं च कर्पूरं कार्तया सह ॥ २१ ॥

बोलं कन्दूरकश्चैव गुग्गुलुः श्रीनिवासकः ।

--usages recorded are :— c.A.D 540 (*Caphura*, c.A.D. 940 (*Camphor*), A.D. 1298 (*Camfera*), etc.

Pages 913-914—TEMBOOL—usages recorded are from A.D. 1298 (*Tembul*) onwards.

Page 599—MUSK—(कर्पूरी) usages :—c.A.D. 390 (*muscus*) mentioned by St. Jerome; c.A.D. 545 (*Musk animal*) etc.

Pages 789-790—SANDAL (चन्दन)—Usages:—*Sandalwood* (c.A.D. 545) onwards.

Page 499—LAC (लाक्षा)—usages :—*Lac-dye* (c.A.D. 80-90) mentioned in *Periplus*.

⁸ The *Gandhanāda* (folios 45-47 of B.O.R-I, MS) describes the manufacture of different kinds of धूप, with fanciful names such as अनंगसुन्दर, कोलाहल, कुमारधूप, etc. The *Gandhasāra* also describes the preparation of धूप, (Vide folios 12-15 of B.O.R.I. MS of *Gandhasāra*).

A 23 नखं कुष्ठं धनं मांसी स्पृक्कशैलेयकं जलम् ।

तथैव कुंकुमं लाक्षा चन्दनागुरुनीरदम् ॥ २३ ॥

A 24 सरलं देवकाष्ठं च कर्पूरं कार्तया सह ।

वालः कुन्दूरकश्चैव गुग्गुलुः श्रीनिवासकः ॥ २४ ॥

- A 25 सह सर्जरसेनेयं धूपद्रव्यैकविंशतिः ॥ २२ ॥
धूपद्रव्यगणादस्मादेकविंशत्येच्छया ।
- A 26 द्वे द्वे द्रव्ये समादाय सर्जभागे नियोजयेत् ॥ २३ ॥
नवे पिण्याकवल्यैः संयोज्य मधुना तथा ।
- A 27 धूपयोग्या भवन्तीह यथावत्स्वेच्छया कृताः ॥ २४ ॥
त्वचं जातीफलं तैलं कुङ्कुमं ग्रन्थिपर्णकम् ।
- A 28 शैलेयं तगरं काष्ठं ताम्बूलं तगरं तथा ॥ २५ ॥
मांसी सरावकुष्ठं च नवद्रव्याणि निर्दिशेत् ।
- A 29 एतेभ्यस्तु समादाय द्रव्यं तत्र यथेच्छया ॥ २६ ॥
मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं कार्यं कन्दर्पवर्धनम् ।
- A 30 द्रुक्सुरानलदैस्तुल्यैर्वान्यकारसमायुतैः ॥ २७ ॥
स्नानमुत्पलगन्धि स्यात्सतैलं कुङ्कुमैर्युतम् ।
- A 31a जातीपुष्पसुगन्धि स्यात्तगरार्धेन योजितम् ॥ २८ ॥
बालकाञ्चनसंयुक्तं पाटलाकुसुमायते ।
- A 31b स व्यापकं स्याद्वकुलैस्तुल्यगन्धिमनोहरम् ॥ २९ ॥
नालिकावंशसंहितं कुट्टिपादेन चार्थकम् ।

- A 25 सह सर्जरसेनैवं धूपद्रव्यैकविंशतिः ।
धूपद्रव्यगणादस्मादेकविंशत्येच्छया ॥ २५ ॥
- A 26 द्वे द्वे द्रव्ये समादाय सर्जभागे नियोजयेत् ।
नखपिण्याकमल्यैः संयोज्य मधुना तथा ॥ २६ ॥
- A 27 धूपयोग्या भवन्तीह यथावत्स्वेच्छया कृताः ।
त्वचं नाडीफलं तैलं कुङ्कुमं ग्रन्थिपर्णकम् ॥ २७ ॥
- A 28 शैलेयं तगरं क्रान्तां चौलं कर्पूरमेव च ।
मांसी सुरां च कुष्ठं च स्नानद्रव्याणि निर्दिशेत् ॥ २८ ॥
- A 29 एतेभ्यस्तु समादाय द्रव्यत्रयमथेच्छया ।
मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं कार्यं कन्दर्पवर्धनम् ॥ २९ ॥
- A 30 त्वङ्मुखानलदैस्तुल्यैर्वालिकाईसमायुतैः ।
स्नानमुत्पलगन्धि स्यात् सतैलं कुङ्कुमायते ॥ ३० ॥
- A 31 जातीपुष्पसुगन्धि स्यात्तगरार्धेन योजितम् ।
सद्रयात्मकं स्याद्वकुलैस्तुल्यगन्धिमनोहरम् ॥ ३१ ॥

- द्विकेसरं वेणुपादं कुन्दपुष्पायते तथा ॥ ३० ॥
 शैलपादार्थसंयुक्तं व्यक्तं मदनकं भवेत् ।
 A 32 मञ्जिष्ठा तगरं बालं द्वयं व्याघ्रनखं नखम् ॥ ३१ ॥
 गन्धपत्रं च विन्यस्य गन्धतैलं^१ भवेच्छुभम् ।
 A 33 तैलं निषीडितं राम तिलैः पुष्पाधिवासितैः ॥ ३२ ॥
 वासना पुष्पसदृशं गन्धेन तु भवेद्द्रुतम् ।
 पूर्ववच्छोधयित्वा तु मुस्तं सेव्यं वचां निशाम् ॥ ३३ ॥
 अभीष्टमन्यत्कलुषं यथावदनुलेपयेत् ।
 उद्धृत्य चन्दनादि च शोधनं वमनं तथा ॥ ३४ ॥
 वर्जयित्वा विरेकं च शेषकर्माणि कारयेत् ।
 तद्वा भवति धर्मज्ञ वर्णकं त्रिदिवप्रियम् ॥ ३५ ॥
 पटवासांसि कार्याणि वर्णकैः श्लक्ष्णचूर्णितैः ।
 A 34 एलालवङ्गककोलजातीफलनिशाकराः ॥ ३६ ॥
 जातिपत्रिकया सार्द्धं स्वतन्त्रं मुखवासकम् ।

^१ Compare the चम्पकगन्धितैल, mentioned in the गन्धयुक्ति section of the *Brhatsamhitā* (c.A.D. 500) :—

“मञ्जिष्ठया व्याघ्रनखेन शुक्त्या
 त्वचा सकुष्ठेन रसेन चूर्णः ।
 तैलेन युक्तोऽर्कमयूखतप्तः
 करोति तच्चम्पकगन्धितैलम् ॥ ६६ ॥

This verse has been incorporated in the *Gandhasāra* (Folio 8 verse 24 of B.O.R.I. MS).

As regards “मृगदर्पयुतं स्नानं”, mentioned in verse 27 of the विष्णुधर्मोत्तर, (गन्धयुक्ति) compare the following verse of नागरसर्वस्व (गन्धाधिकार) :—

“त्वगगुरुमुस्तकतगरं चौरशठी ग्रन्थिपर्णकनखं च ।
 कस्तूरीसंयुक्तं स्नानीयं तत् प्रशस्यते सद्भिः ॥ १२ ॥
 —स्नानीयचूर्णवासः ।”

- A 31 मञ्जिष्ठा तगरं चैलं त्वचं व्याघ्रनखं नखम् ।
 गन्धपत्रं च विन्यस्य गन्धतैलं भवेच्छुभम् ॥ ३२ ॥
 A 32 तैलं निषीडितं राम तिलैः पुष्पाधिवासितैः ।
 वासनात्तत् पुष्पसदृशं गन्धेन तु भवेद्द्रुतम् ॥ ३३ ॥
 एलालवङ्गककोलजातीफलनिशाकराः ।
 जातीपत्रिकया सार्द्धं स्वतन्त्रा मुखवासकाः ॥ ३४ ॥

- A 35 कर्पूरं कुङ्कुमं कान्तं मृगदर्पं हरेणुकम् ॥ ३७ ॥
कङ्कालैलालवङ्गं च जातीकोशकमेव च ।
- A 36 दुक्पत्रं त्रुटिमुस्तं च लताकस्तूरिकं तथा ॥ ३८ ॥
कण्टकानि लवङ्गस्य फलपत्रैश्च जातितः ।
- A 37 कटुकं च फलं राम कर्षिकाण्डां प्रकल्पयेत् ॥ ३९ ॥
तच्चूर्णे खदिरं सारं दद्यात्तुल्यतुलार्पितम् ।
- A 38 सहकण्यारसेनास्य कर्तव्या गुलिकाः शुभाः ॥ ४० ॥
मुखे न्यस्ताः सुगंधास्ता मुखरोगविनाशनाः ।
- A 39 पूर्वं प्रक्षालितं सम्यक्पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ॥ ४१ ॥
शक्त्या तु गुलिकद्रव्यैर्वासिकं मुखवासकम् ¹⁰

¹⁰ Compare the following verses on मुखवास in the गन्धाधिकार of नागरसर्वस्व (p. 12 of Tripathi's Edition, Bombay, 1921).

“जातीफलकस्तूरीकर्पूरं चूतवारि-संस्थितम् ।
धूपितमगुरुकशिल्लकमधुगुडसितैश्च मुखवासः ॥ ७ ॥
क्रमवर्धितं त्वगेला मांसी शठ्यगुरु कुङ्कुमं चापि ।
धनचन्दनजातीफललवङ्गकङ्कालकर्पूरम् ॥ ८ ॥
अष्टांशवंशरोचनसुकलितमतिस्वल्पशर्करासहितम् ।
पिष्ट्वा सहकाररसैर्मुखवासो भूमिपालानाम् ॥ ९ ॥

See also ताम्बूलभोग (p. 85 of मानसोल्लास, Vol II, G.O.S., Baroda, 1939).
Verses 974-976 refer to a गुटिका prepared of खदिरकाथचूर्णं, कस्तूरिक्षोदं,
कर्पूररजस्, श्रीखण्डकल्क etc.

- A 35 कर्पूरं कुङ्कुमं कान्तं मृगदर्पं हरेणुकम् ।
कङ्कालैलालवङ्गं च जातीकोशकमेव च ॥ ३५ ॥
- A 36 त्वक्पत्रं त्रुटिमुस्तौ च लतां कस्तूरिकां तथा ।
कण्टकानि लवङ्गस्य फलपत्रैश्च जातितः ॥ ३६ ॥
- A 37 कटुकं च फलं राम कर्षिकाण्युपकल्पयेत् ।
तच्चूर्णे खदिरं सारं दद्यात्तुल्यं तु वासितम् ॥ ३७ ॥
- A 38 सहकाररसेनास्मात् कर्तव्याः गुटिकाः शुभाः ।
मुखन्यस्ताः सुगंधास्ता मुखरोगविनाशनाः ॥ ३८ ॥
- A 39 पूर्वं प्रक्षालितं सम्यक्पञ्चपल्लववारिणा ।
शक्त्या तु गुटिकाद्रव्यैर्वासितं मुखवासकम् ॥ ३९ ॥

A 40 कटुकं दन्तकाष्ठं च गोमूत्रे वासितं त्र्यहम् ॥ ४२ ॥
कृतं च पूगवद्राम¹¹ मुखसौगन्ध्यकारकम् ।

A 41 त्वक्पश्यथोः सभावशौ सितभागार्धसंयुतौ ॥ ४३ ॥
नागवल्लीसमो भाति मुखवासो मनोहरः ।

कटुकफलनताम्बुत्वक्वृटिव्याधिपत्रै—
नलदनतसुराभिस्तुल्यभागान्वितानि ।

द्विगुणितकृतमात्राप्रातिकल्लोलसैभ्यैः
शशिरसरसभोऽयं गन्धपत्रं विदध्यात् ॥ ४४ ॥

निहितमिदमनर्घं कर्णपत्रं युवत्याः
शमयति विविधानि श्रोत्रपालीगदानि ।

अपरमपि च यावत्काममामोदमत्तं
भ्रमदलिपटलेन व्याप्यते वक्त्रभागः ॥ ४५ ॥

इति श्रीविष्णुधर्मोत्तरे द्वितीयखण्डे मा० सं० रामं प्रति पुष्करोपाख्याने गन्ध-
युक्तिर्नाम चतुष्पण्डितमोऽध्यायः ॥ ६४ ॥

The above chapter is preceded by chapter 63 called
“भोज्यकल्पनाकथनम्” and is followed by chapter 65 called
“राजधर्मवर्णनम्”

¹¹ Compare the description of पूगवास in नागरसर्वस्व (c.A.D.1000)

“कुष्ठतगरजातीफलकर्पूरलवङ्गकैलाभिः ।

वरतनु वासय शीघ्रं पूगफलं भूमिपालानाम् ॥ ११ ॥

The सुश्रुतसंहिता (सूत्रस्थान,) Chap. 46, verses 201-204) refers to पूगवास
and its ingredients (See p. 441 of Vol. I of Marathi Trans. by
Krishnashastry Phadke, Bombay, 1921) :—

“कफपित्तहरं रुक्षं वक्त्रक्लेदमलापहम् ।

कषायमीषन्मधुरं किञ्चित्पूगफलं सरम् ॥ २०१ ॥

जातीकोशोऽथ कर्पूरं जातीकटुकयोः फलम् ।

कक्कोलकं लवङ्गं च तिक्तं कटु कफापहम् ॥ २०२ ॥

लघु तृष्णापहं वक्त्रक्लेददौर्गन्ध्यनाशनम् ।

सतिक्तः सुरभिः शीतः कर्पूरो लघुलेखनः ॥ २०३ ॥

तृष्णायां मुखशोषे च वैरम्ये चापि पूजितः ।”

A 40 कटुकं दन्तकाष्ठं च गोमूत्रे वासितं त्र्यहम् ।
कृतं च पूगवद्राम मुखसौगन्ध्यकारकम् ॥ ४० ॥

A 41 त्वक्पश्यथोः सभावशौ शशिभागार्धसंयुतौ ।
नागवल्ली समो भाति मुखवासो मनोहरः ॥ ४१ ॥

In the foregoing extract on गन्धयुक्ति from the *Viṣṇudharmottara* I find verses 20 to 41 on गन्धयुक्ति from chapter 224 of the *Agnipurāṇa*. To enable scholars to mark the few textual variants I have reproduced the verses from the *Agnipurāṇa* below the footnotes as I found them in the printed edition of this Purāṇa (Venkateswar Press, Bombay). The following table will, however, show at a glance the relation of the *Gandhayukti* verses of the *Agnipurāṇa* with those in the *Gandhayukti* chapter of the *Viṣṇudharmottara* :—

विष्णुधर्मोत्तर Khaṇḍa II Chapter 64 (गन्धयुक्ति)	अग्निपुराण Chap. 224 (राजधर्म)	वि० ध० Kh. II Chap. 64 (गन्धयुक्ति)	अग्निपुराण Chap. 224 (राजधर्म)
Verse 1	A 20	Verse „ 23 ^b	A 26
„ 2	A 21	„ 24 ^a	A 27
„ 3	A 22	„ 25 ^a	A 28
„ 4		„ 26 ^b	A 29
„ 5		„ 27 ^a	A 30
„ 6		„ 28 ^b	—A 31a }
„ 7		„ 29 ^a	—A 31b }
„ 8		„ 30	
„ 9		„ 31 ^a	A 32
„ 10		„ 32 ^b	A 33
„ 11		„ 33 ^b	
„ 12		„ 34	
„ 13		„ 35	
„ 14		„ 36 ^a	A 34
„ 15		„ 37 ^b	A 35
„ 16		„ 38 ^a	A 36
„ 17		„ 39 ^b	A 37
„ 18		„ 40 ^a	A 38
„ 19		„ 41 ^b	A 39
„ 20 ^b	A 23	„ 42 ^b	A 40
„ 21 ^a	A 24	„ 43 ^b	A 41
„ 22 ^a	A 25	„ 44 ^c	
„ 23 ^b		„ 45	

The above table gives an impression that the *Gandbayukti* verses of the *Agnipurāṇa*, which are about half of the *Gandbayukti* verses of the *Viṣṇudharmottara*, have been borrowed by the *Agnipurāṇa* from the *Viṣṇudharmottara*.

I cannot say if both these Purāṇas have borrowed their *Gandbayukti* verses from an earlier common source. We must hunt up the *Gandbayukti* texts in other Purāṇas and correlate them with those in the *Bṛhatsamhitā*, *Viṣṇudharmottara*, *Agnipurāṇa*, *Nāgarasarvasva*, *Gandhasāra*, *Gandhavāda* etc. In this way alone we can put the history of the *Gandhasāstra* on a secure basis.

Gaṅgādhara in his *Gandhasāra* tells us that the *Gandhasāstrā* is helpful in the worship of gods (देवानां शुभगंधधूपसहितस्यार्चविधेरपेक्षम्). This statement is corroborated by the references to perfumes prescribed for religious worship. I note below the following extracts from the *Kālikāpurāṇa* (*Venkateswar Press, Bombay*, śaka 1829—1907) which describe the perfumes to be used for such worship :—Chapter 73 (folio 189)—Description of गन्ध to be used for the worship of goddess—

“गन्धं च सम्यक् शृणुतं पुत्रौ बेतालभैरवौ ।

चूर्णीकृतो वा घृष्टो वा दाहाकर्षित एव वा ॥ ३७ ॥

रसः सम्मर्दजो वापि प्राण्यंगोद्भव एव वा ।

गन्धः पञ्चविधः प्रोक्तो देवानां प्रीतिदायकः ॥ ३८ ॥

गन्धचूर्णं गन्धपत्रं चूर्णं सुमनसस्तथा ।

प्रशस्तगन्धयुक्तानां पत्रचूर्णानि यानि तु ॥ ३९ ॥

तानि गन्धवहानि स्युः स गन्धः प्रथमः स्मृतः ।

घृष्टो मलयजो गन्धः स चूर्णीकृतमेरुणा ॥ ४० ॥

अगुरुप्रभृतिश्चापि यस्य पंकः प्रदीयते ।

गन्धो दृष्ट्वा मघृष्टोऽयं द्वितीयः परिकीर्तितः ॥ ४१ ॥

देवदार्वगुरुर्वह्मशालशारान्तचन्दनाः ।

प्रियादीनाञ्च यो दग्ध्वा गृह्यते दाहजो रसः ॥ ४२ ॥

स दाहाकषितो गन्धः तृतीयः परिकीर्तितः ।
सुगन्धकरवीबिल्वगन्धीनि तिलकं तथा ॥ ४३ ॥
प्रभृतीनां रसो योसौ निःपीडय परिगृह्यते ।
स सम्मर्दोद्भवो गन्धः सम्मर्दज इतीष्यते ॥ ४४ ॥
मृगनाभिसमुद्भूतः तत्कोषोद्भव एव वा ।
गन्धः प्राणग्रंजः प्रोक्तो मोददः स्वर्गवासिनाम् ॥ ४५ ॥
कर्पूरगन्धसाराद्याः क्षोदे घृष्टे च संस्थिताः ।
चन्द्रभागादयश्चापि रसे पंके च संगताः ॥ ४६ ॥
गन्धसारं सर्वरसं गन्धादौ च प्रयुज्यते ।
मृगनाभिर्भवेद् घृष्टश्चूर्णोप्यन्यस्य योगतः ॥ ४७ ॥
एवं सर्वं तु सर्वत्र गन्धो भवति पञ्चधा ।
घृष्टादिभावादन्योन्यं गन्धः प्रीतिकरः परः ॥ ४८ ॥
गन्धस्य विस्तरो भेदः प्रोक्तः कालीयकादयः ।
सर्वः पञ्चविधेष्वेव प्रविष्टो भवति क्षणात् ॥ ४९ ॥
गन्धो मलयजो यस्तु दैवे पित्र्ये च संमतः ।
तस्य पंको रसो वापि चूर्णो वा विष्णुतुष्टिदः ॥ ५० ॥
सर्वेषु गन्धजातेषु प्रशस्तो मलयोद्भवः ।
तस्मात्सर्वप्रयत्नेन दद्यान्मलयजं सदा ॥ ५१ ॥
कृष्णागुरुः सकर्पूरः सहितो मलयोद्भवैः ।
वैष्णवी प्रीतिदो गन्धः कामाख्यायाश्च भैरव ॥ ५२ ॥
कुङ्कुमागुरुकस्तूरीचन्द्रभागैः समीकृतैः ।
त्रिपुराप्रीतिदो गन्धस्तथा चण्ड्याश्च शस्यते ॥ ५३ ॥
दैवतोद्देशपूर्वेण गन्धं संपूज्य साधकः ।
दैवायेष्टाय वितरेत्सर्वसिद्धिप्रदं सदा ॥ ५४ ॥
गन्धेन लभते कामान् गन्धो धर्मप्रदः सदा ।
अर्थानां साधको गन्धः गन्धे मोक्षः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ ५५ ॥¹²

¹² Gangādhara in his *Gandhasāra* calls the गन्धशास्त्र as त्रिवर्त्मफलद i.e. fulfilling the three ends of human life viz. (1) धर्म, (2), अर्थ and (3) काम, He also calls the गन्धशास्त्र as "देवानां...अर्चाविधेरूपकम्" i.e. useful for the

The foregoing description of the different गन्ध and their application in the worship of deities is sufficiently informative. गन्ध is one of the five accessories of religious worship mentioned by the *Kālikāpurāṇa* in the line "गन्धं पुष्पं च धूपं च दीपं नैवेद्यमेव च" (chap. 73, verse, 101) and also described at length in the same context. Of the two items of religious worship (अर्चाविधि) viz., "गन्धधूप" mentioned by the *Gandhasāra* I have already recorded above the testimony of the *Kālikāpurāṇa* about गन्ध. I shall now record its description of धूप and its varieties as used in worship. This description reads as follows :—

Chap. 73 (folio 192) :—

"एवं वा कथितो दीपो धूपं च शृणुतं सुतौ ।
नासाक्षिरन्ध्रमुखदः सुगन्धोत्तिमनोहरः ॥ ३२ ॥
दह्यमानस्य काष्ठस्य प्रयतस्येतरस्य च ।
परागस्याथवा धूमो निस्तापो यस्य जायते ॥ ३३ ॥
स धूप इति विज्ञेयो देवानां तुष्टिदायकः ।
राशीकृतैर्ज्ञैश्चैकत्र तैर्द्रव्यैः परिपूजयेत् ॥ ३४ ॥
ओधान्निवत्ततां कृत्वा न तत्फलमवाप्नुयात् ।
श्रीचन्दनं च सरलः शालः कृष्णागुरुस्तथा ॥ ३५ ॥
उदयः सुरथस्कन्दो रक्तविद्रुम एव च ।
पीतशालः परिमलो विमर्दीकाशलस्तथा ॥ ३६ ॥
नमरुद्वेवदारुश्च बिल्वसारोऽथ खादिरः ।
सन्तानः पारिजातश्च हरिचन्दनवत्तलभौ ॥ ३७ ॥
वृक्षेषु धूपाः सर्वेषां प्रीतिदाः परिकीर्तिताः ।
अरालः सह सूत्रेण श्रीवासः पट्टवासकः ॥ ३८ ॥
कर्पूरः श्रीकरश्चैव परागः श्रीहरामलौ ।
सर्वोपधीव ज्ञातीव वराहश्चूर्ण उत्कलः ॥ ३९ ॥

worship of Gods. This statement corresponds to the statement of the *Kālikāpurāṇa* गन्धे मोक्षः प्रतिष्ठितः

It will thus be seen that गन्धशास्त्र is useful for fulfilling the four ends of human life, viz, धर्म, अर्थ, काम and मोक्ष.

जातीकोषस्य चूर्णं च गन्धः कस्तूरिका तथा ।
 श्रोत्रे वृत्ते च गदिता धूपा एते उदाहृताः ॥ १४० ॥
 यक्षधूपो वृक्षधूपः श्रीपिण्डोऽगुरुभर्भरः ।
 पत्रिवाहः पिण्डधूपः सुगोलः कण्ठ एव च ॥ ४१ ॥
 अन्योन्ययोगा निर्यासा धूपा एते प्रकीर्तिताः ।
 एतैर्विधूपयेद्देवान्धूमिभिः कृष्णवर्त्मना ॥ ४२ ॥
 येषां धूपोद्भवैर्घ्राणैस्तुष्टिं गच्छन्ति जन्तवः ।
 निर्यासश्च परागश्च काण्ठं गन्धं तथैव च ॥ ४३ ॥
 कृत्रिमश्चेति पञ्चैते धूपाः प्रीतिकराः पराः ।
 न यक्षधूपं वितरेन्माधवाय कदाचन ॥ ४४ ॥
 न रक्तं विद्रुमं मह्यं सुरथं कद्रिलं तथा ।
 यक्षधूपः पुत्रिवाहः पिण्डधूपः सुगोलकः ॥ ४५ ॥
 कृष्णागुरुः सर्पूरो महामायाप्रियः स्मृतः ।
 वृक्षधूपेन वा देवीं महामायां¹³ प्रपूजयेत् ॥ ४६ ॥
 मेदोमज्जासमायुक्तान्न धूपान्विनियोजयेत् ।
 परकीयांस्तथाघ्रातांस्तेपि कृत्याभिर्मर्हितान् ॥ ४७ ॥
 पुष्पं धूपं च गन्धं च उपचारांस्तथापरान् ।
 घ्रात्वा निवेद्य देवेभ्यो नरो नरकमाप्नुयात् ॥ ४७ ॥
 न भूमौ वितरेद्धूपं नासनेन घटे तथा ।
 यथा तथाधारगतं कृत्वा तद्विनिवेदयेत् ॥ ४९ ॥
 रक्तविद्रुमशाली च सुरथः सुरलस्तथा ।
 सन्तानको नमेरुश्च कालागुरुसमन्वितः ॥ १५० ॥

¹³ Cf. the use of incense in Egyptian sacrifice as illustrated by a wall-painting in the *Tomb of Two Sculptors (about 1400 B.C.) No. 92—A sacrifice to the Gods—Neb Amūn accompanied by his mother, Thepu, pours oil of incense over braziers filled with offerings, among which hot coals have been scattered, thus causing the oil to be ignited. The flames are to be seen against the papyrus mat which holds the four jars of ointment. A formula records the presenting of incense and sacred gum to Amūn, Osiris, Anūbis and other deities. A servant assists the performance of the ceremony. (See pp. 34-35 of *Egyptian Wall-paintings from Tombs and Palaces of the XVIII and XIX Dynasties (1600-1200 B.C.)* Metropolitan Museum of New York, 1930).*

जातीकोषाक्षसंयुक्तो धूपः कामेश्वरीप्रियः ।

त्रिपुण्यायास्तथैवायं मातृणामपि नित्यशः ॥ १५१ ॥

सर्वेषां पीठदेवानां रुद्रादीनां च पुत्रक ।

एष वा कथितो धूपः शृणुतं नेत्ररञ्जनम् ॥ १५२ ॥

येन तुष्यति कामाख्या त्रिपुरा वैष्णवी तथा ।

.....

चतुर्वर्गप्रदो धूपः कामदं नेत्ररञ्जनम् ।

तस्माद्द्रव्यमिदं दद्याद्देवेभ्यो भविततो नरः ॥ ६१ ॥'

The above discourse on the use of धूप in religious worship may now be compared with the following section called धूपभोग¹⁴ in the मानसोल्लास of the Cālukya King Someśvara (c.A.D. 1130):—

“अधुना धूपभोगोऽयं वर्ण्यते सौरभोत्कटः ।

लाक्षा गुग्गुलु कर्पूर रालकुण्डुसिल्हकम् ॥ ९७ ॥

श्रीखण्डं दाहं सरलं लघुकोष्ठं च बालकैः ।

मांसीकुङ्कुमपथ्या च (श्च) कस्तूरीपूतिबीजकैः ॥ ९८ ॥

शङ्खनाभिनखैश्चैव सितामधुघृतं गुडः ।

समान्येतानि चूर्णानि द्रवद्रव्यं विहाय च ॥ ९९ ॥

द्विगुणं लघुकर्पूरं चूर्णधूपोऽयमुत्तमः ।

एतान्येव हि सिल्हेन मिश्रयेन्मधुसर्पिषा ॥ १७०० ? ॥

गुडेन पिण्डयेत्पश्चात् पिण्डधूपो वरो मतः ।

द्रव्याण्येतानि तोयेन पिष्टानि मधुसर्पिषा ॥ १ ॥

वर्तिरूपाणि शुष्काणि वर्तिधूपो मनोहरः ।

रीतिरूपमयो वापि सुवर्णघटितोऽथ वा ॥ २ ॥

खगो वाऽपि मृगो वाऽपि सरन्ध्रः सम्पुटात्मकः ।

अङ्गारगर्भिते (तो) पिण्डेनान्वितो धूपमुद्गिरेत् ॥ ३ ॥

मुखकर्णादिभिश्छिद्रैः पिण्डधूपे त्वयं क्रमः ।

अङ्गारगर्भिते पात्रे चक्रदण्डेन संयुते ॥ ४ ॥

विकिरेद्धूपचूर्णं तद्वारं वारमिति क्रमः ।

दन्तेन रचिते श्लक्ष्णे सुपात्रे बहुदण्डकैः ॥ ५ ॥

¹⁴ See pp. 144-145 of *Mānasollāsa* (G.O.S. Baroda, 1939), Vol. II.

दण्डेन वा समायुक्ते धूपने सूचिसंयुते ।
 सूचिकाग्रे विनिक्षिप्य वर्त्ति सन्धुक्ष्य वह्निना ॥ ६ ॥
 स्थगयेत्सम्प (म्पु) टेनाथ रन्ध्रैर्धूपो विनिःसरेत् ।
करण्डं दण्डसंयुक्तं पाणिना परिवर्त्तयेत् ॥ ७ ॥
 आत्मनोऽपि मुखं क्वापि प्रेयसीवदनेषु वा ।
 करण्डकमदण्डं तु धूपवर्त्तिसमन्वितम् ॥ ८ ॥
 अंशुकान्तं क्षिपेद्वापि खोम्पके वाऽपि निक्षिपेत् ।
 धूपयेत् शुभां शय्यां वसनेनावगुण्ठिताम् ॥ ९ ॥
 पञ्जसैर्घ्रातवासांसि पिण्डकैश्चूर्णकैरपि ।
 गृहं च पिहितद्वारं निरोधितगवाक्षकम् ॥ १० ॥
 धूपयेद्वहलैर्धूपैः पिण्डधूमसमुद्भवैः ।
 विलासचतुराणां हि नृपाणां च विनोदिनाम् ॥ ११ ॥
 धूपभोगोऽयमाख्यातः सोमेश्वरमहीभुजा ।
भूलोकमल्लदेवेन धूपभोगोऽयमीरितः ॥ १२ ॥

The *Gandhasāra* of Gaṅgādhara states that the *Gandhasāstra* or science of cosmetics and perfumery contributes to the pleasures of kings (राज्ञां तोषकरम्). This remark is substantiated by the above section on धूपभोग composed by a king himself who expressly states that it is meant for royal use (विलासचतुराणां हि नृपाणां च विनोदिनाम् । धूपभोगोऽयमाख्यातः etc.).

While the sections on *Gandhayukti* in the *Viṣṇudharmottara* and the *Agnipurāṇa* describe the manufacture of cosmetics and perfumery, the extracts from the *Kālikāpurāṇa* and the *Mānasollāsa* (c.A.D. 1130) illustrate the use of perfumes in sacred and secular spheres of Hindu life in medieval India (between A. D. 600 and 1300). Before we attempt a treatise on the history of Indian *Gandhasāstra* it is necessary to exploit fully all available sources which contain references to the *Gandhasāstra* either on its technical or cultural side. My own studies in the history of the *Gandhasāstra* so far published have been designed with a

view to providing enough material to other scholars who want to pursue this subject further on the strength of new sources, either Sanskrit or non-Sanskrit. The identification of the several aromatic ingredients mentioned in the texts on the *Gandhaśāstra* will have to be studied both from the technical and historical points of view but I must leave this subject to more competent students of this subject than myself. My own interest in this subject is purely historical and cultural.

MRCCHAKATĪKA—A STUDY IN TIME ANALYSIS

By K. R. PISHAROTI

AMONGST the three dramatic unities of action, of character and of time, the least attended to by dramatists is the unity of time. In this respect the author of the *Mrcchakatika* stands unique. He has observed the unity of time to a remarkable extent; not only that, he has deliberately used a peculiar mode of time treatment, which has come to be known as *double time theory* in Shakespeare dramatic criticism.

The drama¹ opens at nightfall. The Vidūṣaka states that it is already dusk and he dares not venture out then into the public thoroughfare full of *Gaṇikās*, *Viṭas* and *Cetas*.² Again, Vasantasenā evades Śākāra successfully, thanks to the growing darkness, the intensity of which is stressed also by Viṭa and by Śākāra³. Thus the scene takes place in the early part of the night, and it comes to a close with the rise of the moon⁴.

The second act begins early in the morning as clearly indicated by the reference to bathing and *Deva-pūjā*⁵; the

¹ The references given here are to the 1910 edition of the text, issued by the *Nirnayasagar Press*, Bombay.

² Vide, p. 11.

अन्यच्चैतस्यां प्रदोषवेलायां राजमार्गे गणिका विटारश्चेटाः राजवल्लभाश्च पुरुषाः संचरन्ति ।

³ Vide p. 26.

शकार—भाव, भाव, बलीयसी खल्वन्धकारे मायराशिप्रविष्टेव मसीगुटिका दृश्यमानैव प्रणष्टा वसन्तसेना ।

विटः—अहो बलवान्धकारः । तथा हि cf. verses 33, 34 also verse 35.

⁴ Vide p. 41.

चारुदत्त-मैत्रेय भवतु । कृतं प्रदीपिकाभिः । पश्य verse 57.

⁵ Vide p. 45.

(उपसृत्य) चेटी-मातादिशति स्नात्वा भूत्वा देवतानां पूजां निर्वर्तय इति । वसन्तसेना—चेटी, विज्ञापय मातरं 'अद्य न स्नास्यामि । तद्ब्राह्मण एव देवपूजां निर्वर्तयतु इति ।

incidents described here take place *presumably*⁶ the very next morning, as the love-lorn condition of Vas° and the reference to *nyāsa* suggest⁷; and it must have come to a close early in the forenoon itself. The two incidents of the gambler⁸ and the elephant⁹ are introduced to serve as a *make believe* of the passage of a longer period of time for the act. Really the incidents could not, however, have occupied more than an hour or so and take place, we may say, between 8 and 10 A.M. On the same day Act III opens late in the first half of the night, past, however, the usual time for retiring as evidenced by the stage direction¹⁰ and closes just before before day-break¹¹.

Some definite interval of time must have elapsed, it may be argued, between Acts I and III. The first Act begins in the evening and, passing through a very dark dusk, ends with the rise of the moon¹². This means it takes place a couple of days after the full moon, so that it might begin in darkness and end with the rise of the moon. The third Act describes the setting of the moon somewhere about

⁶ The listlessness of Vasantasenā certainly indicates that this act follows immediately the incidents of the previous evening.

⁷ Vide p. 45.

मदनिका-किमत एव सोलंकारः तस्य हस्ते निक्षिप्तः ।

⁸ This is important, since he helps to rescue Vas., when she was left for dead after strangulation by Śākara. This character has to play an important part in the resolution of the story.

⁹ This serves an important purpose from the point of view of emotion delineating. The introduction of the *Prāvaraka* inflames her love longings and she rushes up the terrace to have a look at him.

¹⁰ Vide p. 72.

(निद्रां नाटयन् 'तं तस्य स्वरसंक्रमं इति पुनः पठति' विदूषकः—अपि निद्राति भवान् इत्यादि ।

¹¹ Vide p. 74.

चारुदत्तः—अहमपि कृतशौचः सन्ध्यामुपासते ।

¹² Vide reference given in note 4 *ante*.

midnight,¹³ and it means that this act takes place a few days after the New moon day. Hence apparently there must be assumed an interval of about a *pakṣa*, or a fortnight, between these two Acts.

This assumption is not, however, justified by the situation presented. In the first place there is, indeed, no reason, expressed or understood why Cārudatta should not have been relieved of the burden of the *Nyāsa*. In the second place, that it is a *nyāsa* has been categorically stated¹⁴; it is also stated that the residence of Cārudatta is no safe place for keeping it¹⁵, and Cārudatta informs Vidūṣaka that it is not for a *long period*.¹⁶ And lastly, leaving the *nyāsa* with Cārudatta is certainly creating a source of worry and anxiety for him, and Vasantasenā would be the last person to do so. The purpose with which Vasantasenā leaves her ornaments with Cārudatta is not to safeguard them—for, notice, Vasantasenā could, indeed, have carried them with her at once, because Cārudatta was escorting her,—but to leave open an opportunity to meet him again¹⁷. Again, Cārudatta directs that Vidūṣaka is to safeguard it during night and Vardhamānaka, during day time¹⁸.

¹³ Vide p. 73 :

शार्वलिकः—(नभो विलोक्य) अये कथमस्तमुपगच्छति स भगवान् मृगाङ्कः ।
तथाहि—

घनपटलतमोनिहृदतारा रजनिरियं जननीव संवृणोति ।

¹⁴ Vide p. 40.

वसन्तसेना—पुरुषेण न्यासा निक्षिप्यन्ते न पुनर्गृहेषु ॥

चारुदत्तः—धिङ्मूर्ख, न्यासः खल्वयम् ॥

¹⁵ Vide p. 9.

चारुदन्तः—अयोग्यमिदं न्यासस्य गृहम् ।

¹⁶ Vide p. 40.

चारुदत्तः—अचिरेणैव कालेन ।

¹⁷ Vide p. 45 : the last two sentences ; vide also p. 93.

¹⁸ Vide p. 41.

चारुदत्तः—इदं च सुवर्णभाण्डं रक्षितव्यं त्वया रात्रौ वर्धमानकालेन दिवा ।

When this is read with the statement of Vardhamānaka¹⁹, the normal conclusion is that Act III follows close upon Act I, and the statement of Vidūṣaka²⁰ indicates that he is yet to accustom himself to safeguarding a trust. The character of Cārudatta is such that he should return it at the earliest possible opportunity, and the motive of Vasantasenā requires that she should go and claim it at the earliest possible opportunity and thus have the pleasure of meeting him again. Thus the nature of the situation presented does not justify the assumption of a *pakṣa* between Acts I and III. Of course, the painting of the picture of Cārudatta²¹ does not necessitate any long interval of time at all, for a practised artist could easily paint a picture, particularly when it is intended not for public exhibition, but for self-satisfaction²².

Besides, no interval could reasonably be supposed to exist between Acts I and II or between Acts II and III. The opening of Act II²³ indicates that it naturally enough comes the morning after the events of Act I. Act I describes the first meeting of Cārudatta and Vasantasenā, and Act II describes the natural result thereof, and the love-lorn condition²⁴ of Vasantasenā is emphasised by the revelation

¹⁹ Vide p. 72.

चेष्टः—आर्य मैत्रेय, एतत् सुवर्णभाण्डं मम दिवा तव रात्रौ च । तद्गृहाण ।

²⁰ Ibid.

विदूषकः—अद्यापि एतत् तिष्ठति । किमत्रोज्जयिन्यां चौरौपि नास्ति यः एतं दास्याः पुत्रं निद्राचौरं नापहरति ।

²¹ Vide p. 85 : opening sentence.

²² Note, for instance, Śakuntalā and Ratnāvalī do it in a trice.

²³ Vide p. ?

चेष्टी—एवार्था हृदयेव किमपि अलिखन्ती तिष्ठति ।

This is the only interpretation possible. Vas. must be ruminating over her meeting with Cār. the previous evening. Such an attitude would be out of place, if this scene were to take place some days hence.

²⁴ Compare the last few sentences of Act II, p. 67.

of certain traits of Cārudatta²⁵ by other incidents which emphasise his greatness and which, therefore, steep her all the more in pangs of love. She tries to get relief for her love-sick condition by painting a picture of Cārudatta, and it is with this that Act IV opens²⁶. The assumption of any interval between Acts I and II or between II and III is, therefore, out of tune with the incidents described therein, and it is particularly so with reference to emotion delineation.

Thus from the point of the development of theme and of emotion no interval could exist between Acts I and III. And this, therefore, raises the question: how to reconcile the description of the rise of the moon in Act I²⁷ with the description of the setting of the moon in Act III²⁸, descriptions which are appropriate in the particular contexts? There is probably a *lacunae* in the text²⁹, which is only too well indicated; or, we may assume, it is a particular dramatic device deliberately introduced by the poet to produce the impression of the passage of a longer period of time to enhance the effect of emotion delineation—a method which Shakespeare has successfully used and which in Shakespearean criticism is termed *double time* theory.

²⁵ Vide p. 58.

संवाहकः—यस्तादृशः प्रियदर्शनः... शरणागतवत्सलश्च ।

Vide also p. 60.

संवाहकः—पृथिव्यां त्वमेको जीवति । शेषः पुनः जनः इवसति ।

²⁶ Vide p. 85, note the opening sentence of Act IV.

चेटी—एवार्था चित्रफलकनिषण्णदृष्टिर्मदनिकया सह किमपि मन्त्रयन्ती तिष्ठति ।

Presumably, the painting must have been finished the previous evening, after Vas. sees Cār. walking along in broad day-light, as indicated in the last sentences of Act II.

²⁷ Vide the verse quoted in note 4 *ante*.

²⁸ Vide text quoted in note 13 *ante*.

²⁹ Compare for instance verse 57 and the text following. Vid. says that there is no oil in the house for a light and then Cār. peeps out and finds that the moon has risen and in the next *Cūrṇika* he says—

Act IV begins early the third morning. Vidūṣaka reaches the residence of Vasantasenā and hands over *Ratnāvalī*, as desired by Cārudatta at day break³⁰ after the theft. Vidūṣaka must be reaching her house after the morning has well advanced and after Śārvalika has gone and offered the stolen ornaments to his beloved Madanikā³¹. Towards the close of the act, Vidūṣaka returns to Cārudatta with the message that Vasantasenā would visit him at dusk³² the same evening; and, indeed, Vasantasenā prepares to start for the residence of Cārudatta immediately Vidūṣaka leaves³³.

Act V is in continuation of Act IV. For, in the first place, there is the echo of the words of Vasantasenā with reference to the *Akālavarṣa*³⁴; secondly, Cārudatta is uneasy

Then he re-enters his house. The information given clearly shows that the residence of Vas. was away from that of Cār. and he certainly could not conduct himself thus. It is patent that there is a *lacuna* here. May be in the portion lost, there is some indication, regarding the period of the *nyāsa*.

³⁰ Vide the last sentence in Act III. Vid. starts at day-break and Cār. proceeds to discharge his morning rites.

³¹ This is the main theme of the first part of the Act.

³² Vide p. 112.

वसन्तसेना—अहमपि प्रशये अयं प्रेक्षितुमागच्छामि इति ।

³³ Compare the statement of Vas.

हृज्जे हारं गृहीत्वा शीघ्रमागच्छ ।

This suggests not merely the eagerness of Vas. to start for the residence of Cār., but also it is time to start. This, then, forms a deliberate statement made to bridge over the time difficulty.

³⁴ Vide p. 113, Verse 33 :

चेटी—उन्नमत्यकालदुर्दिनम् ।

वसन्तसेना—उदयन्तु नाम मेघा भवतु निशा वर्षतिमिरं पततु ।

Cf. also p. 114.

चारु.—उन्नमत्यकालदुर्दिनम् । . . . अकालिकं दुर्दिनमन्तरिक्षम् ।

Cf. also p. 123.

विदूषकः—भो अपि जानासि ईदृशे दुर्दिने आगतेति ।

that Vidūṣaka has not yet returned and thirdly³⁵, Vidūṣaka on his return, makes his own comment on the attitude of Vasantasenā³⁶ and her accepting *Ratnāvali*³⁷. Soon after³⁸, Vasantasenā enters the house of Cārudatta, after some parley with the Viṭa³⁹, in consonance with her promise⁴⁰. The reference made by Cārudatta to the rainbow⁴¹ shows that the act closes before nightfall.⁴²

³⁵ Vide p. 115.

चिरं खलु कालो मैत्रेयस्य वसन्तसेनाया सकामं गतस्य नाद्याप्यागच्छति ।

³⁶ Vide p. 115.

विदूषकः—न तथाहं भणितः 'आर्य मैत्रेय विश्राम्यतां मल्लकेन पानीयमपि पीत्वा गम्यतामिति ।

This is a clear statement, showing that Vidū. must have taken only the minimum time at the residence of Vas. ; and the nature of his mission is clear indication that he could not have tarried on the way.

³⁷ Vide p. 116. Note the conversation between Cār. and Vidū. ; also the statement of Vidū. on p. 118.

विदूषकः—भणितं च मया भण चारुदत्तं अद्य प्रदोषे मयात्रागन्तव्यमिति । तत्तर्कयामि रत्नावल्यापरितुष्टा परं याचितुमागमिष्यतीति ।

This would show that *Pradoṣa* is yet to be.

³⁸ Immediately after the statement quoted in the note *ante*, Ceta enters to announce Vas.

³⁹ The conversation between Vidū. and Ceta could be justified only on the ground of *doubling time*, for the humour is feeble and delay is inappropriate.

⁴⁰ Note Vas. has come true to the appointed time : vide p. 124, verse 14 :

मैघैर्वृत्तश्चन्द्रमाः

Also verse 15.

मार्गं रूणद्वि कुपितेव निशा सपत्नी ।

Also verse 17.

हरति करसमूहं खे शशाङ्कस्य मेघः ।

⁴¹ Vide p. 135.

चारु—अये इन्द्रधनुः । प्रिये पश्य, पश्य ।

⁴² It is interesting to notice the reference to the moon. This is quite consistent with what is mentioned in Act III. Note here also the *make believe* of the passage of time is introduced through a long conversation between Vas. and Viṭa.

Cārudatta has necessarily to send Vidūṣaka at break of day to Vasantasenā on account of the loss of the *nyāsa*; and Vasantasenā need reach the residence of Cārudatta only in the evening. Yet the incidents of Acts IV and V are described as run on ones. The undramatic description of the palatial residence of Vasantasenā the inaptly long conversation between Ceṭa and Vidūṣaka, interlaced with some with and humour, and between Viṭa and Vasantasenā, describing thunder and rain,—these, we believe, have been *deliberately* introduced by the poet to serve as a *make-believe* for doubling time and thus bridge over the time difficulty.

The incidents described in the Acts VI—X take place the day following Acts IV and V. Act VI opens with the maids waking up⁴³ Vasantasenā at the house of Cārudatta⁴⁴ and herself getting ready to go to Cārudatta in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden, as desired by him⁴⁵; and the first stage closes with Vasantasenā getting into a conveyance and starting thither⁴⁶. Act VII opens with Cārudatta in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden awaiting Vasantasenā⁴⁷ and growing anxious over her continued delay; and it closes with the arrival of his conveyance, not carrying Vasantasenā, as he expected, but the escaped royal prisoner

⁴³ Vide p. 136 opening sentences.

चेटी—उत्तिष्ठतु, उत्तिष्ठतु आर्या। प्रभातं संवृत्तम्।

⁴⁴ Vide the conversation between Vas. and Ceṭi, p. 137. This is also clear from the present she makes to the son of Cāru.

⁴⁵ Vide the opening sentences of the act. Notice, however, one sentence therein:

चेटी—योजय रात्रौ प्रवहणं वसन्तसेना गच्छतु।

Presumably there is a different reading.

⁴⁶ Vide p. 143.

वसन्तसेना—(दक्षिणाक्षिस्पन्दनं सूचयित्वा प्रवहणमधिरुह्य)

⁴⁷ Vide p. 159: the opening sentences of Act VII. Cār. is already in the *Puṣpakaraṇḍaka* garden, but Vas. is yet to reach there.

Āryaka⁴⁸. Disappointed, Cārudatta returns home⁴⁹; when he meets the *Bhikṣu*, entering the garden⁵⁰. Act VIII opens with the entrance into the garden of the latter⁵¹ and the conversation between himself and Śakāra. Before long Vasantasenā comes into the garden in the conveyance of Śakāra⁵², refuses the advances of Śakāra and is strangled by him⁵³. This act, therefore, takes place in continuation of Act VII. Act IX opens with Śakāra, lodging a case before the magistrates that Cārudatta has murdered Vasantasenā⁵⁴. This is in continuation of the preceding Act; for Vidūṣaka, who has been sent by his master Cārudatta to return to Vasantasenā the ornaments presented by her to Rohasena⁵⁵ before she left his place that morning, hears on his way, that Cārudatta has been taken before the magistrates⁵⁶, and so he says that he would go first to the court before proceeding to Vasantasenā⁵⁷. The trial must, therefore, have taken place about midday.

⁴⁸ Vide p. 160, verse 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*: verse 9.

अपश्यतोद्य कान्तां तां वामं स्फुरति लोचनम् ।

अकारणपरिव्रस्तं हृदयं व्यथते मम ॥

⁵⁰ *Ibid*. the passage following :

कथमभिमुखं अनाभ्युदयिकं भ्रमणकदर्शनम् ।

⁵¹ Vide p. 163. Compare the opening stage direction.

⁵² Vide p. 171 : Compare the stage direction in line 2.

⁵³ Vide p. 188.

(नाटयेन कण्ठे निपीडयन् मारयति)

⁵⁴ Vide pp. 199-200 : the opening soliloquy of Śak.

⁵⁵ Vide p. 219, line 1.

आर्य मैत्रेय, वसन्तसेनयात्मनःलंकारेणालंकृत्य जननी सकामं प्रेषितः ।

अस्याभरणं दातव्यं न पुनर्गृहीतव्यम् । तत् समर्पय ।

⁵⁶ *Ibid*.

प्रियवयश्चारुदत्तोऽधिकरणमण्डपमाहूतः ।

⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

तन्न खलु अल्पेन कारणेन भवितव्यम् । तत् पश्चात् वसन्तसेनासकामं गमिष्यामि । अधिकरणमण्डपं तावत् गमिष्यामि ।

Act X opens with Cārudatta, found guilty⁵⁸ and sentenced to be speared⁵⁹, being taken away by the *Caṇḍālas* to the place of execution⁶⁰. Vasantasena after rescue is being escorted by the Bhikṣu to Cārudatta⁶¹, when she hears the hue and cry in the streets⁶² and the beating of the drums, announcing an execution⁶³. On hearing that Cārudatta is the victim of the day⁶⁴, she rushes to the place of execution⁶⁵ and effects timely rescue⁶⁶. Hence all the five Acts, VI-X, take place on the fourth day after the story is set in motion. The distribution of the incidents of a single day into five different Acts may or may not be justifiable from the dramaturgical point of view⁶⁷; but it serves as a *make-believe*, as before, to justify not merely the *laws delays*, but more the political fiasco of a revolution and a counter-revolution, against the back ground of which is the love theme worked up.

⁵⁸ Vide p. 225, verse 39.

⁵⁹ Vide p. 225.

येनार्थकल्पवर्तकारणात् वसन्तसेना व्यापादिता तं... दक्षिष्ममान नीत्वा शूले भङ्गता ।

⁶⁰ Vide p. 226.

अधिकरणकः 'कः कोत्र भोः चण्डालानां दीयतामादेशः ।

Also p. 227 : the opening stage direction.

⁶¹ Vide p. 245.

भिक्षुः—कुत्र त्वां नेष्यामः ।

वसन्तसेना—आर्यचारुदत्तस्यैव गेहम् ।

⁶² Vide p. 246.

भिक्षुः—किंतु खलु एष राजमार्गे महान् कलकलः श्रूयते ।

⁶³ *Ibid* : speeches following.

⁶⁴ *Ibid* :

उपासिके त्वं किल चारुदत्तेन मारितासीति चारुदत्तं मारितुं गीयते ।

⁶⁵ Vide p. 247. cf. the first two speeches.

⁶⁶ Vide p. 248.

भिक्षुः वसन्तसेना च—आर्य, मा तावत् । आर्याः एषाहं मन्दभागिनी यस्याः कारणादेव व्यापाद्यते ।

⁶⁷ Compare for instance *Nāṭyaśāstra*, or *Daśarūpaka* or *Nāṭaka-Lakṣaṇa-kāśa*. These state that an act contains the incidents taking place

The *Mrcchakatika*, then, dramatises the incidents taking place within the space of about 72 hours—from the nightfall on one day to the afternoon on the fourth day following.

Act I 1st day—Evening.

„ II 2nd „ —Forenoon.

„ III 2nd night—About midnight and later.

„ IV 3rd day—Forenoon.

„ V „ „ —Afternoon.

Act VI 4th „ —Morning.

„ VII „ „ — „

„ VIII „ „ — „

„ IX „ „ —Forenoon—latter half.

„ X „ „ —Midday and after.

It is thus a *run-on* drama, and so far as time treatment is concerned, there is, as we have interpreted it, the deliberate introduction of *double time* primarily for heightening emotion affect. In which respect the *Mrcchakatika* stands unique in the whole range of Sanskrit literature.

in a day. If the texts here are interpreted in the light of the construction of these last five acts, we have here a statement of the most that an act can represent: that is to say they lay down the upper limit. But another statement in NS., lays down that an act must represent the incidents of a day and if they could not be so represented the remainder may be introduced in the interlude. Hence it would appear that rules of dramaturgy insist on the representation of the incidents of a day in an act. And this would mean that the practice of at least one dramatist is against this injunction. And now there is a problem of chronology: did the author of this drama live before or after the author or compiler of *Nāṭya Śāstra*—a subject which we might discuss on a later occasion.

NĀRĀYAṆA KUMBHĀRĪ, HIS WORKS AND DATE

By SADASHIVA L. KĀTRE

THE *Scindia Oriental Institute*, Ujjain, possesses two MSS of a work entitled *Prāyaścittamālikā* or *Śrantaprayāścittārtthamālikā* or *Sukṛtārtthamālā*. The first¹, viz. Accession No. 157, consists of 65 folios of the size $11 \times 4\frac{1}{2}$ inches and is dated. The other², viz. Accession No. 2173, contains 73 folios of the size $9\frac{1}{2} \times 4\frac{1}{2}$ inches, has obviously lost one concluding folio and is consequently not dated. Both the Mss are in good condition and have been written in dark black ink, legibly but incorrectly at several places, by anonymous scribes.

The work deals with the topic of expiation to obviate evil arising from irregularities occurring in the performances of sacrificial rituals. It has only two chapters (= Sāras), the first of which confines itself to the section of Homa and the second to that of Iṣṭi.

The author cites several authors and works in the course of his treatment and generally supplements the citations with his own vṛtti thereon. Among the authorities cited by him I could trace the following :—

अजस्रपटल, अत्रि, अनन्तदेवीय ग्रन्थ,³ अनन्तदेवीय प्रायश्चित्त,³ आचार्यवचन, आपदेवीय ग्रन्थ,³ आपस्तम्ब, आपस्तम्बग्रन्थ (कृष्णभट्टस्य),⁴ आलेखन, आशीचनिर्णय-

¹ *Catalogue of Oriental MSS, Ujjain*, Part I (1936), P. 15 Serial No. 362. Folio references are to this MS throughout.

² *Ibid*, p. 30, serial No. 768. This MS, too, has almost identical readings everywhere.

³ The works of Āpadeva and Anantadeva are cited at several places.

⁴ “.....इति स्मार्तीपनामकविश्वनाथभट्टैः स्वग्रन्थे स्कन्धप्रायश्चित्तेषु मन्त्रस्थागयोरपि विपद्यास—प्रायश्चित्तं लिखितमिदम् । एतस्य मूलं मोलहोपनामककृष्णभट्टस्य आपस्तम्बग्रन्थे मृग्यम् ।....” (—F. 20^a),

“.....इदमापस्तम्बविषयं मोलहोपनामककृतग्रन्थे ।” (—F. 30^b).

This Kṛṣṇabhāṭṭa Molha appears to be the father of Tryambaka-bhāṭṭa Molha (vide Footnote 7), although his authorship of any work is not recorded by Aufrecht or Kane.

ग्रन्थ (जीवदेवीय),⁵ आश्वमेध, आश्वलायन, आश्वलायनसूत्र, आश्वलायनसूत्रवृत्ति-
कार, उद्घोतग्रन्थ, ऋग्विधान, कठाः, कपर्दिभाष्य, कथ्यट, कमलाकरभट्ट, कात्यायन,
किरातार्जुनीय, कुतूहल, कुवलयानन्द, कूर्मपुराण, (मोल्होपनामक—) कृष्णभट्ट, केशव,
कौषीतकी श्रुति, गीता, गृह्यवृत्ति, गृह्याग्निसागर or गृह्याग्निसार, गोभिल, गौतम,
चन्द्रिका, छन्दोगपरिशिष्ट, जनकादयः, जीवदेवीय आशौचनिर्णयग्रन्थ, तोरोरुद्रदेव,⁶
त्रिशच्छ्लोकी, त्रिशच्छ्लोकीव्याख्यान, त्रिकाण्ड or त्रिकाण्डमण्डन, त्रिकाण्डीय, (मोल्हो-
पनामक—) त्रयम्बक,⁷ दक्ष, दानसूत्र, दिनकरोद्घोत,⁸ देवत्रात, देवयज्ञिक, देवा-
जानीयग्रन्थ, धूर्तभाष्यकार, निर्णयनिबन्धसार, नृसिंहकारिका, न्यासकार, परिभाषा-
कुतूहल, पर्वनिर्णयदीप, पारिजात, पृथ्वीचन्द्रोदय, प्रतापनारसिंह, प्रयोगपारिजात,
प्रयोगसूत्र, प्रायश्चित्त (अनन्तदेवीय), प्रायश्चित्तकुतूहल,⁸ प्रायश्चित्तचन्द्रिका, प्रायश्चित्त-
दीप, प्रायश्चित्तदीपिका, प्रायश्चित्तप्रदीप, प्रायश्चित्तप्रदीपिका, प्रायश्चित्तसंग्रह, प्रायश्चित्त-
सूत्र, हस्तारदीय, बोधायन, बौधायन, ब्रह्माण्डपुराण, ब्राह्मण, भट्टाः, भरद्वाज, भारद्वाज,
भारद्वाजीयभाष्य, भाष्य, मण्डन, मण्डनमिश्र, मदनपारिजात, मनु, मरीचि, महाभारत,
माधवाकव्य, माधव, मीमांसा, मोल्होपनामक कृष्णभट्ट and त्रयम्बक, यम, याज्ञवल्क्य,
रामकृष्ण, रामाण्डार, रुद्रदत्त, रुद्रदेव तोरो⁹, लघुहारीत, लौगाक्षि, वल्लिपुराण, वरदराज,
विधिसंग्रह, (स्मार्तोपनामक—) विश्वनाथभट्ट,⁹ विष्णु, विरहणसूत्र, वृत्ति, वृत्तिकृत्,
वैश्वनाथीय, शतद्वयीव्याख्या, शातातप, शुक्लग्रन्थ, शुक्लग्रन्थ, शूलपाणि, सायणाचार्य,

⁵ “.....अथ जीवदेवीयाशौचनिर्णयग्रन्थे च etc.” (=F. 46^b).

⁶ There is only one citation from Toro Rudradeva's *Pratāpanāra-
simha* and it occurs in both the MSS after the conclusion of Chap. 1
and before the commencement of Chap. 2 !

⁷ “...इत्यवदानोपरि अवदानपतने संसर्गे च प्रायश्चित्तम् । इदं मोल्होपनामकत्रयम्बकग्रन्थे । ”
(F. 34^a). This Tryambaka Molha appears to be identical with Tryam-
bakabhaṭṭa Molha of Benares mentioned by Aufrecht (*Catalogus
Catalogorum*, I, P. 241^a, II, P. 51^b) and Kane (*History of Dharmaśāstra*,
I, P. 701^b) as son of Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa Molha and author of many works on
Dharmaśāstra and sacrificial ritual.

⁸ The *Dinakaroddyota* and the *Prāyaścittakutūhala* are cited at numer-
ous places, sometimes under the abbreviations “Uddyota” and “Kutū-
hala” respectively.

⁹ Vide Footnote 4 above. This Viśvanāthabhaṭṭa Smārta may
be identical with Viśvanāthabhaṭṭa, son of Narasimha Dīkṣita, who
wrote the *Śrauta-prāyaścittacandrikā* on the sacrificial ritual belonging to
the Baudhāyana branch of Black Yajurveda. Vide R. L. Mitra :
Notices of Sanskrit MSS, Vol. I, p. 88, No. 165 and Aufrecht : *CC*, I,
pp. 584^a, 677^a, II, pp. 161^b, 231^a.

सिद्धान्तभाष्य, स्कन्द, स्मार्तदीपिका (मत्कृता), स्मार्तपिनामक विश्वनाथभट्ट, स्मृति-
भास्कर, स्मृतिसंग्रह, स्मृतिसार, स्मृत्यर्थसार, हारीत ।

The *Parvanirṇayadīpa*, reproduced in full at the commencement of Chap. 2, is a small treatise in 33 verses, supplemented by a brief commentary, and was composed by the author's own maternal grandfather named Rāmakṛṣṇa¹⁰.

The author records details regarding himself in the following passages and colophons :—

Chap. 1 Beginning

..... नरसिंहाकृते विष्णो ! त्वत्कृतिं वर्णयामि किम् ।

अभक्तभक्तयोर्नित्यं कौपीनधनदो ह्यसि ॥ १ ॥

अत्रापरातुल्ययोगितालंकारः..... अभेदरूपकालंकारः.....

इत्यस्मिन् श्लोकेऽलंकारनिरूपणम्, अत्राद्यपद्ये सगणः, तस्य फललक्षणं—‘देशादं सोऽन्तगुः’ । देशोद्देशे ग्रन्थप्रसिद्धचर्यं सगणोऽत्र योजितः, तथापि नरसिंहदेवतावाचकत्वात् सगणफलदोषो नास्त्येव ।

..... लक्ष्मीनृसिंहं वन्देऽहं सत्यपूर्णं गुहं तथा ।

नौरानृसिंहौ पितरौ कुम्भारीत्युपनामकौ ॥ १ ॥

देवार्थं सुफलार्थं च प्रायश्चित्तार्थं मालिका ।

नारायणेन क्रियते स्वल्पज्ञानाग्निहोत्रिणे ॥ २ ॥

¹¹ पण्डितैर्विष्णुसंकाशैर्मालिकेयं तु कुब्जका ।

विरला सरला कार्या स्वात्मभूषणकाङ्क्षया ॥ ३ ॥

श्रीसूर्यादिसुदेवता मणिमयी श्रीविष्णुमेव विद्धिता

स्वाज्येनोज्ज्वलिताग्निहोत्रिभिरलं वेदादिसद्गुम्फिता ।

द्रष्टृणां सुखदा हुताशनमखैर्विप्रैः सदा मन्त्रिता

प्रायश्चित्तसुमालिका नरहरे ! धार्या त्वया सर्वदा ॥ ४ ॥

न श्रौतीयविचारकौशलमथो नो व्याकृतौ नैपुणं

नो मे गीतमभट्टशास्त्रसुगतिर्नाप्युक्तटोपासना ।

एवं सत्यपि चापलं विदधतो युक्तोपहासार्हता

श्रोतव्यं गुणिभिस्तथापि कृपया कीरोक्तिवस्मे वचः ॥ ५ ॥

¹⁰ “..... निरूप्य होमकृत्यानि त्विष्टिकृत्ये निरूप्यते । मातामहैर्बुधैः पूर्वं रामकृष्णाभिधैः कृतः ॥ पूर्वनिर्णयदोषोऽयमिष्टयर्थे स प्रकाश्यते । कूर्मपुराणे—दर्शं च पौर्णमासं च ये यजन्ति द्विजातयः ।..... पूर्वनिर्णयदोषोऽयं रामकृष्णप्रकाशितः । समर्पितोऽस्तु हरये प्रकाशाय सतां सुदः ॥.....”
Vide (Folios 44^a—46^a).

¹¹ This and the subsequent four verses are found repeated elsewhere, too, in the work.

गुणिभिर्मैघसंकाशैर्मद्राक्यं क्षारजीवनम् ।

तत्पीत्वा मधुरं कृत्वा वृष्टिः कार्यार्थसिद्धये ॥ ६ ॥

इष्टान् शिष्टान्यज्ञकारांश्च पृष्ट्वा ग्रन्थान्दृष्ट्वा शुक्लदेवादिस्रष्टून् ।

सद्ग्रन्थोक्तिरिच्छ्यते श्रौतयुक्त्वा नाहं कर्ता प्रेरको यज्ञभर्ता ॥ ७ ॥

अस्य व्याख्या एवं च उक्तरूपसिद्धिः ।

नीरातटस्थेन विनायकेन विघ्नान्निहन्ना कुलदैवतेन ।

लक्ष्मीनृसिहेन मयि स्थितेन सुप्रेरितोऽहं च तथा करोमि ॥ ८ ॥

Chap. 1 End

नोल्लिख्यतेऽत्र बाहुल्यं ग्रन्थविस्तरतो भयात् ।

प्रायश्चित्तविशेषार्थं ग्रन्थानन्यान्विलोकयेत् ।

दक्षोद्भवेशमृडजातटवासिना हि कुम्भार्युपाभिधनृसिहतनूद्भवेन ।

नारायणेन सुकृता सुकृतार्थमाला स्वीकृत्य तान्तु विबुधाः फलदा भवन्तु ॥

इति प्रायश्चित्तहोममालायाः प्रथमः सारः समाप्तः ॥

Chap. 2 Beginning

. श्रीनृसिंह नमस्कृत्य श्रीनृसिंहात्मजोऽधुना ।

इष्टियोग्यामहं कुर्वे प्रायश्चित्तार्थमालिकाम् ॥

निरूप्य होमकृत्यानि त्विष्टिकृत्यं निरूप्यते ।

Chap. 2 End

इति श्रीमद्गोदावरीतीरविराजमानशालिवाहनशकस्थानक्षेत्रप्रतिष्ठाननिवासिना
कुम्भारीनरसिंहार्यसूनुना श्रीनृसिंहपरायणनारायणेन विरचितायाः प्रायश्चित्तार्थमालि-
काया द्वितीयः सारः समाप्तोऽयमिष्टिप्रकरणे¹² ॥ श्रीनृसिंहार्पणमस्तु ॥

. कर्मकाण्डं समालोक्य श्रुतिस्मृत्युदितं तथा ।

बहुग्रन्थानुसारेण कृतोऽयं ग्रन्थसंग्रहः ॥

तस्मादत्र विवेकज्ञैर्बुद्ध्या संशोध्यतां बुधैः ।

कृतोऽयं ग्रन्थसंमेलः प्रीतः स्यान्नरकेसरी ॥

आश्विनमासे शुक्लपक्षे तिथौ प्रतिपदायां बुधवासरे संवत् १८८२ शके १७४७¹³

Evidently the author comes of a learned family, surnamed Kumbhārī, which appears to be one of Deśastha Brāhmaṇas of Mahārāṣṭra, residing at the celebrated city

¹² Here breaks the other MS (Accession No. 2173).

¹³ This is evidently the date of the anonymous scribe of the MS Accession No. 157.

of Pratiṣṭhāna or Paithan on the banks of Godāvārī in the Deccan. His own name is Nārāyaṇa and his father's and mother's Nṛsiṃha and Nīrā respectively. The joint deity Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha and a shrine of Gaṇeśa on the banks of Nīrā, a sub-tributary of Kṛṣṇā, appear to be his family-deities. Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha further appears to be the deity of his special attachment and he has cited the same illustratively in the Saṅkalpas etc. noted in his work as the deity for the satisfaction whereof the various sacrificial rituals are to be performed. From his vṛtti on the opening verse he seems to have expected his work to circulate extensively in the country. The fact of his maternal grandfather having composed the *Parvanirṇayadīpa*, a work connected with sacrificial rituals, has already been noticed above. This fact combined with several minor evidences visible in the body of the work shows that the author's family was one of hereditary Agnihotrans or, at least, was hereditarily connected with experts in sacrificial ritual. 'Satyapūrṇa' (=lit. Full of Truth) might be the name of the author's Guru to whom obeisance is made in a verse cited above, or the word might have been used only adjectively.

The author's date can be fixed within reasonable limits in the light of external evidence. The lower limit for the same is furnished by the date (Āśvina, Śamvat 1882 = c. September, 1825 A.C.) recorded at the close of our MS Accession No. 157, obviously as the scribe's date. As the author quotes Appayya's *Kuvalayānanda* (c. 1600 A.C.)¹⁴, Kamalākaraḥṭṭa (c. 1610-1640)¹⁵, the *Dinakaroddyota* which was commenced by Dinakaraḥṭṭa (c. 1575-1640)¹⁶, but completed by Gāgāḥṭṭa (c. 1620-1685)¹⁷, Āpadeva (c. 1600-

¹⁴ P. V. Kane : *History of Alankāra Literature*, P.CXXXI.

¹⁵ P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmasāstra*, I, P. 437.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, Pp. 561^b, 702^b.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, P. 742^a.

1650)¹⁸, Anantadeva (1650-1675)¹⁹, Jivadeva (1650-1700)²⁰, the *Grhyāgnisāgara* (1640)²¹ of Nārāyaṇbhaṭṭa Ārde, the *Prāyaścittakutūbala* of Raghunātha Navahasta or Navāthe (1675-1712)²² and Toro Rudradeva's *Pratāpanārasimha* (1710-11)²³ he is certainly later than 1711. Thus his *Prāyaścittamālikā* must have been composed between the period 1711 and 1825 A.C. This period of over a century would be minimised to a certain extent if a MS of the work bearing an earlier scribe's date is brought to light.

On Folio 3 of our MS Accession No. 157, the author says : ".....होमादौ संकल्पविधयस्तु मत्कृतस्मार्तदीपिकायां द्रष्टव्याः..." This shows that he had composed another work named *Smārtadīpikā*. This *Smārtadīpikā* is undoubtedly identical with its namesake represented by a fragmentary palm-leaf MS of 39 leaves in Telugu script preserved in the Tanjore Library.²⁴ As per extracts furnished in the Tanjore Catalogue, the work begins : "श्रीगणाधिपतये नमः ॥ अथाश्वलायनानां सुखावबोधाय नारायणीयादिग्रन्थानवलोक्य लक्ष्मीनृसिंहं नत्वा स्मार्तदीपिकां वक्ष्ये ॥....." and ends :.....ब्रह्मणे दत्त्वा....मग्निं विसृज्य मानुषीं कन्यां विधिना विवाहयेत्पुत्रपौत्रवान् भ.... whence breaks the incomplete MS. We have seen above that

¹⁸ *Ibid*, P. 682^a.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, Pp. 452, 453.

²⁰ *Ibid*, P. 699^b.

²¹ Vide my paper *Nārāyaṇbhaṭṭa Ārde, his works and Date* published in the *Bhāratīya Vidyā*, Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1945, Pp. 74-86, p. 76, where the exact date (viz. Caitra, Samvat 1697=c. April 1640 A.C.) and place (viz. Bhāganagara) of composition of the *Grhyāgnisāgara* have been brought to light probably for the first time. In the same paper (p.86) I have also noted that Nārāyaṇa Kumbhāri is the only author as yet known to me who cites Nārāyaṇbhaṭṭa Ārde as an authority.

²² Vide P. K. Gode's several papers on this author, especially *Raghunātha, a Protégé of Queen Dīpābāi of Tanjore, and his Works*, published in the *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Vol. X, Part 2, pp. 192-140.

²³ P. V. Kane : *History of Dharmasāstra*, I, pp. 585^a, 733^b.

²⁴ *Descriptive Catalogue of Tanjore Sanskrit MSS*, Vol. XVII, serial No. 12630, pp. 7911-12.

Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha was the family-deity or deity of special attachment of Nārāyaṇa Kumbhārī, the author of the *Prāyaścittamālikā*. Hence the author's obeisance to the deity at the commencement of the *Smārtādīpikā* contained in the Tanjore MS proves its identity with the *Smārtādīpikā* composed by Nārāyaṇa Kumbhārī. The remark of the editor of the Tanjore Catalogue that "the author mentions Lakṣmī-Nṛsiṃha as his Guru" is, obviously enough, incorrect.

The *Smārtādīpikā* evidently deals with the ritual of the Āśvalāyanas. Attempts should also be made to trace out a complete old MS of this work which might enable us to fix the author's date more precisely and might also throw further light on his personality and works.

THE FIVE PROVISIONAL DEFINITIONS OF VYĀPTI (VYĀPTIPĀÑCAKA) IN GAṆGEŚA

By TARA SANKAR BHATTACHARYA

(Continued from Vol. III Pt. 2, P. 188)

But the upholder of the view that non-existence, in the middle term, of location pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, defines vyāpti (the first provisional definition under discussion), thinks that, in the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence other than that of quality and action, the middle term is specific existence which extends to the major term, substance-hood, through the relation of substratum-hood (anuyogitā) as determined by specification and existence. So, according to this view, the relation determining the middle term, in this inference, is substratum-hood as determined by specification and existence and, in this relation, the middle term, specific existence, exists only in the major term, substance, and in nothing else. And as a result of this, the existence pertaining to the substratum of the negation of the major term, is to be negated, in the middle term, through the relation of selfsameness whose term is the middle term as determined by the relation determining the middle term, the further qualification of the term being determined by the substratum-hood of the essence of the middle term, being unnecessary. For the relation determining the middle term, in this case, is substratum-hood as determined by specification and existence and the negation of existence pertaining to quality and action (which are the substratum of the non-existence of the major term) exists in the middle term, specified existence, in the relation of selfsameness whose term is specific existence, as

determined by the relation of substratum-hood determined by specification and existence.

Thus, the definition succeeds, even when the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, is negated through that relation of selfsameness which has for its term the middle term as determined by the relation determining its essence. But objection may be raised against this view that, considered in this light, the definition applies to the fallacious inference, it has jar-hood, as it has the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood. In this inference the relation determining the middle term is collective extensity. Now in this wrong inference the definition is alleged to apply, because in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, the middle term is negated in the relation of collective extensity. The reason again of this non-existence of the middle term in the substratum of the non-existence of the major, is that the substratum of the non-existence of jar-hood cannot possess collectively jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood, just as the jar is not both the jar and the cloth.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection is that, in such a case, the middle term is to be qualified by the co-presence of the major term in the relation determining the middle term. And, in support of this, he quotes Raghunātha who, in his *Didhiti*, says that the co-presence of the major term, in the relation determining the middle term, is necessary in determining Vyāpti.

Now combining this new qualification with that under discussion, the definition amounts to this: Invariable concomitance is the co-presence of the middle term with the major term in the relation determining the middle term plus the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, in that relation of selfsameness whose term is exist-

ence or location as determined by the relation determining the essence of the middle term. Adorned by these adjuncts the definition is applicable to all cases of inference whose major term is not universally present.

Let us now see how the definition, understood in this sense, is inapplicable to the fallacious inference, it has jar-hood, as it has the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood. Here the relation determining the middle term is collective extensity. In this relation co-presence of the duality of jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood with the major term jar-hood, is impossible, as jar-hood and the negation of jar-hood collectively cannot exist in the substratum of jar-hood. Hence the definition does not apply to this fallacious inference.

Thus, according to Mathurānātha, the first definition should be conditioned by so many adjuncts, in order that it may be applicable to all cases of inference except the Kevalānvayī. But before he passes on to the second definition, he gives us the views of two other teachers who also arm the definition in such a way as to make it applicable to all cases of inference, except those which have their major term universally present. According to the first of these views, the negation, through the relation of selfsameness, of the substratum-hood pertaining to the middle term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, in the substratum in which the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, completely extends, through the relation of selfsameness, determines vyāpti. To put it summarily, invariable concomitance is the non-existence, in the relation of selfsameness, of the entire substratum pertaining to the middle term, in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. And from this angle of vision, when we consider the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, all the substrata of smoke are negated, through the relation

of selfsameness, in lakes etc., which are the substratum of the non-existence of the major term.

But when we take a fallacious inference like, it has smoke, as it has fire, the definition, in the above sense, does not apply. For the substratum of the non-existence of smoke may be iron-ball in which, the iron-ball on which fire exists, is not negated and thus there is not the negation of the entire substratum-hood of the middle term, in the locus of the non-existence of the major term.

It is now our task to explain the second one of the two views mentioned. Invariable concomitant is that middle term which is the entire substratum-hood of its substratum, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, and in which there is the negation of the substratum-hood of the non-existence, through the relation of selfsameness, of the major term as determined by the relation and essence determining it. To put it in simpler terms, in the entire substratum-hood of the middle term (the middle term here is determined by the relation and essence determining it), there should be the non-existence of the substratum-hood of the negation of the major term (the major term is also determined by the relation and essence determining it and is negated in the relation of selfsameness); such a middle term is an invariable concomitant. Let us see the application of it in the correct inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the middle term, smoke, is hill, field, kitchen, etc. The substratum of the non-existence of the major term, fire, is lake, cloth, etc. Now the substratum-hood of lake, cloth, etc., is not the substratum-hood of hill, field, kitchen, etc. Hence smoke is the concomitant of fire.

One important point may be noted in this connection. The definition, in the sense just now described, applies also to inferences whose major term is present in a part of the substratum of the middle term, but is completely

extensive everywhere else. Consider, for example, the inference, it has the negation of monkey—conjunction, as it is existence. Here the middle term is existence and the major term is the negation of monkey-conjunction. The substratum of existence is substance, attribute and action. In the entire substratum-hood of these three, there is the negation of the substratum-hood of the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction, as the negation of the negation of monkey-conjunction has for its substratum monkey-conjunction and the substratum-hood of monkey conjunction is not the entire substratum-hood of substance, quality and action. Hence existence is the invariable concomitant of the negation of monkey-conjunction.

We have given, by this time, the main ideas of Mathurānātha's comments on the first provisional definition of Vyāpti. But before we take up the second, let us indicate, in brief, Jagadīśa's interpretation of the first definition. Jagadīśa in his '*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha*'²⁹ adopts a line of interpretation, which has, on occasions, a close similarity to Mathurānātha's. We have seen that, according to Mathurānātha, the negation of the major term, in the first provisional definition of Vyāpti, has its counterpositive determined by the relation and essence determining the major term. Similarly, Jagadīśa says that the major term, as determined by the relation and nature in which it exists, is negated and the substratum of this negation has non-existence in the middle term.³⁰ And as Mathurānātha shows that the definition applies even to the infer-

²⁹. A copy of the manuscript of this commentary, written in Bengali characters, has been discovered by Professor D. C. Bhattacharya, my colleague in the Hooghly Mohsin college. Professor Bhattacharya has kindly allowed me to make use of this manuscript.

³⁰. Yena sambandhena rūpeṇa vā sādhyatā, tat sambandhena vastu tadrūpāvacchinnābhāvastatvadavṛttitvam (*Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha*).

ence, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this-tree, when only that substratum in which the negation of the major term³¹ completely extends, has non-existence in the middle term, so Jagadīśa points out that the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, monkey-conjunction, as determined by the relation of complete extensity, is negated in this tree which has monkey-conjunction in the relation of partial extensity.

Thirdly, both Mathurānātha and Jagadīśa think that the relation determining the substratum of the negation of the major term is selfsameness. Jagadīśa, of course, directly does not say that this relation is selfsameness, but the meaning of what he says, in this connection, clearly points to that direction. He says that the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is to be taken in that relation which is the determinant of the negation of the major term as a generic attribute.³² But as a generic attribute is negated in its substratum only in the relation of selfsameness, it can be said that the relation determining the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is the same.

But the difference is often between them with the choice of examples. Thus Mathurānātha shows that the definition does not apply to an anvaya-vyatirekī inference,³³

³¹ Here the major term is determined by the relation and essence determining it and its negation exists in its substratum in the relation of selfsameness.

³² *sādhyaḥbhāvavātvañceha (niruktasambandhāvacchinna) sādhyavattāgraha-virodhitāvacchedaka-sambandhenaiva grāhyam. (Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha).*

³³ Three kinds of inferences are distinguished in the Navya-Nyāya:

- (1) *kevalānvayī* (Purely affirmative)
- (2) *kevala-vyatirekī* (Purely negative). This kind of inference has no other similar instance, *i.e.*, in it the major term does not extend beyond the minor term and the negation of the middle term is the negation of the major term. In the inference, the earth has the difference of others as it has earth-hood, both earth-hood and difference of others are negated, for example, in water.

like, it has fire, as it has smoke, when the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is not negated. Jagadīśa, on the contrary, points out that, when the major term, as determined by the relation and essence in which it exists, is not negated, the definition is inapplicable to a kevala-vyatirekī inference like, the earth has the difference of others, as it has earth-hood (for in this inference, the relation determining the major term, difference of others, i.e., mutual negation of others, is selfsameness. If the major term is to be negated through some other relation, say inherence, then the definition fails, as the major term, mutual negation of others, exists only in the relation of selfsameness and not in the relation of inherence). Again Mathurānātha shows that if the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is not determined by the relation of selfsameness, then the definition does not apply to the inferences, it has quality, as it has knowledge, and it has existence, as it has generic attribute. But Jagadīśa opines that the definition is invalidated in the inference, it has the difference of the jar, as it has cloth-hood, when the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is determined by any kind of spatial relation (daiśika-Viśeṣanātā).³⁴

But the most striking difference between them appears with regard to the existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. We have seen that, according to Mathurānātha, such existence is to be

(3) Anvaya-vyatirekī (Both affirmative and negative).

In this inference both the major term and the non-existence of the major term extend beyond the minor term. Fire, for example, extends to kitchen and the non-existence of fire to lake (consider the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke).

For these distinctions, Vide *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa.

³⁴ Tatra ghatatvādi svarūpasya sādhyābhāvasya daiśika-viśeṣanātaya, adhikarānatvāprasiddheh (as jar-hood, which is the negation of the difference of the jar, does not exist in its substratum in any kind of spatial relation). *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkha*,

determined by the relation determining the middle term. Jagadīśa, on the contrary, points out that the definition is frustrated in the inference, it has existence, as it is a substance, taking the relation, determining the middle term, to be the determinant of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term.³⁵ We have also seen how Mathurānātha replies to this objection by qualifying the definition with fresh adjuncts.

Thus objections raised by Jagadīśa against the first definition are answered by Mathurānātha who, by appropriate qualifications, makes the definition applicable to almost all cases of inference except the kevalānvayī. And this shows that Mathurānāth's comments on the first provisional definition of vyāpti are more comprehensive than Jagadīśa's. But we have sufficiently explained Mathurānātha's position with regard to the first definition. So let us now pass on to the second provisional definition and try to understand its import.

II

The second definition runs as follows :—The negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which (the non-existence of the major term) exists in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term, determining invariable concomitance or vyāpti (sādhyavad-bhinna-sādhyābhāva-vadavṛttitvam). Let us see how this definition applies to the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the major term fire is hill, kitchen, field, yard, etc. The substratum different from these is, for example, the lake. In the lake there is the non-existence of the

³⁵ Sādhyābhāva-vati hetutāghāṭakatvena sambandhena tayā vṛtti-
stadābhāvasyoktau ca sattāvān dravyatvātādityādau tathā sattādyabhā-
vavati āmānyādau hetutāghāṭaka samavāyāditi sambandhena vṛtter-
aprasiddheh. *Ibid.*

major term, fire. Existence pertaining to the lake is negated in smoke. Hence the definition applies to this inference.

The necessity of this second definition is, according to the earlier logicians,³⁶ to fill up the gap in the first definition. The first definition is supposed to fail in an inference like, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree, in which the major term is present in a part of the substratum of the middle term. The second definition is considered to remove this defect. Let us see how the second definition applies to this inference. The substratum of the major term, in this case, is the support of monkey-conjunction, and here it is this tree. The substratum, different from this tree, is quality, etc., on which the monkey cannot sit. Non-existence of the major term, monkey-conjunction in quality, etc., has for its substratum quality, etc. Existence pertaining to quality, is negated in the middle term, this tree. Hence this tree is the invariable concomitant of monkey-conjunction.

Thus, according to the earlier logicians, the second definition applies to the inference in which the major term is of partial extensity. And as the first definition does not apply to it, the second is indispensable. Raghunātha's explanation of the necessity of the second definition is also the same. But Mathurānātha thinks that the first definition is not frustrated in this case, if the substratum of the negation of the major term is undetermined by anything else (*niravacchinna-adhikaraṇatā*). Hence his explanation of the necessity of the second definition is a bit different. He opines that the substratum of the negation of the major term, as undetermined by anything else, is very difficult to find out. Hence the second definition, which applies to the above inference easily, is formulated.

Now as to the proper meaning of the second definition, Mathurānātha points out that the earlier logicians (the logi-

³⁶ The reference is to the *Mithilā School*.

cians of Mithilā) misinterpreted it. According to them the definition means that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is different from the substratum of the major term. But if this meaning is accepted, then the expression, the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, becomes superfluous. For the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum which is different from that of the major term and the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is different from the substratum of the major term, are equivalent.

Hence the proper interpretation, according to Mathurānātha, of this second definition should be the following: vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which (the non-existence of the major term) exists in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term. Now the first definition was the negation of existence pertaining to the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. Hence, in the second definition, existence in a substratum which is different from the substratum of the major term, is added. And this addition saves the definition from being frustrated in the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood. For here the major term is conjunction; the substratum of conjunction is substance; the substratum different from substance is quality, action, etc.; the negation of conjunction exists in quality, action, etc., the substratum of the non-existence of conjunction in quality, action, etc., is quality, action, etc., (and not substance, as the difference of substrata makes the negation different); existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., is negated in the middle term, substance-hood.

But the first definition does not apply to this inference. For the substratum of the non-existence of the major term

conjunction, is quality, action, etc., and also substance (as there may be a substance in a distant part of the globe, with which some other substance may not be conjoined), and, in the middle term, substance-hood, existence pertaining to substance is not negated.

Thus the proper meaning of the second definition is that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which exists in a substratum different from that of the major term. Now here the expression "non-existence of the major term" is unavoidable; for the definition, without this, will not apply to any correct inference and thus will be involved in the fallacy of asambhava (absolute absurdity or impossibility). Let us take the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The major term, in this case, is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, kitchen, field, etc. The substratum different from the hill, kitchen, etc., is the lake. Existence determined by the lake may be substance-hood, as the lake is a substance. The substratum of substance-hood may be the hill. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in the middle term smoke, as smoke exists on the hill. Hence the definition is faulty.

Similarly, "the major term" in the expression "non-existence of the major term" saves the definition from the fallacy of asambhava. For the definition, minus this "major term," is the negation of existence determined by the substratum of the non-existence of the negation existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term and in this sense it does not apply to the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. Let us explain this. The major term, in this inference, is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, kitchen, field, yard, etc. The substratum different from these is the lake. Existence determined by the lake is substance-hood. The negation existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term, is the

negation of substance-hood in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term, i.e., we are to get the negation of the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the negation of substance-hood is substance-hood. Hence substance-hood, in this case, may be called, a positive negation. And a positive negation being not different with the difference of substrata, the hill may be the substratum of this substance-hood which also exists in the lake. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in the middle term smoke, as also exists on the hill. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference.

Thus on the theory that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata, the major term of the non-existence of the major term, in the second definition, is significant and extricates the definition from the charge of asambhava. But it may be objected that the definition is guilty of narrowness, as it does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of either the conjunction of space in the jar or jar-hood, as it has space-hood, if the theory that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata, is accepted. For the major term, in this inference, is the negation of either the conjunction of space in the jar or jar-hood; the conjunction of space in a jar exists in the jar and space; jar-hood exists in the jar; hence the alternative of these two exists on the jar and space; but the negation of this alternative, i.e., either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, exists everywhere excepting the jar; hence the substratum of the major term is everything excepting the jar; the substratum different from everything excepting the jar, is the jar; the non-existence of the major term existing in the substratum different from the substratum of the major term is the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar, i.e., conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar; the substratum of con-

junction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar is the jar and space ; existence pertaining to space is not negated in the middle term space-hood. Hence the definition is narrow being inapplicable to this case.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection, perhaps, is not quite to the point. He says that the second definition has been formulated on the theory that the negation of negation is a separate negation and that negation is different in different substrata. And from this point of view the above objection is baseless. For the negation of negation being an additional negation and negation differing in different substrata, the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood existing in the jar, which is different from the substratum containing the major term, is an additional negation and varies with the variation of substrata and therefore does not exist in the middle term space-hood in which exists the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood. Here the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, has for its counterpositive, the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood and the substratum of this counterpositive is opposed to that of its negation (pratiyogi-vyadhikaraṇa). And conversely the negation of the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood and the negation of either the conjunction of space in a jar or jar-hood, are separate negations, because they are not co-existent but are present in opposed substrata. Thus the rule that a negation is different in different substrata is not true in all cases. Where the co-existence of the negation and its counterpositive and the opposed substratum-hood of the counterpositive appear to be the same, there and there only the negation is to be held to be different in the conflicting substrata, otherwise two contradictions become similar. Let us explain this by a concrete example. The

negation of conjunction may exist in a (distant) substance and conjunction also obtains between substances. Hence substance is a substratum in which conjunction and its negation co-exist. Quality, again, is a substratum in which conjunction is always negated, as conjunction holds only between substances. Thus quality is an opposed substratum of conjunction. Hence the negation of conjunction in substance must be different from the negation of conjunction in quality. One important point is to be remembered in this connection. The negation of conjunction in substance is only partial and not complete, whereas the negation of conjunction in quality is complete. Only in such cases the negation is different in the two substrata.

Thus the charge against the second definition, that it is guilty of narrowness, falls, on the theory that the negation of negation is also a negation and negation differs in different substrata. Hence, every term in the second definition has its own significance and nothing in it is superfluous.

But the question may be asked : Is the second definition applicable to all cases of non-kevalānvayī inference³⁷? And if so, what is the necessity of the third definition? Raghunātha (*Vyāpti-pañcaka-dīdhiti*) replies to this by saying that though the second definition applies to the inferences, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree and it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood, yet in the latter, we have to uphold the theory that negation is different in different substrata. In other words, we assume that the negations of conjunction in quality, action, and substance are all different and separate and on this assumption we can show that the second definition is not narrow. But this view is not unanimously accepted. Some are of opinion

³⁷ Gaṅgeśa says that none of the five provisional definitions applies to the kevalānvayī inference. We shall explain this at the end of this chapter.

that a negation which is partially present in a substratum and completely in another, differs in these conflicting substrata, but in other cases the negation does not vary with the variation of substrata. Others again hold that a positive negation does not differ in different substrata. A third view thinks that the negation of negation is a separate negation in every case. A fourth theory, on the contrary, asserts that only the negations of the negation of asymmetrical things like, the conjunction of space in a jar and jar-hood, are separate negations, for jar-hood and conjunction of space in a jar never come under the same category. But the negations of the negations of similar things like, jar-hood and substance-hood, are not separate negations. In view of this divergence of opinion, the third definition is formulated, for this definition well applies to the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood.

III

Let us now explain the third provisional definition of vyāpti and see how it applies to the inference, it has conjunction, as it has substance-hood. Invariable concomitance is the non-co-existence, with the middle term, of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term (sādhya-*pratiyogikānyonyābhāvā-sāmānādhikaraṇyam*). In other words, vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term. To put it briefly, the negation, in the middle term, of existence determined by a substratum other than that of the major term, determines vyāpti. Now in the inference, it has conjunction, as it is substance-hood, the major term is conjunction. The substratum of conjunction is substance. The mutual negation or difference of substance exists in quality, action, etc. Existence pertaining to quality, action, etc., is negated in

the middle term substance-hood, for substance-hood exists in substances and nowhere else. Hence the definition well applies to this inference even without the assumption that negation differs in different substrata.

Thus, according to Raghunātha, the third definition is formulated, because there is no definite and universally accepted proof that negation differs in different substrata. Jagadīśa also thinks that the necessity of the third definition lies in the view that the same negation may exist in different substrata,³⁸ i.e., in the view that negation is not different in different substrata.

Mathurānātha also agrees with Raghunātha that there being no definite proof that negation differs with the difference of substrata, the third definition has been devised. Let us now explain Mathurānātha's comments on the third definition. The third definition means that the negation, in the middle term, of existence pertaining to the substratum of the mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the middle term, is invariable concomitance. Here the mutual negation is to be qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive. In other words, the mutual negation or difference which does not exist in the counterpositive is to be accepted. For this will save the definition from the fallacy of *asambhava*, even when the middle term exists in the substratum of that mutual negation of the substratum of the major term, which has its counterpositive determined by an essence relating to number. Let us try to understand this with the help of the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. In this inference, if the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is not qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive, then the definition is involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*.

³⁸ Vide the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi-mayūkhā* of Jagadīśa: *atra prati-yogimadanyatāpraveśāpekṣayā navya-lakṣaṇamāha*.

in the following way : The major term, here, is fire ; the substratum of the major term is the substratum of fire ; mutual negation whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term is the difference or mutual negation of the substratum of fire ; and when we say that there is the difference of both the substratum of the major term and the jar, the substratum of the major term is also a counterpositive of the difference of both the substratum of the major term and the jar ; hence by the mutual negation or difference whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, it may also imply that there is the mutual negation of both the substratum of the major term and the jar ; the substratum of the difference of both the substratum of the major term fire and the jar may be the hill, as the hill is not both the substratum of fire and the jar, *i.e.*, the hill is not both the hill and the jar ; existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke ; hence the definition does not apply to this simple case and, therefore, to no case and as such is guilty of the fallacy of *asambhava*.

But if the difference of the substratum of the major term, in the above inference, is qualified by non-existence in the counterpositive, then the definition is not involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*. To explain this : The major term is fire. The substratum of fire is the hill, yard, field, kitchen, etc. The difference, whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, is the difference of the hill, etc. This difference is qualified by its non-existence in the counterpositive, *i.e.*, the difference does not exist in the hill, etc. The substratum of this difference, then, is different from the hill, etc. The substratum different from the hill, etc., is the lake. Existence pertaining to the lake is negated in smoke. Hence the definition applies to this inference. In this instance the definite assertion that the difference of the substratum of the major term fire, should not exist in its counterpositive, prevents the counterpositive of the difference

to be both the substratum of the major term, *i.e.*, the hill, and the jar. For the difference of the substratum of the major term, *i.e.*, of the hill, does not exist in the hill, while the difference of both the hill and the jar exists on the hill.

Thus the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is to be qualified by non-existence in the counter-positive if the third definition is to be freed from the fallacy of *asambhava*. But in that case the definition does not apply to an inference whose major term exists in different substrata. Consider, for instance, the stock inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. The major term fire, in this case, exists in different substrata like the hill, field, kitchen, yard, etc. Taking yard to be the substratum of the major term, its difference or mutual negation, not existing on it, may exist on the hill. Existence determined by the hill is not negated in smoke, and, therefore, the definition does not apply to this inference.

Now Raghunātha supposes this defect to be inherent in the third definition, and, according to him, the fourth definition is formulated to remove this defect. Mathurānātha also thinks that the third definition suffers from this defect in addition to the other defect of its inapplicability to the *kevalānvayī* inference. But he thinks that this defect is not impossible to be removed. If the difference or mutual negation of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term is taken, instead of the difference of the substratum of the major term, then existence pertaining to the substratum of the difference of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term, is negated in the middle term of the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. For the difference of the essence determining the substratum-hood of the major term fire, exists in the lake and existence determined by the lake is negated in smoke.

IV

However, the fourth definition is formulated, according to both Raghunātha and Mathurānātha, in order that it may be applicable to an inference whose major term exists in a plurality of substrata. Let us explain the fourth provisional definition of vyāpti. Invariable concomitance is the existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness of the negation which exists in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term (sakala-sādhyā-bhāvavanniṣṭhābhāva-pratīyogitvam). In simple words, when the middle term is negated in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, we have vyāpti. This definition applies to an inference in which the major term has a plurality of substrata. Consider, for example, the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. Here the major term is fire. All the substrata of the non-existence of fire are all the objects like the lake, cloth, etc. The negation existing in all these is the negation of smoke, as smoke does not exist in any substratum of the negation of fire. The counterpositive of the negation of smoke is smoke itself. The counterpositiveness of smoke, lastly, is undoubtedly present in the middle term smoke. Thus the definition well applies to this inference.

But the definition is too-wide, if the substratum of the non-existence of the major term is not qualified by "all." Minus this qualification, the definition is existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness of the negation which exists in the substratum of the non-existence of the major term. But the definition, in this form, applies, as both Raghunātha and Mathurānātha point out to the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire. Hence the qualification is indispensable.

But the definition, even stated as it is, applies to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence and, to remove this superfluity, Mathurānātha suggests that the

essence determining the counterpositive of the negation which exists in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, should be the same as the essence determining the middle term. Let us see how the definition, is too-wide being applicable to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence. The major term, in this inference, is substance. All the substrata of the non-existence of substance are quality, action, etc. The negation existing in quality, action, etc., is the negation of existence of those other than quality, action, etc. The counterpositive of the negation of existence of those other than quality, action, etc., is the existence of those other than quality, action, etc. The counterpositiveness of the existence of those other than quality, action, etc., exists in the middle term, existence, as existence of those other than quality, action, etc., i.e., specific existence, is not an addition to existence, but is included within existence.

But if the essence determining the counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, is the same as determining the middle term, then the definition does not apply to the above inference. Let us explain this. The counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, in the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence, is the existence of those other than quality, action, etc. Here we get two essences, viz., the essence of those other than quality, action, etc., and the essence of existence. But the essence determining the middle term, existence, is only one. And as two cannot be equal to one, the definition does not apply to this case.

Thus, the essence determining the counterpositive of the negation existing in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term, is the same as the essence determining the middle term. Now this counterpositive, says Mathurānātha, is to exist through the relation deter-

mining the middle term, otherwise there arises the fallacy of a too-wide definition. Consider, for example, the inference, it is a substance, as it has existence. The substrata of the non-existence of the major term substance are quality, action, etc. existence is negated in quality, action etc., through the relation of conjunction. The middle term also is existence. Hence the definition applies to this fallacious inference and is too-wide.

But if the counterpositive of the negation existing in quality, etc., is determined by the relation of inherence, which is the relation determining the middle term, then the definition does not apply to this fallacious inference, for in quality, action, etc., there can never be the negation of existence through the relation of inherence.

In the next place, Mathurānātha suggests that the negation of the major term, in the fourth definition, should have its counterpositive determined by the relation and essence determining the major term, in order that the fallacy of *asambhava* may be avoided. Let us take the inference, the hill has fire, as it has smoke. The major term is fire. The negation of the major term is the negation of fire. Now if fire is not determined by the relation and essence in which it exists as the major term, then it may be kitchen-fire. The substrata of the negation of kitchen-fire are the hill, yard, field, etc. The counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the hill, etc. cannot exist in the middle term smoke, as smoke exists in the hill, etc. Hence the definition does not apply to this simple inference. But if fire is taken as determined by the relation and essence determining the major term, then the substrata of the negation of fire as fire (the essence determining fire) and through the relation of conjunction are the lake, etc. Smoke does not exist in the lake, etc., and smoke is the middle term. Hence the definition applies to the inference and as such is not involved in the fallacy of *asambhava*.

But it may be objected that, though the definition does not commit the fallacy of *asambhava*, yet it is too-narrow being inapplicable to the inference, it has monkey-conjunction, as it is this tree. For the substratum of the negation of the major term, monkey-conjunction, is also this tree and the negation existing in this tree, certainly, has not its counterpositiveness existing in the middle term this tree. In reply to this objection, Mathurānātha points out that all the substrata of the negation of the major term, in the fourth definition, should be taken to be undetermined by anything, *i.e.*, only those substrata are to be accepted on which the negation completely extends. Let us see how this device saves the definition from narrowness. The major term, in this inference, is monkey-conjunction. The negation of the major term is the negation of monkey conjunction. The substrata on which the negation of monkey-conjunction completely extends are quality, etc. Negation existing in quality, etc., is that of this tree. The counterpositiveness of this tree exists in the middle term this tree. Hence the definition well applies to this case and, therefore, is not narrow.

But the objection may be raised that, though the definition is not too-narrow, yet it is too-wide, as it applies to the fallacious inference, it is earth, as it has monkey-conjunction (the inference is fallacious, because even water may have the conjunction of monkey), if only the substrata on which the negation of the major term completely extends, are to be accepted. For the substratum on which the negation of the major term, earth-hood, completely extends, is water and in some portion of water there must always be the negation of monkey-conjunction.

Mathurānātha replies to this objection by saying that just as the substrata on which the negation of the major term completely extends, are only relevant, so also the negation which completely extends in these substrata

are to be taken. And in that case the definition does not apply to the above inference. For in water (the substratum on which the negation of the major term, earth-hood, completely extends), the negation which completely extends is certainly not that of monkey-conjunction and in the middle term, monkey-conjunction, there cannot be the counterpositiveness of that which is not monkey-conjunction.

But if the negation, which completely extends in the substrata which have again the complete extension of the negation of the major term, is only to be accepted, then according to the view that the mutual negation or difference of the substratum of partially pervading existence is completely pervading existence, the definition does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of substance-hood, as it has the difference of the substratum of conjunction. Let us see how the definition is inapplicable to this inference.³⁹ The major term here is the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the major term is substance-hood. The substratum of substance-hood is substance. The negation which completely extends in substance may be that of the essence of quality, (guṇatva) as this essence of quality exists in quality and not in substance. But the counterpositiveness of the essence of quality may not exist in the middle term, the difference of the substratum of conjunction, as the substrata different from the substratum of conjunction, are the six categories of quality, action, generic attribute, inherence, etc. Hence the definition is too-narrow being inapplicable to this case.

But this objection, as Mathurānātha points out, does not stand on a sound basis. For the upholders of the doctrine

³⁹. According to the view that the mutual negation of the substratum of partially pervading existence, is completely pervading existence, this inference is correct, but according to others, it is a fallacious inference.

that the mutual negation of the substratum of partially pervading existence, is completely pervading existence, think that the negation of mutual negation is a separate negation and from this standpoint the definition is not inapplicable to the inference in question. Let us clarify this point. The major term, in this inference, is the negation of substance-hood. The negation of the negation of substance-hood is substance-hood. The entire substratum of substance-hood is substance. The negation which completely extends in substance is that of the difference of the substratum of conjunction, as the negation of the mutual negation of the substratum of conjunction is also a negation. The counterpositiveness of the difference of the substratum of conjunction exists in the middle term which is also the difference of the substratum of conjunction. Hence the definition applies to the inference and the charge of its narrowness falls.

But though the definition applies to this case, yet, it may be alleged, that it does not apply to the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth. For what is the definition? It is the negation of the middle term in all the substrata of the non-existence of the major term. But the question of all the substrata of the negation of the major term is absurd in the inference just stated, for the simple reason that the substratum of the negation of the major term (negation of this jar-hood) is this jar which is only one.

But this objection, Mathurānātha thinks, rests on the misinterpretation of the word "all" in the definition. All the substrata of the negation of the major term does not mean many such substrata, but the entire substratum without any remainder (aśeṣa). And viewed in this light the definition applies to the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth, as the question of a substratum without any remainder is not irrelevant.

Thus the fourth definition is armed by Mathurānātha with necessary weapons in order that it may be free from the faults of narrowness and superfluity in many cases of non-levalānvayī inference. If we restate the definition, so aimed, then it runs as follows: Invariable concomitance is the existence, in the middle term, of the counterpositiveness, as determined by the relation and essence determining the middle term, of the negation which pervades, without any remainder, the substratum, undetermined by anything, of the negation of the major term which is determined by the relation and essence determining it. Here the substratum of the negation of the major term is taken to be undetermined by anything, in order that the definition may be applicable to the inference, it has the conjunction of monkey, as it is this tree; the major term is considered to be negated being determined by the relation and essence determining it, so that the definition may not be involved in the fallacy of asambhava; the substratum of the negation of the major term is taken entirely, without any remainder, to save the definition from the charge of narrowness, in the case of the inference, it has the negation of this jar-hood, as it is the cloth; and, lastly, the counterpositiveness of the negation, existing in the entire substratum of the negation of the major term, is considered to exist through the relation and essence determining the middle term, because the definition may be extricated from the charge of superfluity in the case of the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence.

But in spite of all these, the definition, it may be objected to is not absolutely free from being too-narrow and too-wide. For the substratum of the negation of the major term, it has been said, should have pervasion (vyāpakatva) and in the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence, the general negation of the middle term, existence, exists, as knowability, pervading the substratum of the

non-existence of the major term. Thus the definition is too wide, as it applies to a fallacious inference.

Secondly, pervasion (vyāpakatva) means the existence of the essence which is not the determinant of the counterpositiveness of the mutual negation which exists in the substratum of the pervaded. Fire, for example, pervades smoke. This can be determined by the definition of pervasion just mentioned. The substratum of smoke is the hill, yard, kitchen, field, etc. In these there is the mutual negation of non-fire. The essence which does not determine non-fire is fire. Hence fire pervades smoke. Now, accepting this meaning of pervasion, it can be shown that the fourth definition does not apply to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. Let us explain this. According to the definition the negation of the middle term must exist pervading the entire substratum of the non-existence of the major term. The definition of pervasion, on the contrary, implies that the pervading must be the non-determinant of the counterpositiveness of the mutual negation existing in the pervaded. Now in the inference, under consideration, the substrata of the non-existence of the major term non-smoky are the hill, yard, field, kitchen, etc. The mutual negation existing in these may be, according to the principle of elimination, one by one, of all (cālānīnyāya), the mutual negation of the yard-fire on the hill, that of the hill-fire on the yard, and so on. The counterpositiveness of these mutual negations exists in the yard-fire, the hill-fire and so on. The non-determinant of these yard-fire, hill-fire, etc., is non-fire. The counterpositiveness of the negation of non-fire does not exist in the middle term non-fiery. Hence the definition fails to characterise a correct inference and, therefore, is narrow.

The reply of Mathurānātha to this objection is two-fold. In the first place, the negation, whose counterpositiveness, as determined by the relation and essence

determining the middle term, exists in the middle term, should exist in the undetermined substratum of the non-existence of the major term, which is determined by the relation and essence determining it, as the determinant of its pervasion. Secondly, pervasion should mean the non-determination of the counterpositiveness of the absolute negation (and not of the mutual negation) which exists in the substratum of the pervaded. And under these two safeguards, the definition does not apply to the fallacious inference, it is a substance, as it has existence and well applies to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. To take the former inference first, the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is the negation of substance-hood in the relation of inherence; the substratum-hood of such negation, undetermined by anything, is the substratum-hood of quality, etc.; the absolute negation existing in the substratum of this substratum-hood is the negation of the negation of existence pertaining to quality, etc.; the negation which does not determine the counterpositiveness of such absolute negation is not the negation of the middle term existence. Now as to the second inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery, the negation of the major term, as determined by the relation and essence determining it, is the negation of the negation of smoke in the relation of selfsameness; the undetermined substratum-hood of such negation is the substratum-hood of the hill, etc.; the absolute negation existing in the substratum of this substratum-hood is the negation of the negation of the non-fire pertaining to the hill, etc.; the negation which does not determine the counterpositiveness of such absolute negation, is the negation of non-fire; the middle term, non-fiery, contains the counterpositiveness of non-fire; and this is what the definition demands.

V

Thus the fourth definition is stretched, by Mathurānātha to its utmost limit to make it applicable to instances to which it is not supposed to be applicable by other commentators. Even Raghunātha thinks that the fourth definition fails in an inference in which the major term or the substratum of its negation is strictly one individual⁴⁰. The same writer further says that the fourth definition does not apply to the correct inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. But these defects disappear in the fifth definition and hence, the necessity of the fifth definition lies in the fourth definition being involved in the fallacy of narrowness, being inapplicable to some correct inferences. But we have seen that Mathurānātha apprehends these objections against the fourth definition and replies to them by interpreting the adjective "all" (sakala), in the fourth definition, to be meaning not many, but entirely without any remainder, and by taking the determinant of pervasion (vyāpakatāvachchedaka) to be connoting the non-determination of the counterpositive-ness of the absolute negation existing in the substratum of the pervaded. Hence Mathurānātha's explanation of the necessity of the fifth definition should have been different from that of Raghunātha. But Mathurānātha does not state definitely the necessity of the fifth definition. Perhaps he has a tacit agreement with Raghunātha, though he goes beyond the latter in his discussions on the fourth definition.

However, let us now explain the fifth definition. Invariable concomitance is the non-existence (in the middle term) as determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term (sādhyavadanyāvṛttitvam). In other words, when the existence pertaining to the objects, which are different from the substratum of the major term, is negated in the middle term, we get vyāpti. Let us see how this definition applies

⁴⁰. Vide *Vyāpti-pañcaka—dīdhiti*.

to an inference in which the major term is strictly one individual, and secondly, to the inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery. As an example of the first type of inference, let us take the inference, it has the negation of that colour, as it has the negation of that taste. The major term, in this case, is the negation of that colour. The substratum of the major term is the substratum of the negation of that colour. The difference of the substratum of the major term is the substratum of that colour. The existence pertaining to the substratum of that colour is negated in the middle term, the negation of that taste. Hence the definition applies to the inference.

In the next place, in the inference, it is non-smoky, as it is non-fiery, the major term is non-smoke. The substratum of the major term is the lake, red-hot iron-bar, etc. The difference of the substratum of the major term is the hill, yard, etc. Existence pertaining to the hill, yard, etc., is negated in the middle term non-fire.

Now, as to the significance of terms in the fifth definition, Mathurānātha points out that, as in the first definition, the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, should be a general negation, if the definition is not to be too-wide. Consider, for example, the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire. The definition applies to this inference, if the non-existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, be not a general non-existence. For existence pertaining to the lake which is different from the substratum of smoke, is negated in the middle term fire and this is the requirement of the definition. But if the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term, be a general negation, then the existence pertaining to a particular object, different from the substratum of the major term, cannot be logically shown to be negated in the middle term, but the existence of all such

objects should be shown to be negated. But all objects different from the substratum of the major term smoke, have not their existence negated in the middle term fire; the existence of red-hot iron-ball, for example, is not negated in fire. Thus the definition does not apply to a fallacious inference, if the negation of existence determined by the difference of the substratum of the major term is a general negation.

But it may be said that the difference of the substratum of the major term implies all objects different from it and as such the proposition that the negation of existence pertaining to objects different from the substratum of the major term should be a general negation, is a tautology.

But this objection misses its mark, as the definition applies to the fallacious inference, it has smoke, as it has fire, when the non-existence of the difference of the substratum of the major term smoke, and that of another particular thing, say water, i.e., two negations, are shown to be in the middle term fire. But if it is definitely stated that the non-existence of the difference of the substratum of the major term, is a general non-existence, then the question of a dual non-existence does not arise.

Thus the negation of existence pertaining to objects different from the support of the major term, is a general negation in the fifth definition. But what is the precise meaning of the term "difference of the substratum of the major term" in the definition? This means, according to Mathurānātha, a negation whose counterpositiveness is determined by mutual negation and the essence of the substratum of the major term. In other words, the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of the major term is implied by the expression, "difference of the substratum of the major term." If the expression means only the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term, then the definition turns to be too-narrow. Consider, for example,

the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The substratum of the major term, fire, may be the hill, yard, field, etc. The mutual negation of these may be the propositions, the hill is not the yard, the yard is not the field; the yard is not the hill and so on. The hill, therefore, may be available as the mutual negation or difference of the yard which is also a substratum of fire. Existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke. Hence the definition does not apply to this inference.

But if the counterpositive of the mutual negation of the substratum of the major term is determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, then we can speak only of the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire and not of the propositions, the hill is not the yard, the yard is not the hill and so on. And the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire exists in the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. Thus the definition applies to the inference and is not narrow.

But just as the counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term is to be determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, so it is to be determined by mutual negation; for the same counterpositive, undetermined by the latter, leads to the fallacy of narrowness. Let us again take the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke. The counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term, as determined by its essence, is the difference of the essence of the substratum of fire. This may be the proposition, "the essence of the substratum of fire does not exist," *i.e.*, the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire.⁴¹ The absolute ne-

⁴¹ Though the proposition, "the substratum of fire does not exist," is an absolute negation, yet it may be a mutual negation or difference, according to the rule that the difference of the difference of

gation of the essence of the substratum of fire may exist on the hill. The existence pertaining to the hill is not negated in smoke. Hence the definition does not apply to the inference and is narrow.

But the definition well applies to the above inference, if the counterpositive of the difference of the substratum of the major term is determined both by the essence of the substratum of the major term and by mutual negation. Let us explain this. The substratum of the major term is the substratum of fire. The difference of the substratum of fire, as determined by its essence and mutual negation, gives the mutual negation of the essence of the substratum of fire, *i.e.*, the proposition, it is not the essence of the substratum of fire. (Here the question of the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire does not come in. For the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire is a mutual negation, according to the rule that the difference of the difference of the self-determined is the self; the absolute negation of the essence of the substratum of fire thus has dual counterpositiveness in this case, one existing on the essence of the substratum of fire and the other on the difference of the self-determined; the former of these counterpositives is determined by the essence of the substratum of the major term, but not by mutual negation, and the latter is determined by mutual negation, but not by the essence of the substratum of the major term.) The mutual negation or difference of the essence of the substratum of fire exists in the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. And this is what the definition demands.

The significance of the difference of the substratum of the major term, in the fifth definition of *vyāpti*, is now

the self-determined (*i.e.*, the self) is the self. The difference of the difference of absolute negation is absolute negation. Hence absolute negation may be mutual negation or difference.

brought out, and the import of the substratum of the major term now remains to be explained. Such a substratum is to be taken, says Mathurānātha, in the relation determining the major term. In the inference, it has fire, as it has smoke, the relation determining the major term is conjunction. If the substratum of the major term fire is taken in any other relation, say, inherence, then the definition does not apply to the inference. For the part of fire is the substratum of fire in the relation of inherence and the difference of the part of fire is also the hill the existence pertaining to which is not negated in smoke. But the substratum of fire, in the relation of conjunction, is the hill, yard, etc., and the difference of the hill, yard, etc., is the lake the existence determined by which is negated in smoke. Hence the relation determining the substratum of the major term should be the same as determines the major term.

We have finished, by this time, our discussions on the five provisional definitions of vyāpti. It is now our task to explain how these five definitions do not apply to the kevalānvayī inference. But before we take up this explanation, let us see what a kevalānvayī inference means.

Kevalānvayī Inference : The term kevalānvayī is defined by Gaṅgeśa⁴² as the non-counterpositiveness of the absolute negation which has existence (Vṛttimadatyantābhāva-pratīyogitvam). This definition means that when an absolute negation is possible, it has a counterpositive; the kevalānvayī is not this counterpositive. In other words, the kevalānvayī term is purely affirmative. If we take the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, the term nameable is purely affirmative, because there is nothing that is not nameable.

Let us now see how the definitions are frustrated in this kevalānvayī inference. The first definition states that vyāpti is the negation, in the middle term, of existence of

⁴² *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, part II, P. 572, Calcutta.

objects having a substratum in which the major term is negated. But the major term, in this inference, is universally present. Hence the substratum of the negation of the major term is not available.

The second definition takes *vyāpti* to be the negation of existence-having a substratum which contains such a negation of the major term as exists in a substratum different from that of the major term. But in the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, the substratum different from that of the major term is absurd, as the major term is all pervading.

According to the third definition, *vyāpti* is the non-co-existence of the mutual negation, whose counterpositive is the substratum of the major term, with the middle term. But the question of the difference or mutual negation of the substratum of the major term does not arise in the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable, nameability being completely pervasive.

The fourth definition asserts that *vyāpti* is the counterpositiveness of the negation existing in the entire substratum, without any remainder, of the negation of the major term. But the substratum of the negation of the major term is absurd in an inference whose major term is universally present. Hence the definition does not apply to the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable.

Lastly, the fifth definition requires the difference of the substratum of the major term and as such does not apply to the inference, it is nameable, as it is knowable.

AN ADVAITIC ACCOUNT OF THE THEORY OF KARMA¹

By H. G. NARAHARI

WORKS there are in Sanskrit literature which deal with specific concepts of religion and philosophy ; but it is only very rarely that we come across a manual whose essential aim is to give an account of the very popular ethical doctrine, the theory of Karma. This indeed is the purpose of the *Prārabdhadvāntasamḥṛti*² of Acyutaśarma Moḍak, the exposition of the doctrine of Karma in which it is the object of this paper to consider.

Acyutaśarma Moḍak is a recent writer, though he has written profusely in philosophy and literature. To him we also owe the *Mahāvākyārthamañjarī*,³ the *Advaitajalajāta*⁴, the *Avaidikadhikṛti* or *Śāktasāsana*⁵, the *Pūrṇānandendukaumudī*⁶, a commentary on the *Jīvanmuktiviveka* of Vidyāraṇya, and the *Sāhityasāra*⁷ with his own gloss, the *Sarasāmōda*. From his own colophons in some of the works enumerated above,

¹ This paper was prepared by me as Research Fellow in the Sanskrit Department of the Madras University.

² The only known Ms. of this work is in paper and is deposited in the Government, Oriental Library, Mysore, with the shelf-number B. 223. I have described this Ms. at length in the *New Indian Antiquary*, 1942, V. 115 ff. It is this Ms. that I have used in the preparation of this paper.

³ A Ms. of this is deposited in the *Adyar Library*, and this bears the shelf-number XI. D. 14.

⁴ A reference is made to this work in the *Prārabdhadvāntasamḥṛti* see H. G. Narahari, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 1941, V. 196 f.

⁵ This is also mentioned in the *Prārabdhadvāntasamḥṛti* (Mysore Ms., p. 26) : . . . *upapāditam madiye . . . avaidikadhikṛtināmake śāktasāsane ca*.

⁶ This is printed in the *Anandasrama Sanskrit Series* (No. 20), Poona, 1926.

⁷ Printed by the Nirnayasagara Press, Bombay, in 1906.

it is clear that he must have lived sometime between 1775 and 1850 A.D.⁸

In the *Prārabdhadvāntasambhṛti* with which work we are concerned at present, the author imposes on us no personal views of his on this much discussed theory. He bases all his conclusions on the writings of Sarvajñātman, Vidyāranya, Madhusūdanasarasvatī, and on the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. This is the reason why I have called his exposition "an advaitic account," and have not associated it with his own name. The purpose of the work is not only to give a traditional account, but also to combat the prevailing misconception that the theory of Karma means that all man's deeds, beginning from his birth till the moment of his death, are only pre-determined by his past deeds (*prārabdhakarma*).

All human activity (*vyavahāra*), we are told⁹, can be classified under three heads, into that produced from Karma which has begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*), that from subconsciousness (*samskāra*), and lastly that from human volition (*prayatna*). Of these three factors which govern our entire experience in this world, *prārabdha* is that by which we are to understand the aggregate of virtuous and wicked deeds which, under the direction of providence, attain to the stage when they can begin to operate¹⁰. Also, among these deeds, the most powerful virtue, vice, or fear, brings about the next body, and that which is instrumental in determining the kind of birth, the length of life, and the variety of experience of the individual, gets the designation of *prārabdha*¹¹; the kind of birth (*jāti*) may be brāhmaṇa and the

⁸ H. G. Narahari, *Adyar Library Bulletin*, 1941, V. 197.

⁹ *Prārabdhakaraṇakāḥ saṃskāraṇakāḥ prayatnakaraṇakāścāpi nīrūktavyavahāraḥ* (Mysore Ms., p. 4)

¹⁰ *Prārabdham nāma debapātavyavahitottarakṣaṇe paramēśvaraprevi-
tāṇi sarvāṇi seṇcitapunyaḥpāpāni phaladānonmukhāni bhavanti* (Mysore Ms.,
loc. cit.)

¹¹ *...teṣāṃmadhye yad balavat puṇyam vā pāpam vā bhayam vā tad bhāvi-
deham ārabhat jātyāyur bhogadaṃ prārabdhamity ucyate* (Ibid.)

like, if the deeds are a mixture of virtue and vice, low birth if they are purely vicious, and a godly birth if the deeds are purely virtuous. The duration of life (*āyus*) may be one hundred years and so on. The experience (*bhoga*) may, as is well-known, be pleasure or pain, originating respectively through favourable and unfavourable circumstances.¹² The variety in the degree of the enjoyment of happiness or the suffering from pain is due to individual causes. The experience of all men consists in the reaping of the fruits of deeds which are a mixture of virtue and vice.¹³

It has already been stated that our experience consists either of pleasure (*sukha*) or of pain (*duḥkha*). Of these, pleasure is of three kinds¹⁴ : it may be illusory (*prātibhāsika*), or actual (*vyāvahārika*), or else it may first be imaginary and then become actual (*prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārika*).

Among these, that which is produced by the abnormal working of the intellect is illusory happiness (*doṣasamsargīkaraṇajanyam*¹⁵ *prātibhāsikam*) that which is not thus produced (*tad ajanyam*),¹⁶ and hence rational is called actual happiness (*vyāvahārika sukha*). This "actual happiness" is of two varieties ; it may either be that produced from the sight of a beautiful (*ramya*) object, or else that produced when one sees what is dear (*priya*) to him. These two kinds of feelings are but the different phases of the mind, manifesting themselves when the observer gets the knowledge of things which are beautiful and so on (*te ca tattad draṣṭṛgrbhītaramyādīvastuviṣayakajñānottarabhāvicittavṛttiviśeṣatve eva*).¹⁷

The terms *ramyatva* and *priyatva* do not stand in the same relation as *ghaṭatva* and *kalaśatva* stand to each other. To one suffering from fever, sweet rice undoubtedly appears

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4 ff.

to be beautiful (*ramya*), but as the face of a woman is to an unattached ascetic, so is it undesirable to him. Gold does appear beautiful even to a recluse, but only he does not consider it worth possessing. In the same way, the bitterest medicine is desirable to one afflicted with disease, but the man is never known to enjoy it; and the recluse finds the bundle of rags in the street desirable but not charming. It is therefore evident that, inasmuch as that which is beautiful (*ramya*) need not also be dear (*priya*) to the same person, it is wrong to think that the two are synonymous.

A further subdivision is possible of that which is dear (*priya*) while the same cannot be said of that which is beautiful (*ramya*). It can be ordinary (*priya*), moderate (*moda*) or the highest (*pramoda*), accordingly as the object is seen, obtained and enjoyed (*priyam tu viśayasya dr̥ṣṭatvalabdhavabbuktatvaiḥ priyamodapramodanāmakam*)¹⁸. That which is charming to see, that which is acquired on account of its charm, and lastly, that which is enjoyed on account of its charm, constitute thus the three varieties of the dear (*priya*).

None of these distinctions made of actual happiness (*vyāvahārika-sukha*) have been made in the case of illusory (*prātibhāsika*) happiness. This is because the moment we begin to posit there also distinctions accordingly as the object is seen, obtained or enjoyed, the pleasure so derived from an illusory object ceases to be different from that derived from an actual object. We then get the third variety of happiness mentioned already, namely, actual happiness derived from illusion (*prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārikasukha*).¹⁹

The pleasure derived from an illusory object may, no doubt, be similar to happiness derived from a real object, but still the two are not the same; actual happiness is that

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5 ff.

derived by seeing, obtaining or enjoying an object which is really existent; but in illusory happiness the object is not there. Its presence is supposed, and the person feels the same amount of joy as if the object were really before him. This is a phenomenon the truth of which cannot be denied. It has the evidence of experience. A man may be excited with thirst, and it is possible that the mere sight of a mirage may quench his thirst. One who has never seen a rose and has a yearning to see one, may be completely but falsely delighted to see an artificial rose made of paper. The man is as happy as if a real rose were in front of him. The pleasure in the two cases does not vary, but the object differs; while in the case of actual happiness, the pleasure is derived from an actual object, it is an imaginary object that brings happiness in the case of illusory happiness. The effect is the same, but the cause is different. This variety of happiness which, though derived from an imaginary object, does not differ in essence from that derived from an actual object, is designated *actual happiness derived from illusion* (*prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārikasukha*).

It is here the fault of the observer who fails to distinguish between the real and the imagined, between appearance and reality. A person may tread on a rope at dark, and his very imagination that he tramped on a serpent may kill him. The same person would no doubt die if he trod on an actual cobra, but here he is killed by a false imagination that he trod on a cobra when he really trod on a rope. It is not the rope that is responsible for his death, but it is the rope taken for the cobra, the *imaginary cobra*, that took away his life. It is, therefore, quite possible that imaginary objects can bring about effects which are not different in nature from those of actual objects²⁰. If the person himself subsequently realized that he was under an illusion when

²⁰ *Ibid.*, P. 6.

he mistook the rope for the snake, or the paper rose for the real rose, he would neither die in the former case, nor be happy in the latter case. The former case gives no opportunity for the person to correct himself, and in the latter case he is too much beladen with illusion to think of correcting himself. Inasmuch as real effects have come from illusion in both these cases, the experience here belongs to a category which is different both from pure actuality and pure illusion. It has the elements of both, and is hence classified under a separate head.

The three kinds of happiness considered so far, i.e., *prātibhāsika*, *vyāvahārika* and *prātibhāsikajanyavyāvahārika* are each further three-fold²¹, accordingly as they are manifested (*vyakta*), imperceptible (*avyakta*) and partially manifested (*iśadvyakta*). The first of these varieties has already been explained. Only the last two need explanation.

One experiences imperceptible pleasure (*avyakta sukha*) on cognizing an object which he does not like (even to see) [*avyaktam tu svāniṣṭaviśayaka Jñānadaśāyāmeva*²²]. For instance, though one loses courage on seeing before him a tiger, rendered powerless by magic, the thought that the animal is quite unable to (kill him gives him some pleasure (*yathā mantraugha vaśīkṛtavvyāgbṛādijñānād bhītyāditāmasavṛttan vadhyatvādyabdhāvāt tatra ānandāmsābbhivyaktibhāvena . .*²³). His trepidation at the sight of the tiger may not allow him to express this joy. The existence of such joy does, however, become evident on subjecting the mind of such a person to psycho-analysis. Pleasure exists in him, but only it is not knowable. It is *avyakta*, incapable of perception, though capable of detection.

Further, it is common that, on seeing a tiger, paralysed through magic or imprisoned in a cage, one begins to admire

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

its beauty and feels happy at its charms (*sa eva vyāghrādi yādi mantrādinā vaśikṛto yadi vā pañjarādiniruddhascet ramyo' yamiti dhīviśaya iti tādrjñānajananyavrttau īśadvyaktaṁ tat, tadvrtter-śatsātvikatvāt*).²⁴ The person is all the while conscious that, if only the tiger were free, he could not, with the same courage stand before it, enjoying the pleasure of its sight. The thought, however, that the tiger, in its present surroundings, is capable of no harm, gives him the courage to employ his aesthetic faculties on seeing the animal. While the man feels happy at the sight of the beautiful animal, he shudders when he remembers the ferocity of the charming beast before him in its wild state. A careful analysis of the mind of such a person shows that it is not pure joy that he is experiencing, but that his is a pleasure that is not untainted with a feeling of terror. His pleasure is, therefore, partial, and here we have an illustration of the third variety of happiness mentioned above, of pleasure that is slightly manifest (*īśadvyak-tasukha*)²⁵

All that has been discussed so far constituted what may be called social pleasure (*laukikakāryasukha*).²⁶ There are also other varieties like religious happiness (*vaidikasukha*), assumed happiness (*ābhāryānanda*), and subconscious happiness (*vāsanānanda*)²⁷; religious happiness is, again, fourfold; it may be happiness produced as a result of the worship of a symbol (*pratīkopāśana*), of concentration on the Ego (*abrahmagrhopāśana*), of profound meditation (*nididhyāśana*), or of firm knowledge of the self (*dṛḍhatamātmājñāna*); "assumed happiness" may be illustrated by such experiences as 'My son is a veritable desire-yielding gem' (*putro mama cintāmaṇireva*), 'Penance is as good as my wish-yielding tree' (*samādhīr mama kalpadruma eva*)²⁸; "subconscious happiness"

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6 ff.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 7 ff.

is the pleasure one feels while unconscious or sound asleep.²⁹ In the words of Vidyāraṇya³⁰, it is that happiness which is reflected in the self (*buddhivṛtti*) when one is in a state of unconsciousness or deep sleep :

मूर्च्छासुषुप्त्योर्यद् ज्ञानं भाति तत्कारणं धियः ।

कारणे बुद्धिवृत्ती च स्वानन्दः प्रतिबिम्बति ॥

This pleasure varies in accordance with the sleep the man had. As the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*³¹ would have there are three kinds of sleep, pure (*sātvika*), mixed (*rājasa*) and impure (*tāmasa*), depending on the nature of food taken. This "subconscious happiness" is described³² thus :

किञ्चित्कालं प्रबुद्धस्य ब्रह्मानन्दस्य वासना ।

अनुगच्छेद्यतस्तूष्णीमास्ते निविषयः सुखी ॥

"The impression of the highest happiness (*brahmānanda*) continues (in the mind of man) for some time, even after he has got up from sleep ; this makes him keep silent and feel happy, even in the absence of the necessary agent (to make him happy)."

Happiness, as such is defined by Mādhavācārya to whom it means only contentment (*ānando nāma tr̥ptih*)³³. Desire for an object is an impediment in the way of enjoying happiness in its fullness. And happiness necessarily comes to every individual, the moment he gets into possession of his desired object, though it has to be acknowledged that the degree of happiness depends on the degree of the vanquishment of desire.³⁴

Pain (*duḥkha*) also admits of all the distinctions we have made in the case of happiness (*sukha*)³⁵. One thing need be

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8 *Anubhūtiprakāśa* (Bombay Edn.), p. 14.

³¹ IV. 3. 197-8, p. 832 (Benares Edn.).

³² Bhāratīrthaguru, *yogānanda*, cited in Mysore Ms. B. 223, p. 8

³³ *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, VIII. 2.

³⁴ Mysore Ms., p. 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

noticed in this connection that, so far as the qualities of imperceptibility (*avyakta*) and partial manifestation (*īśādyakta*) are concerned, they are common to both illusory (*prātibhāsika*) pain and actual (*vyāvahārika*) pain³⁶. Pain becomes manifest (*vyakta*) in an individual when, for instance, a thorn pricks him and he becomes conscious of the prick.³⁷

But if the person, in his zeal for plucking the rose from the thorny bush, does not mind the many pricks he receives in the course of his attempt, we have there an illustration of pain that is partially manifest (*īśādyaktaduḥkha*)³⁸. It does not mean that the person does not feel the prick of the thorn. He does feel it. Only his enthusiasm in getting the rose, and the final triumph on getting it, do not allow him to remember, after getting the flower, the pain he might have felt by the prick of the thorns in the course of his attempt. The pain of the man is, therefore, only of secondary importance. It is existent but not prominent, noticeable but not notable. It thus remains slightly manifest (*īśādyakta*), not glaringly palatable.

In illustration of pain that is imperceptible (*avyakta*), the gardener can serve as an illustration³⁹. Let us suppose that he is desirous of having a rose-plant in his garden. This desire spurs him into action, and we see him make the greatest effort to bring a plant and install it in his garden. He may have to buy the plant a dealer, and may be required to pay a very heavy price for it. Or else, he might be required to go a very long and tiresome distance to bring the plant from a friend. But neither the distance nor the cost of the plant, matters anything to the gardener. All that

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

he wants is the rose-plant, and he is prepared to sacrifice anything to get it.

We will suppose that the gardener has succeeded in bringing a plant to his garden, and in planting it there. Still his trouble is not yet over. He is required to keep, day and night, a strict watch over it. An ill-disposed neighbour may steal it, or a wild animal may trample upon it. And, to prevent all that, it is necessary for him to keep strict vigilance. To do that, he may be required even to sacrifice his food and drink, but he does not mind. He is content if his plant is safe.

This is not all. Rearing the plant till it grows big enough to yield him beautiful blossoms, is no easy task. It means a good deal of exertion to the gardener. But he cares for the plant more than he does for himself.

The plant is now capable of yielding blossoms. When the first bud comes, and when that bud develops into a beautiful flower, can we measure the joy of the gardener who is privileged to see the plant which he reared with his own hands, yield a beautiful blossom? His exultation is immeasurable.

But still do we see that he experiences all this joy for nothing? He has paid the highest price to get this happiness. Day and night he has toiled, and today he reaps the benefit of all his exertions. His exertion has brought him a considerable amount of pain. But the sight of the beautiful flower on his own plant makes him forget, at once, all the pain he might have felt before. He is now in transportations of joy, and can forget all his pain. We only see him rejoice, not sorry for all he did to get this happiness. Even if the pain he suffered is there in him not forgotten, it is only ignored. It might be remembered, but it is also subsequently stifled within. Consequently, pain, though existent, remains unnoticed. It is imperceptible (*avyakta*), felt by the person but not shown by him.

Having noticed so far the varieties of happiness (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), it is now necessary to seek for the cause or causes of these two which together constitute our experience on earth. There are three factors which bring happiness or misery to man⁴⁰. His past karma which has begun to operate (*prārabdhakarma*) determines as stated already, the kind of birth, the length of life and the variety of experience of the individual. But it is also true that a man's subconscious impressions (*samskāra*) sometimes bring him happiness or misery. Besides these two, there is also a third cause which is so instrumental. This is man's own will or effort (*prayatna*).

The pleasure that the individual enjoys when in meditation is due to his *prārabdhakarma*; the bliss that he experiences when in deep sleep comes from his subconscious impressions (*samskāra*); and the joy of the man, on seeing that the *kārīrī* sacrifice he performed has been immediately followed by a shower of rain, proceeds, doubtless, from his own effort (*prayatna*). It would be an error, says Acyutaśarma,⁴¹ to imagine that all happiness proceeds only from a man's *prārabdhakarma*, that like the bliss-in-meditation, sleep is the result of his past deeds, that sacrifices like the *kārīrī* only serve to remove the obstacle in the way of the shower of rain, and that it is *prārabdhakarma* alone that is actually responsible in bringing out the desired shower of rain. It is necessary to remember in this connection that it is only the individual soul (*Jīvopādhi*) that is bound to obey the dictates of the *prārabdhakarma* which determines to some extent its experience (*prārabdhabbogō'pi Jīvopādhikacaitanya-sya vaktavyaḥ*)⁴². We have on the authority of Vidyāranya⁴³

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *op.cit.*, p. 12.

that there is no delimiting adjunct to the supreme-soul in the state of deep sleep :

जीवोपाधिलयेऽप्यत्र तद्वीजस्यावशेषतः ।

तदुपाधिक एवास्मिन्देहेऽन्येद्युः प्रबुध्यते ॥

During this state, when is felt only the state of non-duality, it is also stated that unrestrained desire, sin from deeds, and fear from the result of these deeds are all absent⁴⁴ :

समाधिमुत्तरोरद्वैतं स्वयमेवानुभूयते ।

छन्दः कामः कर्मपापं भयं स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।

अनर्थरूपत्रितयमद्वैते वीक्ष्यते न हि ॥

What follows necessarily from this discussion is that, in deep sleep there is no influence of karma (*tāmasasuptau karmaphalābbhāvaḥ*)⁴⁵. It would thus be wrong to hold that the bliss one experiences in deep sleep comes only from his *prārabdhakarma*. Similarly it has to be acknowledged that the pleasure owing to rain, which one derives after the performances of sacrifices like the *kārīrī*, is only due to his individual effort (*prayatna*), and that it is wrong to impute it to the influence of past deeds.⁴⁶

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*⁴⁷, it is stated that, when a man dies, his soul does not go alone, but that it carries with it its knowledge, its deeds, and its previous reminiscences (*ibaivāgne tam vidyākarmaṇī samamvārabbete pūrvaprajñā ca*). To borrow the metaphor from Śaṅkara⁴⁸, the soul is a loaded cart which makes a good amount of noise as it moves, and feeds on knowledge, deeds and reminiscences of the past ; by knowledge (*vidyā*) we are to understand⁴⁹ a man's knowledge of his deeds in his previous life, and this may be true (*pramā*), false (*bhrama*), or dubious (*samśaya*) ;

⁴⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtikasāra*, IV. 3. 264-65.

⁴⁵ Mysore Ms., p. 12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ IV. 4. 2.

⁴⁸ Śaṅkara's commentary on above.

⁴⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtikasāra*, IV. 4. 40 ; Mysore Ms., p. 13.

the deeds (*karma*) means⁵⁰ those bodily actions which are either meritorious or vicious ; and the reminiscences of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*), also called *vāsanā* consist of impressions of deeds whose fruits have either been stored up or enjoyed.⁵¹

It is also possible to distinguish a man's deeds in his previous lives, inasmuch as they are moderate (*madhya*), slow (*manda*) and acute (*tīvra*) ; that which has three parts of *sātvika* and one part of *rājasa*, and which is hence predominantly virtuous, belongs to the first of these varieties ; that which is partially *sātvik* and partially *rājasa* and which is an admixture of virtue and vice, belongs to the second group ; and lastly, that which has one part of *sātvika* and three parts of *rājasa* in it, and in which vice is predominant, belongs to the last.⁵²

It is therefore this triad (corresponding to *prārabdha* and *saṃskāra* in the previous classification) which follows a man from his previous life, that is capable of determining to a certain extent, his happiness or misery⁵³. There is also besides the man's individual volition (*prayatna*), which can bring him happiness or misery. Granted that sacrifices like the *kārīrī* serve only to remove obstacles which impede rainfall, even then the efficacy of human effort cannot be denied. The reason is not far to seek. It is easy to see that, at least in removing the obstacle, the individual effort of man has not been in vain.⁵⁴

While interpreting the passage from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* Sarvajñātman and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī seem to differ from Vidyāraṇya. According to Vidyāraṇya⁵⁵, *vidyā* and *karma* are each three-fold ; the former may be true (*saṃyak*), false (*mithyā*), or doubtful (*saṃśaya*) ; and the latter

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 41 ; Mysore Ms., *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, IV. 4. 42 ; Mysore Ms., *Ibid.*

⁵² Mysore Ms., p. 14.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 18 ; *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtikasāra*, IV. 4. 38-39.

⁵⁴ Mysore Ms., p. 18.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

may be performed by the mind (*manas*), or tongue (*vāk*), or body (*kāya*), and may be of perceivable or imperceivable effect (*dr̥ṣṭādr̥ṣṭārtharūpa*) accordingly as it is ordinary (*laukika*) or scriptural (*śāstrīya*). *Sāṃskāra*, according to him, means impressions of deeds whose fruits have either been enjoyed or stored up (*karma tatphalopabbhogayor manoniṣṭhas-sāṃskārah*).

To Sarvajñātman⁵⁶, though three names are mentioned in the Upaniṣadic sentence in question, all must be taken in the sense of *karma* alone, and, like the cause, *karma*, *vidyā* and *karma* are both four-fold.

In the face of the Upaniṣadic statement, *puṇyaḥ puṇyena karmaṇā bhavati, pāpaḥ pāpena*,⁵⁷ which definitely asserts the efficacy of a man's good and bad deeds in determining his future birth, it is difficult to accept, says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī⁵⁸, that *vidyā* and *pūrvaprajñā* also can be so instrumental. It is only *karma* that determines man's existence, and hence all the three conjointly and inseparably form the cause, *vidyā*, *karma* and *pūrvaprajñā*, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī adds, are each fourfold; they are either ordained by scriptures (*śāstravibhita*), or prohibited by scriptures (*śāstrapratīṣiddha*), or not enjoined (*vibhita-sama*), or even not prohibited (*niṣiddhasama*); the first variety of *vidyā* may be illustrated by devotion to God and the like (*devatādyupāsana*), and the second, by the study of wicked literature (*asatśāstraviṣaya*), seeing of the Gaṅgā (*gaṅgādarsana*) belongs to the third group because, though a beneficial act, it has not been enjoined; and looking at a corpse which is terrific (*bībhatsitaśavādiviṣaya*) belongs to the last variety because, though undesirable, it has not been prohibited by scriptural injunction. *Karma* similarly becomes fourfold accordingly as it means a sacrifice (*yāga*), or a murder (*vadha*),

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵⁷ *Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, III. 2. 13.

⁵⁸ Mysore, Ms. loc. cit.

or (killing of an animal for) food (*āhāra*) or (killing for) sport (*vibhāra*). Likewise, reminiscence of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*) admits of four groups like *mūlānubhava* and so on.

There is thus an apparent difference of opinion between Vidyāraṇya on the one hand, and Sarvajñātman and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the other; to the former the triad beginning with *vidyā* are threefold, while to the latter these are divisible fourfold. But really there is no such difficulty at all. When Vidyāraṇya speaks of three varieties of *vidyā* he only refers to a further classification of *vidyā* already known to be fourfold, accordingly as it is *vibhita* and so on. Inasmuch as the latter can be further classified into true (*samyak*), false (*mithyā*) and dubious (*saṁśaya*), there are in all twelve kinds of knowledge (*vidyā*).⁵⁹

Karma similarly admits of twenty-four varieties⁶⁰; the four varieties propounded by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (viz., *vibhita* etc.) become threefold each accordingly as man thinks of it (*mānasika*), talks about it (*vācika*), and performs it (*kāyika*), thus giving us twelve varieties of *karma*; these twelve varieties can be further subdivided into those which are of visible fruit (*dr̥ṣṭārtha*) and those of invisible fruit (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*), so that in all we have twenty-four varieties of *karma*.

Reminiscence of the past (*pūrvaprajñā*), in so far as it means the reminiscent impressions of the twelve varieties of *vidyā*, becomes first twelve-fold. It means also the reminiscent impressions of *karma*. Karma, as we have already seen, is twenty-four-fold; but since the impression of *karma* means both of that which has been stored up (*sañcita*) as well as of that whose results have been enjoyed, we have in all forty-eight varieties of *karma* whose reminiscent impressions

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

constitute a part of *pūrvaprajñā*. The past experience of the individual consists, as stated before, of the reminiscent impressions of a man's knowledge (*vidyā*) as well as of his deeds. *Vidyā* is twelve-fold, and *karma* forty-eight-fold. Adding up, *pūrvaprajñā* becomes sixty-fold.⁶¹

There are thus ninety-six elements in the apparatus which bring about the birth of the individual (*janmārambhaka-sāmagrī evaṁ saṁnavatireva*)⁶².

This apparatus, no doubt, continues to operate till the man is emancipated, but there is ample scope for *Jīvanmukti*. The man's *vidyā*, which brings him his body, is not destroyed till his body also meets its end, his *karma*, no doubt, remains till pleasure and pain are brought to him, and his *pūrvaprajñā* or *vāsanā* continues to exist till he experiences pleasure or pain with his body. Still it has to be admitted that, if the man should have no interest in the results of the deeds, scriptural or profane, performed by him, and should realize, by means of true knowledge (*viveka*), that they are all transient, his *vāsanās* are destroyed and he gets himself installed on the throne of *Jīvanmukti*.⁶³

There need be no doubt whether the statement that *pūrvaprajñā*, also called *vāsanā* or *bhāvanā*, is the cause for the deeds, scriptural or otherwise, which bring pleasure or pain to man, is based on any authority. Even in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*,⁶⁴ there is the statement :—

स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्रतुर्भवति यत्क्रतुर्भवति यत्कर्म कुरुते यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभि-
सम्पद्यते ॥

True, only *kṛma* and *kratu* are mentioned here as the originators of *karma*, and there is no reference to *vāsanā* or *pūrvaprajñā*. But ancient teachers, it may be noted in this

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁶⁴ IV. 4. 5.

⁶⁵ *Bṛhadāranyakavārtikasāra*, IV. 4. 93-103, 44-45.

context, have equated *kāma* with *pūrvaprajñā* or *vāsanā*. The following verses⁶⁵ of Vidyāranya may be noted in this connection :

वासना कर्म विद्या च त्रयं जन्मप्रयोजकम् ।
 उक्तं तत्र प्रधानत्वं कर्मणः श्रूयते पुनः ॥
 उत्तमाधमदेहाख्यवैषम्यं कर्मणा भवेत् ।
 देहे विद्यावासनाभ्यां भवेद्भोगस्य कौशलम् ॥
 कर्म साध्वेव कर्तव्यमिच्छताभ्युदयं परम् ।
 पापं तु सर्वदा हेयं दुःखेभ्यस्त्रायता भृशम् ॥
 पूर्वकाण्डपरा इत्थं कर्म प्राधान्यमूचिरे ।
 अथ वेदान्तशास्त्रज्ञाः प्राहुः कामप्रधानताम् ॥
 पुमानादौ काममय एव भत्वा तु कर्मकृत् ।
 यतोऽयं कर्मणां हेतुः कामोऽतोऽस्य प्रधानता ॥
 अकामस्य क्रिया काचिद्दृश्यते नेह कस्यचित् ।
 यद्यद्वि कुरुते जन्तुस्तत्तत्कामस्य चेष्टितम् ॥
 इत्येतद्विशदीकर्तुं स यथेत्युत्तरा श्रुतिः ।
 कामः क्रतुः कर्म जन्मेत्येषामेष क्रमो भवेत् ॥
 पुंसो या विषयापेक्षा स काम इति भण्यते ।
 स एव वर्धमानः सन् क्रतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यते ॥
 रुचेरतिशयः काम्ये विषये क्रतुरीर्यते ।
 पाक्षिकं कर्म कामे स्यात्करोत्येव क्रतौ सति ॥
 पुण्यपापात्मकं कर्म ह्यपूर्वादृष्टशब्दितम् ।
 उत्तमाधमजन्मास्य फलं प्रोक्तं पुराऽपि च ॥
 लोकेऽपि यादृशः कामस्तादृजिनश्चयवांस्तथा ।
 कर्म कृत्वा फलं गच्छेत्तच्छुभाशुभयोः समम् ॥
 पूर्वप्रज्ञा तदुद्भूतविद्यायाः कर्मणस्तथा ।
 ताभ्यां च भावनोद्भूतिरित्यन्योऽन्यस्य हेतुता ॥
 कर्मणो भुज्यमाणस्य परिशेषो हि भावना ।
 मूलं च जायमानस्य प्रधानं तेन भावना ॥

For achieving *Jīvanmukti* what is necessary is, as stated already, vigorous efforts to destroy one's *vāsanā* (*mabāprayāt-nataḥ satataṁ vāsanā-kṣayaṁ sampādyā*)⁶⁶. There need now be no misgivings about the ability of the individual to coun-

⁶⁶ Mysore Ms., p. 26.

teract the influence of his *prārabdhakarma* and *vāsana*⁶⁷. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*⁶⁸, there is a long discourse by Vasiṣṭha where he speaks to Rāma of the supreme power of human volition (*prayatna*) which makes it prevail even over *prārabdha* (the previous deeds of man which have begun to operate in having brought out the body). Not only is individual volition (*prayatna*) able to transcend the influence of *karma* which has begun its operation (*prārabdha*), it also helps the individual to put forth his necessary endeavour to fight Destiny which is no more than the sum total of man's deeds, and even to take up to these practices which are necessary to bring the aspirant final Beatitude.

It is thus clear that man's actions in this world are controlled by three factors, his past actions (*prārabdhakarma*), his subconscious impressions (*samskāra*), and his volition (*prayatna*). It may be that, to a great extent, his happiness or misery proceeds from the first two causes. But the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* would have us remember in this connection that it is wrong to consider them as the only causes and that their power over man is unassailable. It points out that there is still another cause on which human experience in this world is, to a certain extent, dependent, this is his own individual effort (*prayatna*). Of the three causes this last is the most powerful, and has the capacity to withstand the influence of the other two. The *prārabdhakarma* and the *samskāras* may induce the individual to do certain things, but his *prayatna* helps him to resist their influence.⁶⁹

We thus see that, though a man's *prārabdhakarma* and *samskāras* may induce him to do certain things, they cannot compel him to do anything. He has the power of veto in his hands, the freedom to resist their influence or to succumb

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ H. G. Narahari *Adyar Library Bulletin*, February 1946, pp. 35 ff.

⁶⁹ H. G. Narahari, *New Indian Antiquary*, 1942, V. 118.

to it. And if he should not use the power vested in him, no body is to blame. He cannot condemn his *karma* for, while it tempted him, it did not force him, and he was at full liberty to direct himself as he liked. The theory of *karma* is, therefore, neither pessimistic nor fatalistic. Nor does it teach Predeterminism. All that we are to understand by it is that, of the three factors that guide man's destiny in this world, his *prārabdhakarma*, i.e., his deeds in his previous life or lives, is one of the most important.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ H. G. Narahari, *Aryan Path*, 1940, XI. 603 ff.; *New Indian Antiquary*, *loc. cit.*

THE RELATION OF THE GĪTĀ WITH THE R̥GVEDA

By V. B. ATHAVALÉ

IN the May 1946 issue of the '*Prabuddha-Bharata*' monthly, I have already proved that the composition of the *Gītā* poem took place in 3016 B.C. In the *Gita* we find references to some proper names of people in the ancient times. In the third chapter there is a quotation by Prajāpati. The words 'पुरोवाच प्रजापतिः' clearly show that Prajāpati was an important personality in the ancient times. G. III. 20, gives the name Janaka. G. IV. 1, gives the names Vivasvān, Manu, Ikṣvāku. The author of the *Gītā* tells in the next two verses that he is tracing the history of the Yoga secret to ancient persons as far back as it was possible. In the tenth chapter, there is a reference to seven great Sages of the past and the four sons of Manu, who succeeded him. The name Bhṛgu is specially mentioned as a prominent personality among the seven sages. There is Viṣṇu of Aditi; Bṛhaspati, chief among the priests; Uśanā of Kavi. Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana, the author of the *Gītā*, must have collected the information from some old literature. There is no doubt that the references are to the ancient Vedic literature. For, the word "वेदः" is directly mentioned in the *Gītā* many times. G. XV. 18 "वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः" is evidently a reference to the *Puruṣa* hymn of the *R̥g-Veda*.

No one has tried so far to trace the exact source of the references. The aim of this article is to trace the exact source of each proper name and try to arrange the names in geneological family succession, G. X.6, "येषां लोके इमाः प्रजाः न महर्षयः सप्त पूर्वं चत्वारो मनवः तथा ।" clearly states that the history of the people on this earth can be traced only up to the seven great Brāhmaṇa families and the Kṣatriya Rājarsi family of

Vivasvān. We must establish as to who were the contemporaries in the Brāhmaṇa and Kṣatriya families.

R. 10. 63. 7, येष्यो होत्रां प्रथमा मा येजे मनुः समिद्धाग्निः मनसा सप्त होतृभिः। is a ṛc by Gaya Plata. It is addressed to 'Viśvedevās.' It states that Manu was the first to propitiate the gods with seven priests by offering sticks (Samid) in the sacrificial fire. The verse X. 6 in the *Gītā* is clearly a reference to the ṛc mentioned above. This proves that the seven sages were contemporaries of Manu. Bhṛgu was thus a contemporary of Manu. *Gītā* mentions the name prominently because Bhṛgu was the first to invent Araṇi, a machine to produce fire by rubbing two logs of wood. Six Ṛṣis¹ have extolled Bhṛgu for this in eight different ṛcs.

Gaya Plata tells in R. 10. 63. 1, "परावतो ये दिधीषन् आप्यं मनुप्रीतासो जनीमा विवस्वतः। ययातेनद्रिषस्य बर्हिषि विश्वेदेवाः आसते।" that let all the gods take the grass seats offered by Yayāti, a son of Nahuṣa, whose father was Manu, who was the son of Vivasvān. This ṛc shows clearly that Gaya is a priest of Yayāti and he is giving the names of the ancestors of Yayāti. In the 7th ṛc of the same hymn, Gaya is arguing that because Manu was the first to praise the gods by offering oblations in the fire, the gods must come in the sacrifice of the grand-son of Manu.

We can even trace the name of the chief of the seven priests in this first sacrifice by Manu. R. 8. 27.1 "अग्निरुक्थो पुरोहितो ग्रावाणो बहिरध्वरे।" is a ṛc by Manu addressed to "Viśvedevās." He gives the name of his priest to be Agni. This can be verified by a hymn of Agni himself, the name of whose father was Saucika. R. 10. 52. 1, is a ṛc addressed to 'Viśvedevās' by Agni. विश्वेदेवाः शास्तन मा ययेह होतावृतो मनवै यन्निषद्य। I, surrounded by priests, am praising you for Manu.

¹ Nodha R. 1.58.6, and R. 1.60.1. Dirghatamas. R. 1.140.2, and R. 1.143.4. Paruchepa R. 1.127.7 Bharadvāja R. 6.15.2. Vāmadeva R. 4.7.1. Somahūti. R. 2.4.2.

Because the name of the priest should not be confused with Agni, the fire, people called him *Āṅgirā*. *Gōtama* in R. 1. 83. 4, आदंगिराः प्रथमं दधिरे वय इद्वाग्नयः शम्या ये सुकृत्यया " tells that it was *Āṅgirā* who was the first to put oblations in the sacrificial fire. *Parāśara*, in R. 1. 71. 2 & 3 " पितरो न उक्त्यै रद्वि रुजन् अंगिरसो रवेण । दधवृतं धनयन्नस्य धीतिमादिदर्यो... । tells that it was our ancestor *Āṅgirā*, who cleared the way to heaven and he was the first to establish the sacrificial fire. The opening hymn of *Rġ-Veda* " अग्निमीडे पुरोहितं । अंगिरः । अग्ने सुपयनो भव " also calls Agni a priest², and to avoid confusion between Agni the priest, and Agni the fire, puts the words " *Āṅgiraḥ agne* " together.

As we get in the *Rġ-Veda*, the hymns directly by *Manu* and *Āṅgirā*, and they refer to each other in their hymns, it is evident that they were contemporaries. *Vivasvān* was the father of *Manu*, and *Saucika* was the father of *Agni*. *Vivasvān* is a son of *Aditi*. But *Aditi* is the name of the mother of *Vivasvān*. For, *Manu* refers to the name in R. 8.27.5, देव्यदिते सद्ने पत्स्येमहि । as *Devī Aditi*. 'We do not know the name of the father of *Vivasvān*. We cannot extend backward the genealogy of *Manu* beyond *Aditi*. In the case of *Āṅgirā* of the *Brāhmaṇa* family, we know only the name of his father. In *Rġ-Veda*, we find hymns by *Manu*, *Agni*, etc., and their successors. There are no hymns either by *Aditi*, *Vivasvān* or *Saucika* in the *Rġ-Veda*. The names of the ancestors are mentioned by *Manu* and others in their hymns. As *Manu* was a contemporary of *Āṅgirā*, *Vivasvān*, the father of *Manu* must be a contemporary of *Saucika*, the father of *Āṅgirā*. As there are no hymns by these persons, it is not possible to give the additional verification by cross references. For instance, *Brhaspati*, a son of *Āṅgirā*, tells in R. 10.72.8 अष्टो पुत्रासो अदितेः that *Aditi*

² R. 1.105.14 ; R. 1.128.1 ; R. 6.16.9 ; R. 6.16.11 ; are the four additional *ṛcs* where Agni is mentioned to be a पुरोहित of *Manu*.

had eight sons. *Adhwaryu Brā.* gives the names as follows. (1) Viṣṇu, (2) Mitra, (3) Varuṇa, (4) Dhatru, (5) Aryamā, (6) Arīṣa, (7) Bhaga, (8) Vivasvān. This shows that Viṣṇu was the eldest brother of Vivasvān. These names are referred to in their hymns by Manu and others³, but there are no hymns by these persons. Viṣṇu is praised in the *R̥g-Veda* by Manu and other³ Ṛṣis. Vasiṣṭha, (R.7.99 & 100); Dīrghatamas, (R.1.154-156); Medhātithi, (R.1.22.16-21); Gotama, (R.1.90.9). The common feature in these praises is that the adjective 'उरुक्रमः' is repeated by every one. It must have been some valourous deed which gave protection to many people. One hymn tells, त्रीणि पदा विचक्रमे विष्णुः गोपा अदाभ्यः । अतो धर्माणि धारयन् विष्णोः कर्माणि पश्यत । विष्णोः किन्तु वीर्याणि प्रवो यः पार्थीवानि विममे रजांसि ।

Now, we shall see how Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana has referred to these hymns about Viṣṇu in the *Gītā*. *Gītā* gives quotations from the Vedic literature by the *Pratīka method*, which Vyāsa has copied from the Brāhmaṇa literature. The method is to choose some significant words from a ṛc and add the words प्राहुः, विदुः, उक्ताः to indicate that it is a quotation. *Gītā* IV. 1-2 gives the succession of names Vivasvān-Manu-Ikṣvāku and ends with words परंपरा प्राप्तं राजर्षयो विदुः. Manu had four sons. (1) Ikṣvāku, (2) Śaryāta, (3) Nābha, and (4) Nahuṣa. Śaryāta had a daughter, while Nābha had no issue. Thus Ikṣvāku and Nahuṣa were the only progenitors of the Manu family. Ikṣvāku being the oldest, he got the title of king-ship (मनुः वैवस्वतो राजा), which Manu had received, because he was the first to perform the fire sacrifice.

Gītā extends the succession backwards from Vivasvān to Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva. Arjuna at once contradicts the statement and shows the impossibility. "How can you, who are recently born, be the teacher of Yoga to Vivasvān, who

³ Manu. 8.27.8 ; Prajapati. 3.54.14 ; Vasuśrutā. 5.3.12.

lived in very ancient times?" Kṛṣṇa answers that "I have born many times for the sacred duty of protecting the pious and destroying the wicked. And I remember them all."

If Vivasvān got the Yoga secret from a certain person; the person must be some elder contemporary and competent enough to teach Vivasvān. We have already seen that Viṣṇu was the elder brother of Vivasvān and was praised for protecting and preserving Dharma in three strides. Thus it was Viṣṇu who must have taught Yoga to Vivasvān. *Gītā* X. 21 आदित्यानां विष्णुः tells exactly the same thing. In the chapter XI, Arjuna has twice addressed Kṛṣṇa as Viṣṇu. *Gītā* XI.18, uses the words 'त्वं शाश्वतधर्मगोप्ता सनातनः पुरुषः' which are congruent with 'विष्णुः गोपा अदाम्यः। अतो धर्माणि धारयन्'. "*Gītā* IV. 9, uses the words "जन्म कर्म च मे दिव्यं एवं" They correspond with विष्णोः कर्माणि पश्यतः...।" This proves clearly that Vyāsa is directly quoting from the *Rg-Veda*.

In the tenth chapter of the *Gītā*, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipāyana is depicting that Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva is a personality who can identify himself with any thing or person in the past, present or future. In the *Rg-Veda* times Vāmadeva was a well-known person, who could identify himself with any thing or person in the past or present. In R.4.27.1, गर्भेनुसन्नवेषाम वेदमहं देवानां जनीमानि विश्वा। Vāmadeva tells that he got this power when he was in the womb of his mother. I am quoting below a Jñāna ṛc by Vāmadeva Gautam and a parallelly congruent statement in the *Gītā*.

Vāmadeva Gautama

Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva

अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चाहं
कक्षीवान् ऋषिरस्मि विप्रः
अहं कुत्समार्जुनेयं नृञ्जे
अहं कविरुशना पश्यतामा

आदित्यानां अहं विष्णुः, ज्योतिषां रविः
मुनीनां अप्यहं व्यासो
पाण्डवानां धनंजयः
कवीनां उशना कविः

If Vāmadeva is identifying himself with Manu in the past, Kṛṣṇa is identifying himself with Viṣṇu. The sun in the sky is identical. Kākṣivān and Ārjuneya Kutsa, are the two contemporaries of Vāmadeva. Vyāsa and Arjuna are

the two contemporaries of Kṛṣṇa. Uśanā Kavi is again, common. This proves conclusively that Vyāsa has directly quoted the ṛc.

Now we shall turn to Prajāpati, whose speech is quoted in the *Gītā* from the second half of III.10, and concluded at the end of the verse 13. For, in the 16th verse, the word 'Pārtha' proves that Kṛṣṇa is addressing Arjuna. In the 15th verse, the verb 'विद्धि' shows that it is Arjuna who is being addressed by Kṛṣṇa. But the 14th and the 15th verse together form one sentence, where Kṛṣṇa is explaining the 'cycle' started by Prajāpati. The words वः, अवाप्स्यथ, भावयत, etc., indicating second person plural in the 11-13 verses, corroborate that Prajāpati is addressing the people.

First let me quote the ṛc with which the verses are congruent, and then I shall prove that it is by Prajāpati—

Gītā III.10-13.

R̥g-Veda X.117.8

अप्रदाय यो भुंक्ते स्तेन एव सः । भुंजते ते मोघं अन्नं विदते अप्रचेताः सत्यं ब्रवीमि वध
त्वघं पापाः यं पचंत्यात्मकारणात् । प्रव- इत् स तस्य । नार्यमणं पुष्यति नो
तितं चक्रं नानुवर्तयति इह यः । सः अधायुः सखायं केवलाघो भवति केवलादी ।
मोघं स जीवति ।

The congruence of all the important words proves that Vyāsa has written the verses directly from the ṛc. Now let us try to see if we can determine the identity of Prajāpati from the Vedic sources. In the *R̥g-Veda*, there are 66 ṛcs by Prajāpati. The name of his father is Viśvāmitra. There is a name Vimada in the Viśvāmitra family, whose father was Prajāpati. Vimada gives his name either as ऐंद्र विमद or प्राजापत्यः विमदः । This shows that Prajāpati was alternatively known as Indra. This can be corroborated from the fact that Indra is one of the Pravaras in the Viśvāmitra family. Vimada refers to Kakṣivān in R. 10.21.5, अयं कक्षीवतो मही विबोमदे । Kakṣivān refers to Vimada in R. 1.116.1, यावर्भगाय विमदाय जायं । This proves conclusively that Vimada and Kakṣivān were contemporaries. But we know that Vāmadeva was a contemporary of Kakṣivān. We know that Aṅgirā

was a contemporary of Manu. Vāmadeva was a son of Gotama, whose father was Rāhugaṇa, who was a son of Aṅgirā. Similarly, Kakṣivān was a son of Dirghatamas, whose father was Ucathya, who was a son of Aṅgirā. Thus the father of Vimada must be a contemporary of the father of Vāmadeva. We can thus fix the geneological position of Indra.

R.10.48.2 अहं इंद्रो रोधो... अथर्वण... । त्रिताय गा अज— is a ṛc by Indra. He says that he chastised Atharvan, and helped Trita. This Trita can be proved to be a contemporary of Rāhugaṇa. Because in R.9.38.2, Rāhugaṇa tells that the fingers of Trita are pounding the soma juice. Trita tells in R.1.105.17, that he had fallen in a well and was calling out for help. Brhaspati heard it and helped him to get out. This proves that Trita, Prajāpati (Indra), Brhaspati were all contemporaries.

Now we shall see how Prajāpati became known as the creator of Yajña. *Tait.7.1.1*, प्रजापतिः वाव ज्येष्ठः स ज्योतिष्टोमेन अग्रे अयजत् tells that Prajāpati was the first to worship through the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. We are not at present concerned with the exact form of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. It means that Prajāpati was the first to organize the Yajña as an institution where any work is undertaken for the common welfare of all the people concerned. R.10.130, is a hymn where Yajña is said to be the child of Prajāpati. R. 10. 121, is a hymn, where Prajāpati is called Ka.


Tait. Br. 2.2.10, gives an interesting episode about the way in which Prajāpati got the name Ka. Prajāpati first created only the gods. Indra was created later. The following talk ensued between Indra and Prajāpati.

Prajāpati :—‘Oh, Indra go to the heavens. You rule over the gods who live there.’ Indra went to the gods accordingly. The Gods asked him, ‘Who are You?’ Indra said, ‘My name is Indra, and Prajapāti has sent me to rule over you.’ Gods said, ‘We are older than you.’

How can you be our ruler?' 'What benefit can we derive from you?' Indra came back to Prajāpati and narrated what had happened. Indra saw that Prajāpati had a peculiar lustre on him. Indra asked Prajāpati to hand over the lustre to him so that he would rule over the Gods by that power. Then Prajāpati formed a sort of crown out of the lustre, and put it over the head of Indra. Then Indra was able to rule over the gods, and Prajāpati got the name Ka.

The story shows clearly that it was Prajāpati who laid the foundation of cooperative efforts for the common good of people. Food is the primary necessity of the people. The theme in the ṛc quoted is food. *Gītā* also says that it was Prajāpati, who set this wheel of food and efforts in motion first. Bṛhaspati was the chief priest in the Yajña Institution. R. 10.130.4, अनुष्टुभा सोम उक्थैः बृहस्पतेर्वाचं... tells that Bṛhaspati sang in Anuṣṭubh meter the Soma song. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* also tells that Aṅgirā was the first to sing the Sama chant. Then Bṛhaspati took up the work. It is thus clear that the statement in the *Gītā* about Bṛhaspati is based on the information from the *Rg-Veda* literature.

Here is the geneological table established on the evidence of cross references by different persons in the *Rg-Veda* hymns. Viśvasṛja was the organizer of 'सत्र' a variation of Yajña. Ayasya was the Sāma chanter. The case of तृत्समद changing his Gotra, gives an interesting confirmation to the correctness of the geneological table.



A CRITICAL SURVEY OF INDIAN AESTHETICS

By H. L. SHARMA

INTRODUCTORY

A constructive and critical study of the works of arts regarded as documents of aesthetic development of an admittedly genial Indian race, revealing the highest spiritual conditions at successive stages, and their interpretation in the light of the recently unearthed forces and factors of our mental life, is the most coveted but colossal task. A work of genuine art is eternally fresh and refreshing, for our appreciation for it grows with our insight into the dynamism of human nature : Our reflective enjoyment of an artistic creation grows by our growing realisation of what it reveals through, and conceals behind, the visible, audible or verbal symbols. Luckily in India, art-speculation has kept pace with art-creation : nay, even both the creative and critical activities have traced the same historiograph, rising and falling together, and, ultimately have met the same destiny. The present essay does not venture to re-construct the whole of the aesthetic life documented in the works of sculpture, architecture and painting and literature. It is, however, ambitious to present the main currents of our aesthetic consciousness, and, more, to rethink them in the light of the new psychological findings, and other speculative developments.

A HISTORICAL CONSPECTUS

A dark pall thickens around the earliest attempts of the sons of the soil at creation and expression according to their own genius and idiom. The Indus Valley Art (3000 B.C. with some cultural affinities with Babylon and Sumeria) breaks forth at a very high level of attainment of aesthetic

expression 'with a strong Dravidian flavour.' Some crudities and flat naturalism aside, the dance-poses of the bronze-girls (from the Mohenjodaro finds) and other coin-carvings fully represent the sensuous and buoyant character of the Indian artistic genius.¹

Nothing survives of the age that succeeded the Indus Valley civilization. But it was the age of the Aryan Contacts and colonization, the age of the vedic bards whose youthful exuberance and buoyancy of spirit, childlike simplicity and naturalism, gave us the lyrics that the Vedas are. It was also the age of the early epics.

The Vedic songs (Sama, Chanson, gesang, Sang, or Zang in languages of the Vedic family) are a masterpiece of lyrical poetry.² They contain the emotional outpourings of a heart deeply touched by the majesty and awe of Nature and her effulgence. The expression, unadorned and direct,

¹ Speaking of the Primitive Art, which is the truest art, Clive Bell gives three characteristics which are also true of India's primitive Art. They are : absence of representation, absence of technical swagger, sublimely impressive form. Ref. "Art." by Clive Bell.

'Representation' in Art does not seem to be native to India's soil. It is due to the Hellenic influence which has kept Europe under its sway for centuries. A creative genius does not represent, but *creates* 'significant forms' according to certain 'unknown and mysterious laws.'

² The Vedas are not consciously the works of poetry, though they are the best examples of poetic art. Lyricism in the Vedas does not mean that they are purely 'emotional.' But Indian Art-genius hates, by some necessity of its inherent constitution, the 'abstract emotion' arising from (a mathematical like) contemplation of 'formal beauty.' Formalist Aesthetics in Europe has become encumbered with a mass of mathematical formulae. In India we have kept clear of it. The Indian artist creates 'significant forms' and affords to give 'contemplative joy,' but fills in the 'forms' with 'Rasa,' an untranslatable Aesthetic term. From the start, Indian Aesthetics builds itself on a complete Metaphysics which makes 'bliss' to be the central element of Reality. That is the reason why Indian Arts have strong flavour of transcendentalism. It is also religious (though not sacerdotal) for it possesses 'high seriousness' characteristic of all true Art that is not meant for mere amusement but for serious occupation. This occupation is an 'end-in-itself' for it means 'a state of ecstasy' and a 'moment of gusto.'

is matchless in vigour and clarity. The moods of the songs vary from the frankly erotic to the terrible. The idiom of poetic expression is a prayer, or an apostrophe. There is an attempt at idealisation by overcoming the early naturalism, and there is the vigorous use of metaphor to idealise and comprehend the inner and outer harmonies. There are beautiful examples of filling in the outer with the inner passions and sentiments. Sometimes stirrings of the human soul body forth in vibrating symbols. The symbols, at times, attain such a vigour and vitality that the invisible becomes visible, the inaudible becomes an echoing voice and the intangible produces a feeling of happy contact. Symbolism sometimes rises to mystic heights. The Vedas, in brief, as the records of the first human attempts at creative expression reveal some dynamic elements in our aesthetic consciousness, singularly free as it is from the prepossessions of the later hardened and conventionalized forms, and poetic devices and embellishments. The Vedas are not the primitive patterns of human poetry: they are the ideal to be aimed at, for they did not arise out of the needs of the courtly majesty or for the enjoyment of the paymaster. They satisfy the supreme test of any high class art, namely, that art as the expression of the creative soul is its highest satisfaction.

For instance, the Vedic poetry is the best example of "the strange combination of imaginative autonomy and profound total harmony," "the maximum of independence combined with the most complete and pervasive subordination" which "is characteristic of the movement of creative imagery in its highest form." The Vedic poet was "a master of metaphor" and his "transcendentalism (which is only the name for a prodigious metaphor) was inevitable." There is the amazing "organic unity" born of a 'creative passion.' The medium of expression is not heavy—true to the language of aesthetic experience—each

word and imagery is a ringing symbol echoing some deep and sonorous voice from afar.

There was, however, no, conscious or unconscious, effort to develop an aesthetic theory. The conception of *rasa*, as the central element of beauty experience was there, if any, only in an embryonic stage. 'Rasa' had come to mean (from its original meaning of *soma rasa*), by a process of natural transference, the essence of things. And by the same process of emotional transference, *rasa*, *Ānanda* and *Ātman* (the living reality of all) were identified. "The *rasa* thus stands for 'Supreme Reality of the Universe,' 'self-luminous consciousness' and 'perennial bliss.'

There are, however, a few *Vāk sūktas*, from which some theory of poetic art can be gathered. There are many hints to indicate that there is some meaning, more interesting and important, beyond the visible symbolism of language. This is the Principle of suggestion in germ-form. The word 'Kavi' has been used in the sense of *Krānta-darśī*, which means that he is a person who sees more and beyond the ordinary man's vision. The poet is the seer. This view is not different from that of Kanovitch who regards the artist to be the true metaphysician. The poetic emotion is profound and from its profundity streams forth the cataract of divine songs. The sublime grandeur of Nature is used for emotional effect.

The Epic Age.—'Pathos' and 'rhythm' constitute the essence of *Vālmiki Aesthetics*. The *Kraufica* episode reveals the true nature of 'pathos' (so much abused by the later theorists) and also how 'pathos' flows out into the measured movement of symbolic expression. The Will-to-be, says Schopenhaur, is at the heart of the Being; it is the Will-to-power, replies Nietzsche. The first is the logical limit to which the Christian philosophy of sorrow and self-abnegation can go; the second,—if it is granted that the dynamics of the human mind works with contrasts,—is a reaction to the

first and pushes the pendulum to the other extreme—is the unlimited positive self assertion. Both the views are admirable, for both are atheistic and dynamic. But neither of them can give us a clue to the artists' consciousness. Schopenhauer's pessimistic negationism must exhaust itself in some form of nirvāṇa—like state where the passion-to-be is dried up. The second leads to a sadistic (other-destroying, cult, but ultimately turns upon itself—it must become a masochistic (self-annihilating) tendency.

An artists' metaphysic is much different. It is the "*Will-to-Beauty*,"³ he says, which is at the heart of things, the centre from which everything radiates and to which everything returns. The *Will-to-beauty* is an unconscious—surge of pure emotion which moves the whole stream of evolution. It is the sole creative force. Pure emotion, which is the same thing as *Will-to-beauty*, best fulfils itself in the raptures of sex-love between man and woman. For, there is no better example of the "Harmonic movement" of emotion, of the best finished rhythm and rapture, of creation and fruition, than that of its overflow in sex-excitement. Any other content which this emotion may be filled with arises only in a "religio-economic order" of the society. In a completely socialist order of collective life, there is room only for the sex-emotion. The harmonic movement of the sex-emotion is due to the contrast which its needs must create. Man and woman are sharply contrasted and that is the reason why there is so complete harmony between them. But even this harmony, for such is the stern demand of the law of emotion, must create its own contrast. The sex-emotion must touch its climax and then must experience a dead crash. This will be the complete beauty, achievement of the fullest harmony upon which any further improvement will have marring effect.

³ *The Will-to-Beauty*: Kanovitch.

This is the only key with which we can unlock the mystery of art-consciousness concealed behind the Kraufica story. 'Pathos' reveals a peak of emotional tide in a complete harmony with itself, which is also the complete rhythm and beauty. 'Pathos' are the real emanating source from which gushes forth the fountain of pure poetry. We may not accept the whole of this metaphysics of Kanovitch; it must, however, be conceded that the poetic emotion (the creative intuition of passion of Croce) fills out itself from within with 'pathos' and, following its own law, creates a rhythm and harmony in the midst of contrast.

The *Rāmāyana*, as an example of the highest creative art, offers problems of great Aesthetic interest, viz., what tremendous forces must be at work to lead to such a sublime art-creation? Why art is intensely appealing? The first question cannot be touched upon without entering into mystic regions. The Indian theorists coming after Vālmiki could not take the second question, for they were not initiated into the subliminal forces of human life. An aesthetic based upon Psychoanalysis will have us believe that "situation," is but an infantile play of the censored 'Id', a paranoiac flood of self-delusion, and nothing more. Even 'sublimation' theory will explain its moral and social acceptability. The question, to admit of solution, will require some sounder metapsychology and metaphysics, something like that of Kanovitch.

The Kraufica episode is the "recurrent⁴ symbolic imagery" "which is somewhat analogous to the action of a recurrent theme or 'motif' in a musical fugue of sonata". Everything else leads to this and takes on its aesthetic quality from this. It seems to be the radiating centre of all aesthetic creation and enjoyment.

4, Caroline F.E. Spurgeon—*Shakespearean Criticism*.

Love,⁵ from which springs all life, reaches its climax, in Sītā and Rāma. But, love unless it creates its contrast and meets an utter crash, will not bring about harmony, hence no beauty no rhythm. This is how we can understand the source of aesthetic appeal of tragedies⁶, in which alone art reaches its perfection; for the *Rāmāyaṇa* is but a tragedy.⁷ This is also how we can distinguish between the 'artistic and what is merely sensational.'

The Age of Maurya Art and After.—We have no clue to the state of aesthetic development after the age of the Epics, till we come to the Maurya period. It is known as the age

⁵ Metaphysics, based upon the metapsychology of Jung and Freud, does not hesitate now to regard life as an offspring of love, and this is the 'sex-love' in its healthy form. Jung quotes in his '*Psychology of the Unconscious*,' Miss Miller as unconsciously singing of love and life thus:—

When the eternal first gave love

A myriad hearts sprang into life

Ears filled with music, eyes with light

Pealed forth with hearts with love all rife. All glory to the God of love.

On this metapsychology, the artist bases his metaphysics "Love is at the very heart of things, ever expanding into creation, fruition and fulfilment and pushes on the stream of evolution to create harmony, beauty and rhythm. 'Love is Kāma, Libido, Elan Vital. The Upaniṣads speak of creation springing from Kāma.

⁶ Incidentally we can now re-think the Aristotelian conceptions of Tragedy, 'Pathos' and 'Catharsis.' 'Pathos' as the deepest emotional stirrings, creates a harmony of contrasts by following its inner law, and, thus becomes the source of tragic feeling. 'Catharsis' is only the release of the pent-up emotional energy.

Not the pure will of Kant, or the will of Schopenhauer or that of Nietzsche or the surge of life of Bergson, is the truly creative and fructifying energy. It is Emotion, says Kanovitch, but it seeks consciousness without which it will be blind. Kanovitch errs, like Bergson, in trying to get mind out of emotion. Mind, life and Emotion are equally fundamental and are irreducible minima.

⁷ The conformist Indian dramatists taking their command from Bharata could not develop the tragedy form of art on which rests the glory of Shakespeare. The Śakuntalā of Kālidāsa vibrates with a strong tragic note in spite of its apparent 'Comic' conclusion. It is a mistake to suppose that in tragedy there is pleasure of Catastrophe. This error has created questions yet unsolved. (vide:—Viśvanātha Bradely on '*Tragic feeling*'))

of Buddhist art, but save its theme and content, it is basically Indian art. "At this stage the robust, sculpture of earlier stages is made pliable by a penetrating flowing rhythm. The characteristic voluptuous forms of Indian art, through which pulsates the sap of life, make their appearance in the Yakṣi figures of the Bharhut stūpa rails . . . the buoyant, passionate figures of yakṣis on the Sanchi gate are in the true Indian tradition." The Aryan contribution to this is the symbolic presentation of artistic experience.

A little later, Kuṣāṇa and Andhra art emerges with "increased plastic penetration and greater vitality. Frankly sensuous, but in different way from the nudes of the Greek schools, are the female figures of mathura. Most probably originating from aboriginal symbols, of fertility, these graceful if voluminous nymphs fix, for centuries to come, the round-breasted, narrow-waisted and full-hipped ideal of female beauty for the Indian artist. In South more fluid, mellow and exuberant than in the North, it comes nearest to classic perfection." Greek contacts bring in the Hellenic representationism to Indian art. But it is simply absorbed in the Gandhara school of art.

The Age of Bharata : (First century B. C.) In Bharata we have the first theorist, the founder of the Rasa school of Poetics. Drama is the only form of aesthetic creation and aesthetic delight. Dance, music, poetry are "subordinate and ancillary to histrionics." Without attempting to discover the underlying rock of aesthetic experience, Bharata begins his enumeration of the emotional moods whose representation forms the main-spring of art-delight. "Through harmonious blending and representation of appropriate vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicari bhavas, there arises in the audience a certain climax of emotion, invariably accompanied by a thrill or sense of joy, and that is Rasa, or aesthetic pleasure." But Bharata does not explain why the representation of the various emotional moods (whether Lyrical,

Pathetic, Heroic or Horrible) in drama leads to a 'dramatic' delight when these very moods are not always pleasing really. As an aesthetic philosopher, he even fails to answer: what constitutes the organic unity of the vibhāvas (excitants) to make an emotional situation. Does the organic unity of the excitants constituting the 'situation' spring from the unity of creative passion, or, the emotion itself proceeds from a certain "harmonious blending"? But what brings about the harmony of "blending" itself? And, then, the all important question—what is the fountain-head of aesthetic creative energy?

Art philosophy of Bharata is in a seed-state. But he touches upon all points. Dance has the same aesthetic essence as poetry or music. These are all different forms of abhinaya or symbolic translations of aesthetic emotion. The analysis of 'timbre' into tonal complexes and 'tones', the different varieties of dances and the revealing powers of the bodily movements, the metres contributing to an emotional crescendo, and a host of other discussions relevant to the art and science of Histrionics, speak of a clear conception of "harmony" and "symmetry" in the mind of Bharata. Names occur of masters and authorities in different arts, which evinces that the forms of creative expression must have attained a high degree of perfection.

Classic Art of the Gupta Age and After:—A new content is given to Indian sculpture, painting and creative literature by the Paurāṇic Hinduism. "The latent naturalism of earlier periods is now overcome or harnessed to spiritual representation of superhuman, elementary or cosmical powers. The human figure is only the vehicle of transcendental forces. The boar incarnation of Viṣṇu in Udayagiri is of impressive power which changes primitive terror to a deep experience of divine force. The iconography of the Hindu Pantheon is developed during this age. During the 7th and 8th centuries, Indian Art reaches its high-water mark. The

surging power of Brāhmanism fills Indian sculpture with unheard of virility.⁸ Sweeping movement becomes an expression of force; the swelling rounded forms of human or animal bodies become signs of pent-up energies." The flower of aesthetic creation reaches its full bloom in the arts of Kālidāsa, Bhavabhūti, Bhāsa, Bhartṛhari, to name the chief of the master singers. Art becomes conscious of its capacity and fills itself with vigour and life. It attains to classic perfection. Born of his great creative genius, there is in Kālidāsa that marvel of masterly unity of 'pathos,' metaphor, music and diction which even to this day remains a coveted ideal. There seems to be nothing external in his art. For there every word is a ringing symbol charged with an "emotionally communicative virtue"; every metaphor is so tremendously revealing and aesthetically suggestive that it creates an intense and "intimate sense of things"; and his every 'form' a "storage of aesthetic irradiation," so that it gives a true relish of the Beautiful. Bhavabhūti and Bhāsa are perfect examples of a classic dramatic art. Bhartṛhari produces lifting lyrics, which have

⁸ Brāhmanism of this age seems to have derived its avatāravāda from the Buddhist Jatakas. The morphology of the Buddhist and the Hindu Art is exactly the same. One of the new finds at Rājghāṭa, Benares, depicts the "*Taccha Śukara Jātaka*" which Mr. Adris Banerjee assigns to the Pre-Gupta age. It is not a zoomorphic representation of a divinity, Vārāhi, but a pictorial depictum of a Buddhist Jataka. Other finds of the same place indicate the continuation of the same 'form' with a different 'content.' Brāhmanism even depicted Buddha as an incarnation of Viṣṇu. Later Śaivism and Śākta followed the same plan in painting and sculpture (Ref. *Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research Institute*, Vol. III Part I, Nov. 1945. *Some sculptures from Rajghat, Benares.*" by Adris Banerjee.) A study of the morphology of Indian Art is interesting from many points of view: (i) It proves that the division of Art into Jaina, Bauddha, Hindu, Śaiva & Śākta, is wrong. (ii) It lends support to Psycho-analytic Symbolism of Art and Religion. (Ref. *Jung and Freud*). (iii) It indicates that the creation of new art-forms, as vehicles of aesthetic charm, requires fertility of a very superior creative genius. The majority only imitates the conventional forms. (iv) The epochs of art-creation synchronise with all-round historical transitions and social revolution.

a parallel only in the Jayadeva of the *Gītagovinda*. From the viewpoint of art-development, it is really the golden age of India.

We can now historically expect the formulation of a complete theory of the Beautiful. There was now naturally a brisk speculative activity to comprehend within the four walls of a formula the complete beauty of creative art. It was also the age of productive speculation in other branches of knowledge and philosophy and Grammar. The Bharata formula was narrow and lop-sided, for it unduly emphasized the role of emotional element therein. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, and Vāmana advocated the cause of poetic figures, excellencies and diction respectively and gave their own formulae of 'Poetic Beauty.' That they failed was foredoomed for the same old faults of narrowness and rigidity.⁹

The Dhvanikāra¹⁰ was expected to be born in the middle of the 9th century to evolve the central principle of aesthetic creation from which all elements of poetic beauty flow out and to which they all flow in. The Dhvanikāra gathers up all elements in his pivotal principle of Suggestion. He discovered the Suggestive function of the linguistic symbols over and above the Indicative, Implicative and significative functions. Aesthetic sense cannot be directly conveyed by the primary function of language. That will be dull and without charm of surprise. The author of Dhvani rightly holds that aesthetic enjoyment cannot be passive or receptive state of the mind. Beauty-experience required

⁹ M. Müller is quoted by W. Knight in his "*The Philosophy of the Beautiful*" as holding that the Indians, in spite of their highly speculative acumen, pitifully lacked the sense of the Beautiful. India's paintings, her sculpture and creative literature, considered as works of art, are simply worthless. Even the Sanskrit language, he teaches, does not give any equivalent to "the Beautiful."

¹⁰ The scholars are divided in regard to the actual formulator of Dhvani theory. Some hold that Ānanda is both the author of Kārikās as well as the Vṛttis, while others argue that Kārikās and Vṛttis indicating two different stages of development, have different authors.

an intense and complex activity of the mind in passing from the expressed to the impressed. Similarly the secondary or implied sense or even the total meaning of the sentence cannot convey the aesthetic suggestion. A work of creative art with its language of symbols fills the mind with flood of aesthetic suggestions. Suggestive power of a symbol, therefore, is the true test of art and the suggested meaning (distinct from any other kinds of meaning) is the true aesthetic essence.

After cutting this new path it was stated that what is suggested can be an emotional mood, a metaphor revealing some imagery and a situation. Suggestive function was tried for the first time. Proper place and definition in the light of the new discovery were assigned to different aspects of poetic art. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, more than the Dhvanikāra gave a new content to figures, excellencies and diction based upon their psycho-aesthetic significance. It was a new approach to aesthetic theory of poetry.¹¹

*What followed after :—*The historic cycle of growth moves from creation to perfection through criticism and reactions. Then comes elaboration followed by stagnation and decay and revolt where the wheel completes its circle. The discovery of Dhvani was the high-land-mark. It aroused two reactions: one from Kuntala, and the other from Mahima Bhaṭṭa. But the work of the master was completed by Abhinava. Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha gave finishing-touches

¹¹ The theory of Dhvani does not actually arise from the Sphoṭa of Pāṇini Darśana (grammatical philosophy) though its author sought the authority of a very respectable branch of Indian speculation Vyākaraṇa. We may well remember that Abhidhā, Lakṣaṇā and Tātparyā functions of language have already been discovered before Dhvani or Vyāñjanā through the needs of vedic interpretation. The credit of the Dhvanikāra to enter into the vedic and grammatical speculation of his age and realise the significance of each of the discovered functions for art-enjoyment. He found that they exhaust themselves in grasping some form of primary meaning, the concealed power of art for enjoyment remaining thus uncovered by them.

their textbooks; the first carrying the message of Ānanda with his emphasis on rasa, alaṅkāra and vastu, the second following Abhinava with his stress on rasa alone. There was then nothing new save the brilliant scholastic activity.

Similar was the fate of art-creation.¹² Traditional forms lay like ice on the artists mind. Iconographical demands of the priests and the fastidiousness of art-critics chilled his imagination and creativity, till there was nothing but dull elaboration of decorative details in sculpture, painting and literature. No doubt that there were flashing sparks at times, such as the Rājasthānī painting of Rāgamālās, or "pictorial representation of musical moods" or the Moghul art with a delicate Persian touch and technical excellence. No wonder, therefore, that there was suppression of aesthetic activity during the Medieval India, till the period of Indian Renaissance.

Indian Renaissance and its Aesthetic value:—It is only after the Indian artist ceased slavishly to ape the genius and idiom of alien art that the results become appreciable. In the first part of the period of revival, there was intense search after proper themes and forms of creative expression. In Tagore's lyrics, poetic art attains a high degree of maturity with its revival of the soul-stirring mystic notes of the Upaniṣads. The medieval theme of devotion, and, a little later, of courtly eroticism, gave way to the themes of revolution, hope, mystic reading of the future in the language of stars and so on. New forms have been inspired by our Western contact. In paintings, Nand Lal Bose and Ukils, and in Dance, Udaya-śaṅkara, are leading the revival. There are so many currents in the present day aesthetic creation that they cannot be boiled down within a limited space. The art of cinema is open to question.

¹² The morphology of Art in Mediaeval India reveals a decadent conventionalism, created by the dictation of the Āgamas.

No theory of the current art can be formulated, for, yet immaturely engaged in 'trial and error' its dominant marks are not visible. Its emphasis is on the lyrical element as is natural of a romantic revival. A few epics of some merit have been tried in Hindi and Bengali with the old themes. The age has not yet discovered its own epic. The symbolism in lyrics has become clearer, purer and stronger. But sometimes the suggestion is uncertain, and symbols hazy. Naturalistic symbolism of the poets, painters and Dancers strikes a highly mystic note. There is also developing, side by side, a realistic symbolism under the western influence.¹³

Art as the creation of Beauty, the highest fulfilment of emotional life, its harmony and music, is the total manifestation of the total human personality of an age. It is so with the politico-economic social order, or the religio-ethical institutions. They too reveal the 'whole man.' But in artistic expression there is more freedom, as Art cannot be 'made to order.' Hence its tremendous revealing power and hence its vital connection with the spiritual life of a whole nation. An artist is thus the whole nation; he is the seer and the profound philosopher. This explains why art contains so many non-aesthetic elements. In fact, religion and morality, politics and

¹³ Rahasyavāda of Tagore and Chāyāvāda of other Indian painters seem to be the first natural reactions of the vanquished East to the victor-West. Rahasyavāda, singing of the vision of the Infinite and Eternal Bliss in the midst of the toil and turmoil of the finite mortals, is the victimised East's challenge. In the hands of Tagore, it rose to a rousing music. It was indeed a revival of the dormant genius of India. But Art required new creation of 'forms' and 'themes' as fit vehicles for the aesthetic experience of the Age, more than mere Renaissance. The slavish Hindi imitators of the Bengali Art do not seem to realise that the poetry of revival has now no appeal. Rahasyavāda in their hands has not blossomed. It has only withered. We require another Tagore to lead the Age now to the creation of new art-forms, less mystic and more real, to embody the new 'visions,' hopes and fears.

economics, of a society spin round a nucleus, the aesthetic element, like the electrons of an atom. A study of Aesthetics of a nation should centre round this nucleus by the exclusion of other non-aesthetic elements. A sound metaphysics and metapsychology, visualising the 'whole man' can only illumine this central element of art-experience, Beauty. Art-Philosophy and Psycho-aesthetics are other aids to study it. It is why the study of arts is the proper part of Philosophical speculation.

THE SCHOOLS OF AESTHETIC THEORY

INTRODUCTORY

Emotional life of a nation evolves channels of creation in arts and literature, as her ethical attitude evolves social and political institutions, and her thought-life develops scientific studies. Every passing phase of national life sets its themes for spiritual expression in the light of its experience, its hopes and fears. Thus arts and literature of a country speak of her articulate inner life in successive phases and stages.

Aesthetic speculation in India grew round literature, though its results admit of much wider application. Historically her sculpture, painting and architecture (her music and dance if anything survives of these) as well as her literature have common themes and forms, were fed by the same currents of vitality and emotion, suffered from the same causes and have now awakened to the same new vigour and life. Philosophically arts and creative literature differ in the nature of their language—their medium of expression—but their aesthetic appeal and essence are at bottom the same. As avenues of spiritual creation, one form of art is translatable into another. It is why the schools of Indian Poetics can be taken to represent the different schools of Aesthetic Theory without any violence.

THE RASA SCHOOL

'Emotionalism' of our age is the natural antithesis to the Cartesian rationalism, Newtonian machanism and the Benthamite utilitarianism, which three 'isms' matured into a grand chaos and discontent on the eve of the last century. It is now felt that Emotion, rather than Reason, can best understand the Spiritual demands for justice, harmony, beauty and peace and, restore, what Reason has destroyed, our sense of rhythm and rhyme of life. Metaphysics, metaphysics as well as psycho-aesthetics have strongly voiced their claim for Aesthetic Imperative, and have tried to quell the Ethical and Rational Imperatives. To comprehend the nature and significance of Rasa in the context of contemporary thinking, let us begin by expounding the new revolt.

"*The Will-to-Beauty*" is the natural culmination of a line of thought (trying to give an appropriate content to, first, Kant's Ding-an-sich and then to Hegel's *Logos*) which has passed through the metaphysical development of the "The Will to Live," 'The Will-to-power', 'the Will-to-believe' and the conceptions of the Elan Vital, 'Eros' and 'Id'. All these are the fruitions of an attempt to characterise the ultimate Reality wherewith to make 'creation,' 'Life' and 'Rhythmic harmonic movement' intelligible ideas to us. 'Emotion' is at the galactic centre; nay, it is the cosmic essence, out of whose tremendous commotion rise countless nebulae like sparks and form themselves into steller and planetary universes. The same Emotion, through its law of 'harmonic movement,' creates the habitable home, ascends through plant and animal life to the conscious Homo sapiens seeking ever "more complex harmony." Even in the human race, it "lives¹⁴ by the expression of its energy, (not by being quiescent)," and raises terrible revolts when any false religio-economic order of the society tries to sup-

¹⁴ Kānovitch: *The Will-to-Beauty*.

press its harmonic creation, its buoyant art, "laughter, health and abundance." "In order to realise itself in a fitting organism, the Will proceeds from steller harmony to the wonderment of landscape, its colour and sound, its moonlight, its sunrise and sunset, until it finds itself in the human form that will express its emotion."

"Human emotion is the climax of its energy . . . The true nature of woman is sincerity or emotion, to which intellect is subservient . . . Sex passion is nature's central motive by which means it rises to love and to its highest ecstatic beauty. "In art there is the most sincere expression of emotional rapture, its freedom, vigour and buoyancy. 'The artist is the true metaphysician. Beyond cause and effect the mind sees only mystery. The mind ever enquires for a cause, but the mind does not know that its search for a cause is necessitated by the need of contrasted action. The artist, however, is able to see that the contrasts flow into the motive and stop there."

Some such metaphysic underlies the theory of *Rasa*. But no conscious effort was ever made to base it so securely except through the needs of topical treatment. Abhinava and Viśvanātha, the two staunch advocates of *Rasa* as the central art-emotion, have only touched the fringe of a metaphysic. Abhinava,¹⁵ for instance, teaches that there is the greatest harmony of our being in an aesthetic sex-emotion while commenting on Ānand who cryptically sums up his position in the *Kārikā*.¹⁶ The latter even holds that emotion

¹⁵ Abhinava: *Locana*. रतौ हि समस्तदेवतिर्यङ् नरादिजातिष्वविच्छिन्नैव वासनास्त इति न कश्चित्तत्र तादृग्यो न हृदयसंवादमयः यतेरपि हि तन्वमत्करोऽस्त्येव . . . येषां . . . वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः ।

¹⁶ *Dhvanyāloka* 2.7. शृङ्गार एव मधुरः परः प्रह्लादनो रसः । तन्मयं काव्यमाश्रित्य माधुर्यं प्रतिष्ठितम् । Ānandvardhana also clearly indicates the creative function of the genius in art : अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरैकः प्रजापतिः । यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते । शृङ्गारी चेतकविः काव्ये ज्ञात

progressively¹⁷ gains in sweetness and energy as it becomes more and more pathetic. Viśvanātha is more lucid. Rasa¹⁸ is to him the self-luminous, effulgent and most absorbing ecstasy, a transcendental emotion of admiration in which a man feels most himself. It is an uninterrupted state of rapture which gives him a feeling of infinity, and in which all limits¹⁹ of individuality melt into a joy. He holds that 'pathos' intensify the art-emotion, but why? he does not answer.

We can, however, construct a better metaphysic for the Aesthetics of Emotion from our philosophical literature in which the use of 'Rasa' abounds and from which alone the whole suggestion seems to have been derived. 'Rasa'²⁰ in the Vedic literature came to mean a highly ecstatic state

रसमयं जगत् । स एव वीतरागश्चेत्त्रीरसं सर्वमेव तत् । भावानचेतनानपि चेतनवच्चेतनानचेतनवत् । व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतन्त्रतया ।

Man feels bound down to objective Reality at the perceptual level. The artist moves स्वतन्त्रतया in the acts of creative imagination. The artist creates an aesthetic order by the acts of his original genius, as the scientist creates rational order in the universe. I lay full and equal emphasis on 'creative' function in thought, emotion and conation, of which the products are Truth, Beauty and Goodness; and 'creation' 'elaboration.'

¹⁷ *Dhvanyāloka* 2.8. शृङ्गारे विप्रलम्भाख्ये कर्णे च प्रकर्षवत् । माधुर्यमाद्रितं याति यतस्तत्राधिकं मनः । *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

¹⁸ सत्त्वोद्रेकादखण्डस्वप्रकाशानन्दचिन्मयः । वेद्यान्तरस्पर्शशून्यो ब्रह्मास्वाद-सहोदरः ॥ लोकोत्तरचमत्कारप्राणः कैश्चित् प्रमातृभिः । स्वाकारवदभिन्नत्वेनायमास्वाद्यते रसः ॥ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*.

¹⁹ Viśvanātha quotes his grandfather: पुण्यवन्तः प्रमिष्वन्ति योगिवद्रस-सन्ततिम् । स्वादः काव्यार्थसम्भेदात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः ॥ परस्य न परस्येति, ममेति न ममेति च । तदास्वादेविभावादेः परिच्छेदो न विद्यते ॥ *Ibid*.

²⁰ The whole of the *Taitta. Āra. Valli* is the lucid exposition of a metaphysic which envisages 'emotion' as the central creative Reality. On such a view we can base a consistent art-theory. Ref. *Chndogya* 7.4 where आशा is the basic Reality [आशा वाव स्मराद्भूयसी] आशा is Kāma according to Śaṅkara. Greater than Āśā is only Prāṇa. [प्राणो वा आशया भूयात्] This is an important vitalistic conception in Upaniṣads. In the same context, the *Up.* speaks of Sukha and identifies it with Infinity (म) 7. 12, 23, 24.

which is our truest nature, by a process of emotional transference. Rasa is reality and Rasa is Ānanda of which our momentary joys are faint reflections. In Rasa one realizes one's highest truth. From Ānanda starts the cosmic movement and creation. Ānanda fills the entire space, for who could move and have his being without it. Ānanda is infinite and incomparable. It is also the most terrible, for it cannot be suppressed. It is the cause of all harmony and rhythm and creation.

Rasa, Ānanda, Sukha, Kāma are all used as synonyms. The upaniṣads even frankly compare the Rasa-emotion to an erotic²¹ experience. The highest blissful state is likened to the all-engulfing rapture of love-embrace²². Vātsyāyana, perhaps taking hint from this, describes sex-joy as Rasa-emotion. The Indian Science of Erotics took hint to liken the two, or, the upaniṣads, from the former—we cannot easily decide. But it is clear that the later writers in the Vedānta²³ gave a central place to Ānanda in their systems. The Nyāya²⁴ sūtras even openly criticized the Vedāntas for its hedonic stand. By now Rasa or Ānanda-emotion, an unfettered experience of an unalloyed joy, is an established philosophical question. But Ānanda is one aspect of

²¹ तद् यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरमेवायं पुरुषः प्राज्ञेनात्मना सम्परिष्वक्तो न बाह्यं किञ्चन वेद नान्तरम् । *Brha.* 4-3-21.

²² रसो रतिः प्रीतिर्भावो रागो वेगः समाष्टिरिति रतिपर्यायाः । Vātsyāyana describes the climax of sex emotion : “भावासक्ताः कामुकाः कामिनीनामिच्छन्त्यङ्गेष्वम्भसीत्र प्रवेष्टुम्” ॥ *Kāmasūtra* 2.1.05.

²³ *Pañcadaśī* 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 establishes the doctrine of Ānanda Ref. ब्रह्मसूत्र-आनन्दमयाधिकरण-Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja.

²⁴ *Nyāya Sūtra* with *Vātsyāyana Bhāṣya* 1.2.1. The science of Indian Erotics gives a theory of Pleasure : Ref. काम० सू० with जयमंगल-प्रीति-विशेषाः—अभ्यासादिभमाणाच्च तथा सम्प्रत्यादपि । विषयेभ्यश्च तत्रज्ञाः प्रीति-माहृश्चतुर्विधाम् । This corresponds to Function—Fiction—and Factum Pleasure of Modern Psychology. Ref. Narsworthy : *Psychology of childhood*.

the Reality. It is thus a correction to the extreme view of Kānovitch.

The buoyant and frankly sensuous character of the original Indian Art is in tune with this aesthetic conception of Reality. According to this view, God is intense passion and beauty which embodies itself in the varied creations of art. Art-experience, therefore, is genuine and progressive expression of Reality. This conception reigned over the literary and artistic creations in India, till in Śrīharṣa and his contemporaries and successors it degenerated into vulgar and ornate quibbling in the name of Śrīngāra-rasa. In Bhoja we find the systematic attempt to throne eroticism in place of the creative Emotion of true art. The later history of literary expression in India of Rīti age marks the culmination of this degeneration.

The Metaphysic of Emotion, as propounded by Kānovitch and the philosophical traditions of India, is the key to understand such great arts as those of Vālmīki, Kālidāsa, Shakespeare or Goethe. It gives the correct view of Beauty as an intensely satisfying experience of "Contemplative (platonic) order." It explains and establishes the Aesthetic Imperative in the order of things and saves the theory of art from the charges of pseudo satisfaction and paranoiac delusion by psycho-analysis.

Indian Art was but dimly aware of its deeper metaphysical basis. But a metapsychology underlying art was conceived even by Bharata. He spoke of the unconscious emotional disposition and their manifestation in art-creation and art-enjoyment. His successors implicitly accepting his authority could not critically enter into metapsychologic questions with regard to art and exhausted their sharp acumen in scholastic elaboration and wrangling. The Unconscious, as the subliminal rock of our life, the Id and Eros, as "a cauldron of seething excitements" and as one which "knows²⁵

²⁵ Freud: *New Introductory Lectures*.

no value, no good, no evil, no morality but only the economic and quantitative factor of the pleasure-principle" and from which the instinctual eathexes seeking discharge flow in incessant hurry inventing their "surrogates and symbolism,"—all these ideas were not present in their mental horizon. Interpretation of art in terms of deeper experience of the soul was not tried. Metapsychology had not developed into a system to throw light on the springs of art-creation and art-emotion.

Psycho-analytic approach to Art and Religion may itself be neurotic and its answers of knotty Aesthetic problems be unacceptable, yet the questions it has raised are fundamental. For the complete system of Art-philosophy we must now ask: what is the secret behind the creative power of art; what is the source of its universal and intense appeal; is in art a progressive and sublime fulfilment of our innermost being, or is there regression to infantile phantastic thinking? Is it the search after the "mother" in art as Jung would have it, or is it some form of "father-worship" under the fiat of the oedipus complex as Freud teaches us? Do the symbols of art-emotion follow the laws of scientific symbolism or, are they purely erotic? and as vehicles of libidinal fire, are only surrogates?

These questions were not, and could not be, raised by the Indian Aesthetic thinkers. They also confused the art-emotion with our emotional experiences arising in connection with the instincts. By the progressive emphasis on the role of instinctual emotions in poetic art, there was ultimately the apotheosis of sensual and sexual element to the detriment of aesthetic emotion and to the neglect of other art-elements. Dr. Sankaran rightly opines that the principle of Dhvani in the 9th century put some check to the excesses of the emotional theorists. But the art of the later centuries fully answers to the objections that it is an

'escape'²⁶ poetry, a pseudo-fulfilment and at times approaches mental debauchery.

Indeed the question of distinguishing Aesthetic emotion from the instinctual moods is an important one. Bharata, inspite of his analysis of the poetic sentiments and their excitants, ensuants and accessories, was not clearly aware of this distinction. Vāmana, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin use the words 'Saundarya,' 'Mādhurya' 'Ramanīyatā,' but their sense is exhausted in the meaning of embellishment only and never comes to signify 'The Beautiful' in Art. Not the Dhvanikāra, but his commentator, Abhinava comes very near defining the Beautiful as the contemplative joy in which the subject is absorbed²⁷ in the object's qualities. He quotes Bhaṭṭanāyaka²⁸ as holding that in art there is neither an ethical imperative nor a scientific attitude, but only an attitude of enjoyment. The object of Art is in rhythmic harmony²⁹ with the self; its contemplation induces Rasa in the heart which fills in the whole body like fire pervading the dry wood.

Mammaṭa, not more original than a text-book compiler, does not take due cognisance of the vital distinction, and

²⁶ That is the characteristic of recent poetry. Discontent and wistfulness wrought by the modern civilization now find an outlet in the poetry. Not a gust of joy springing at the wonders of the universe, but deep melancholy, dejection and pessimism only reflect their dark shadow in our contemporary art. Of course, there are, at times, brilliant flashes of real art. Ref. 'Yeats' in "*Tendencies in the 20th century Literature*." By Amiya Cakravarti.

²⁷ *Locana* : वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनम्

²⁸ *Ibid*. काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो, न बोद्धा न नियोगभाक् ।

²⁹ *Ibid* : योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः । शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना ॥ The author of बालप्रिया commentary interprets भावः भावना निरन्तररसचर्चणा । रसोद्भवः चर्चणाप्राणस्य रसस्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुः । And further : रसचर्चणैवात्मा स्वरूपं यस्य स आनन्दः । Here रसचर्चणा has been rendered as contemplative joy and हृदयसंवाद as emotional rhythmic harmony. Also *Locana* : शब्दसमर्प्यमा संवादसुन्दरविभावानुभाव-समुचितप्राणविनिवृष्ट इत्यादि वासनानुरागमुक्तमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्चणाव्यापार-रसनीयरूपे रसः ।

only elaborates his masters with slight refinements. His invocation³⁰ defines art creation as something brimming with ecstatic joys, illumined by the nine emotional moods and unfettered by the ordinary laws of nature. It is an overpowering emotion which dismisses everything inimical³¹ to it. Mammaṭa, however, in quoting Abhinava,³² with whom he is quite in accord, strikes a full note of an aesthetic philosopher. Art-joy or Rasa, he cites Abhinava, is a generic passion in which all individualising tendencies have been merged, all that is foreign to the aesthetic delight has been ruled out, and which as a powerful revelation through reiterative contemplation fills the whole heart and body with a transcendental emotion of admiration.

Nothing can be more complete and faithful than the above description of aesthetic experience. But it is wonder that Mammaṭa does not ask or answer how an instinctual emotion is transmuted by the artist to become an aesthetic emotion. How, for instance, the pathetic, the disgusting or the horrible, becomes in poetry or in painting a source of deep contemplative joy? While discussing the question of the process of aesthetic enjoyment, he quotes Bhaṭṭa³³

³⁰ *Kāvya-prakāśa* : नियतिकृतनियमरहितां ह्लादैकमयीमनन्धपरतंत्राम् ।
नवरसश्चिरां निमित्तिमादधती भारती कवेर्जयति ॥

³¹ *Ibid* : सकलप्रयोजनमौलिभूतं, समनन्तरमेव रसास्वादनसमुद्भूतं, विगलिता वेद्यान्तरमानन्दम् ।

³² *Ibid*. साधारणोपायवलात् तत्कालविगलितपरिमितप्रमातृभाववशोन्मीलित-
वेद्यान्तरसम्पर्कशून्यपरिमितभावेन प्रमात्रा सकलसहृदयसंवादभाजा साधारण्येन स्वाकार-
इवाभिन्नोऽपि गोचरीकृतश्चर्व्यमाणतैकप्राणो विभावादिजीवितावधिः पातकरसन्ध्यायेन
चर्व्यमानः पुर इव परिस्फुरन् हृदयमिव प्रविशन् सर्वाङ्गीणमिवालिङ्गन्, अन्यत्
सर्वमिव तिरोदधत् ब्रह्मास्वादमिवानुभावयन् अलौकिकचमत्कारकारी शृङ्गारादिको
रसः ।

³³ *Ibid*. विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मना भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानः
स्थायी सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयसंविद् विश्रान्तिसतत्त्वेन भोगेन भुज्यते इति भट्ट-
नायकः ॥ Thus Bhaṭṭanāyaka adds two more functions to language-
symbolism भावकत्व and भोजकत्व and dispenses with Dhvani.

nāyaka as teaching that the generalising function of the linguistic symbols causes traffic from the artist to the spectator. Now the generalising function (Bhāvakatva-Vyāpāra) of language is common to all symbols whether they are employed for artistic or non-artistic expression. How is it possible for this function (over and above the Primary function) to generalise an emotional experience (which is felt as absolutely personal) and to open the flood-gate of beauty-emotion? How through the device of generalization (साधारणोपायवलात्) the personal limitations are overthrown (तत्कालविगलितपरिमितप्रमातृभाव) ? And, how a generic emotion, if such a term were possible, could be identified with aesthetic experience?

Viśvanātha rose to realise the difficulty which he could not solve. How the 'pathos'³⁴ can give us a sense of joy in art? he asks, but replies that connoisseur's experience is the only testimony. Jagannātha³⁵ tries to correct the contradiction in Viśvanātha's definition by leaving out 'emotional' element and confining to 'beauty-element' only. He also defines "the beautiful" in art as a contemplative joy. Dr. S. K. De sums up Jagannātha's position which is not different from that of Abhinava in the following words: "A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment; the former is individual and immediately personal and therefore may be pleasureable or painful, but the latter is generic and disinterested and marked by an

³⁴ *Sāhityadarpaṇa*: कष्टादावपि रसे जायते यत्परं सुखं-सचेतसामनुभवः प्रमाणं तत्र केवलम् ॥ किञ्च तेषु यदा दुःखं न कोऽपि स्यात्तदुन्मुखः ॥ तथा रामायणादीनां भविता दुःखहेतुता ॥ ननु कथं दुःखकारणभ्यः सुखोत्पत्तिः ?" हेतुत्वं शोकहर्षादिर्गतेभ्यो लोकसंश्रयात्-शोकहर्षादयो लोके जायन्तां नाम लौकिकाः ॥ अलौकिकविभावत्वं प्राप्तेभ्यः ।

³⁵ काव्यसंश्रयात् सुखं संजायते तेभ्यः सर्वेभ्योऽपीति का क्षतिः ॥ तेभ्यः सुरते दन्तघातीदिभ्य इव सुखमेव जायते ॥ रमणीयार्थप्रतिपादकः शब्द काव्यम्... रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकगोचरता । लोकोत्तरं चाह्लादगतश्चमत्काराप-रस्पर्शानुभवसाक्षिको जातिविशेषः । कारणञ्च तदवच्छिन्नो भावनाविशेषः पुनःपुनरनुसन्धानात्मा ।

impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernormal (alaukika) and those things which cause disgust, fear sorrow in ordinary life and those normal emotions which are far from pleasant in actual experience, being conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal and bring about this supernormal pleasure which is not to be compared to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of Rasa ; it is also the essence of all poetry as conceived by Jagannātha.³⁶

No wonder that deep thinkers become aware of the oddity of the logical conception of a 'a generic,' 'disinterested' 'Supernormal' and 'impersonal joy' in art. An aesthetics basing itself on 'instinctual emotions' and recognizing no other source of 'beauty-experience' must resort to some such absurd phraseology. Bhavabhūti,³⁷ for instance, realised that the aesthetic emotion was essentially one which varies with other varying elements. His conception of 'pathos' was not that of exciting pity. 'Pathos' is at the very fountain-head of our existence. The present is empty and 'slipping underneath our feet,' the past, for ever gone and the dark future staring with mysterious eyes drags us on mercilessly. Whitehead puts it in a more scientific language, "The contrast between the comparative emptiness of Presentational Immediacy and the deep significance disclosed by causal efficacy is at the root of the pathos which haunts the world" (*Symbolism*, p. 55). It seems that he regarded the so-called nine rasas as the various moods of pathos in which the nine associated instinctual emotions are only elements. It might have been also clear to him that the natural emotion must not be overdone to mar the sweet-

³⁶ *Sanskrit Poetics*, Vol. II P. 320.

³⁷ *Uttāracarita* : एको रस करुण एव निमित्तभेदात् etc. The whole drama is an illustration of 'Pathos' in Whitehead's sense.

ness of beauty-emotion. Ben Johonson advised Shakespeare not to overshoot the mark of poetic beauty by emotional outbursts in the following words, "In the very torrent, tempest and I may say, the whirlwind of passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give sweetness." "Whatever feelings," writes Victor cousin, "art proposes to excite in us, they ought to be restrained and governed by the feeling of beauty. If it produces only pity or terrors beyond a certain limit, above all physical pity or terror, it revolts, it ceases to charm; it misses its proper effect, for an effect which is foreign is vulgar." (Judgment in Literature).

King Bhoja's³⁸ thesis also maintained the unity of aesthetic emotion. The other innate dispositions like Rati, etc., constellate round the *Sṛṅgāratattva* like solar constellation round the sun. Rasa is the emotionalization of the soul-energy (रसनीयतयात्मशक्तेः) which creates rhythm and harmony of life (संविदोऽनुभवहेतुः). It is the mind's most joyful occupation. Mere abundance of sex-passion does not constitute rasa at all. (रत्यादिभूमनि पुनर्वितथा रसोक्तिः।)

In fine we must ask: What is the conception of Rasa which when realised in any form of art transforms the objective world to a new³⁹ vision and invests our perceptions with inexhaustible⁴⁰ charm? Only a metapsychology (such that of Bergson or Freud) can answer the question, which substitutes a vital or emotional approach to Reality in

³⁸ *Sṛṅgāraprakāśa*: अप्रातिकूलिकतया मनसो मुदादेयः संविदोऽनुभवहेतुरिहाभिमानः। ज्ञेयो रसः स रसनीयतयात्मशक्ते रत्यादिभूमनि पुनर्वितथा रसोक्तिः॥ रत्यादयोऽर्धशतमेकविजितानि भावाः पृथग्विधविभावभुवो भवन्ति। शृङ्गारतत्त्वमभितः परिवारयन्तः सप्ताचिषं श्रुतिचया इव वर्धयन्ति॥ आभावानोदयमनन्यधिया जनेन सम्भाव्यते मनसि भावनया स भावः। यो भावनापथ्यमतीत्य विवर्तमानः साहृकतौ हृदि परं स्वदते रसोस्तैः॥

³⁹ *Dhvanyāloka* 4.4 दृष्टपूर्वा अपि ह्यर्थाः काव्ये रसपरिग्रहात्। सर्वे नवा इवाभान्ति मधुमास इव दुःमाः॥

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* 4.7 न च तेषां घटतेऽवधिः, न च ते दृश्यन्ते कथमपि पुनरुक्ताः। ये त्रिभ्रमाः प्रियाणामर्था वा सुकविवाणीनाम्॥ or cf. *Māgha*: क्षणे क्षणे यन्नवतामुपैति तदेव रूपं रमणीयतायाः; Keats'; A thing of beauty is joy for ever.

place of jejune intellectual outlook. A theory of instinctual emotions (such that of Bharata or McDougall) is inadequate which confuses the latter with aesthetic experience. Emotion which moves the stream of evolution, expands and creates harmony; emotion of which the entire universe with all colour, tone and brilliance, is the artistic expression, is the fountain of creative energy behind art. Enjoyment and creation of art only slightly differ in complexity of mental processes. From this point of view, expression in art is not "an infantile⁴¹ regression" nor "primitive form of phantastic thinking": it is positive growth and progression. Croce⁴² speaks of a creative intuition in art, which is a form of supra-intellectual realisation of emotion. In fact, in art, its expression or enjoyment, there is the effort to transcend the limits which the intellect and our individuality impose upon us. The meaning of aesthetic responsiveness now becomes clear, namely, it consists in making the intellectual processes subservient to emotional creation of harmony and rhythm at a higher level of life.

At a higher level of life! This incidentally explains the nature of the sublime in Art and its moral atmosphere. In and through Art, there is the effort to grow to newer and greater harmony and hence to greater metaphysical truth. Most of the emotional energy has come to attach itself to the procreative function (this being quite important), therefore in most art it centres round the sexual libido or Śrī-gāratattva. The effort to lift it up (to bring about more harmony through contrast) is to de-sexualise it. This effort produces an intense sense of expansion and growth by the emergence of new values and rhythm of life. Any piece of painting, poetry, sculpture or music which vividly raises before us new visions of emotional harmony, contrast and

⁴¹ Jung : *Psychology of the unconscious.*

⁴² Croce : *Aesthetics.*

pathos is sublime to that extent. This helps us to give a true content to otherwise precarious, Śānta⁴³ rasa. Quietism, with which it has been identified, is, at the worst, an escape-feeling of regression to the "mother" and therefore neurotic; at the best, it is a form of 'pathos' originating in the "emptiness of presentational immediacy." The suggestion be hazarded that Śānta Rasa is the sublime of Art. Without such a conception of Śānta Rasa, we have no idea of the sublime in Indian Aesthetics.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SONUS AND SYMBOLISM IN ART

The aesthetic energy has a special mode of expression in all artistic creations. The channels through which it tends to flow may vary with the material of the medium, but its natural idiom, depending upon an inveterate habitus of the creative genius, must follow some universal law. The search of this law began so soon as man began to reflect on the springhead of beauty-emotion. The first poets of the vedic age must have felt a deep thrill, sensation and confusion when they found that something had mysteriously stolen into their heart that attuned their whole being to an unheard of musical harmony. Even Vālmiki was struck in wonder when the poet in him—the tempestuous stirring of aesthetic

⁴³ Bhatrhari's *Vairāgyaśataka* contains some best illustrations of Śānta Rasa, sometimes heading towards a pathological quietism, sometimes ringing a pathetic note, and many times rising to the sublime. His poetry makes it clear how the mind flows backward and forward, between the sexual and the de-sexualised state. There is some pity felt in the process of desexualisation. Vide such numerous examples. कान्ताकोमलपल्लवाधरसः पीतो न चन्द्रोदये, तारुण्यं गतमेव निष्फलमहो शून्यालये दीपवत् ।

The dominant note of the *Mahābhārata* is the Śānta Rasa, but it is not quietism. The poet is constantly creating situations in which the hero makes efforts to sublimate his libido in spite of his failings which only make the sublime more pathetic. The Heroine, Draupadi, round which the story is woven is a sex-symbol and the Pathos and Sublime reach a climax in the suicide march of the five brothers along with her.

energy—ran out into a sonorous song. In fact, no artist can discover intellectually the source of his art, nor can he enjoy its charms. His joys are its creation. Only a critic with complete sympathy with poet's genius can discover the natural idiom of art-emotion.

A strange paradox about Art is that it reveals something which it, at the same time, conceals. The Expressionist school errs by overemphasis on the revealing power of Art as does the Impressionist by its exclusive stress on the inexpressible. The truest essence of aesthetic creation and enjoyment is a miraculous confluence of Expression and Impression. The medium of art-creation, therefore, plays the double role. The visible symbol thus leads to the vision of the invisible, the audible makes us hear as inaudible deep symphony.⁴⁴ The unfortunate beings bound to the perceptual level see, but they see not, hear, but they hear not; for the charm reveals itself to some one like to the lover the well clad, passion-stricken lady-love. Contemplation in art-enjoyment, held and heightened by harmony and rhythm, breaks through the veil and ushers into the region of Emotion. That is indeed the metaphysical function of art-contemplation.

The universal idiom of art-emotion, the inflow and outflow of a symbol causing a rapid centripetal and centrifugal movement of attention could not crystallise into a conscious theory without an insight into soul-dynamics.⁴⁵ The Hellenic philosophers could not rise above a theory of Representationism in Art. To Plato, the creations of art were a

⁴⁴ उत त्वः पश्यन्न ददर्श वाचमुत त्वः शृण्वन्न शृणोदयेनाम् । उतो त्वस्मै तन्व वि सस्ते जायेव पत्य उशती सुवासाः *Rgveda*, X.71.4.

⁴⁵ Representationism, as a method of approach in Epistemology of Art, is grounded in a naïve empirical Realism, which, in its turn, arises from a false notion of cognitive functions. Cognition in all its forms of perception, ideation, intellection or intuition, essentially reveals some phase of Reality. Naïve Realism assumes that perpetual consciousness only reveals, and other cognitive functions are only elaborative

tertiary reality, being reproduction—not even replicas—of the visible world, which in its turn was an imperfect shadow—not even a facsimile—of the supra-mundane Idea. Plato's⁴⁶ theory is a gross Naturalism. Unable to recognize any independent art-emotion because of his metaphysical approach, he required the re-representation (that the work of the art is) to be filled in by the moral emotion arising from the excellence of character. Aristotle could not shake off representationism, but he overcame the gross Naturalism by introducing the idea of the Universal. Though he confined to Mimesis in Art, yet he recognized the independence of art-emotion, 'pathos' and emphasized its purgatory value. Addison psychologised the speculation on art, and for the first time in the West, spoke of the Pleasures and Powers of Fancy. But under the Hellenic influence, he assigned to Imagination an elaborative function of idealization of nature. He could not say that the artist uses the outward as a symbol and vitalizes it with an inner passion. Bacon, Lessing and Victor Cousin, could not conceive of Art and Poetry as anything more than 'Feigned History' and Imagination was required to keep close to outer reality, and submit to the authority of Reason. In an atmosphere of Intellectualism in Art Emotion could not be hailed as a great revealing power. Representationism in Art raised the same problem as it did in Epistemology, viz., what is the nature of truth expressed in art! Even to this day, the English

and constructive. Hume's philosophy is thus a *reductio ad absurdum* of his own position. Casual nexus was only a psychological habit of the mind to Hume, and a logical necessity of the apperceiving reason to Kant. To Whitehead causal efficacy is our most primitive consciousness. To none of them, Reason, as revealing relations amongst the relata, is as trustworthy as perceptual consciousness! How can they go to Intuition, bound to a two-dimensional view of Reality as they are!

⁴⁶ We can save Plato's position (given to him by his Western critics) by a shift of emphasis from his Transcendental metaphysics to his Idealist Ethics. Plato conceived moral life as a great harmony and rhythm—resulting from an inner and outer organisation through self-restraint. He had an artist's idea of moral life and a moralist's idea

critics fondly discuss the question of "poetic truth." The position was, however, abandoned when M. Arnold defined poetry as interpretation of life rather than representation of idealized reality. But the symbolic nature of art became clear only by the efforts of the Psycho-analysts. Recently both the developments of Psycho-analysis and Psycho-aesthetics have contributed to the theory of art-symbolism.⁴⁷

of art, in which there is the fusion of the Good, the Beautiful and the True. Reality can be conceived as a great harmony which is equally revealed to emotion, thought and being. Vide the following: "Excellence of thought, and of harmony and of form and of rhythm, is connected with excellence of character, with good nature . . . And defectiveness of form and rhythm and harmony are associated with deficiencies of thought and character while the corresponding artistic excellences are associated with the corresponding moral excellences of self-restraint and goodness; indeed they are directly expressive of them. . . We must look for artists who are able out of goodness of their own natures to trace of beauty and perfection . . ." *Republic*.

⁴⁷ "The business of the poet is to tell, not what has happened, but what could happen, and what is possible, either from its possibility or from its necessary connection with what has gone before. . . Poetry deals rather with universal history with the particular." *Poetics*.

"Because the Mind of Man requires something more perfect in matter than what it finds there . . . because the Imagination can fancy to itself things more, great strange or beautiful than the eye ever saw . . on this account it is the part of the poet to humour Imagination in its own Notions, by mending and perfecting Nature." Addison: *Essays*. Addison also speaks of 'Secondary pleasure' derived from fancied objects and 'primary pleasure' of the real objects.

"Poetry is nothing but feigned History . . . The use of this feigned history hath been to give some shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points wherein the nature of things doth deny it; the world in proportion being inferior to the soul. Therefore because the acts and events of true history have not the magnitude which satisfyeth the mind of man, poetry feigneth acts and events greater and more historical . . It doth raise and erect the mind by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doth buckle and bolt the mind into the nature of things" Bacon: *Essays*.

"He (the Poet) desires to make the ideas which he arouses in us so vivid that, as they flash through our mind, we believe that we are experiencing the true, the objective impressions produced by the physical originals of these ideas, and in this moment of our illusion, we cease to be conscious of the medium which he employs for this purpose" Laocoon. Lessing reduces Art to pictorial element. His "our illusion" resembles Śaṅkuka's explanation of art-enjoyment as चित्रतुरगन्याय-
"बालानां चित्रतुरगे वस्तुपरिच्छेदशून्या तुरगोज्यमिति बुद्धिर्भवति।"

In India, Art and its interpretation started with a different premise, and took no time to seize at the principle of aesthetic expression and enjoyment. In Bharata, Bhāva is the emotional stir created in the mind of the sahr̥daya by the power of music, dance, and dramatic disguise; it is the artha illumined by Vibhāva and intensified by Anubhāva. Bhāva also means reiterative contemplation induced by drama and its accompaniment. Not only, Bhāva also implies in Bharata the intense creative energy awakened by beauty-emotion. The Vibhāvas do not mean the stimuli of psychology and bhāva is not a response. The Vibhāvas, the ālambana as well as Uddīpana, constitute a situation, which can be suggested to a contemplative mind. The suggested situation, vivified by dramatic art, fires up the aesthetic imagination, and starts a train of bodily and mental reactions. Charged with an all absorbing beauty-emotion, the experience is quite intense, but it is held in a sustained animation by the train of bodily and mental reactions which it initiated.

Bharata's treatment contains a clear hint, but it was not worked out into a self conscious Principle of suggestion in Art till the time of the Dhvanikāra in the 8th century. He clearly

"We desire to see and feel again the natural beauty, physical and moral, which delights us in the world of reality; and we, therefore, endeavour to reproduce it, not such as it was, but such as our imagination represents it to us. Thence, arises a work original and proper to man, a work of art." At times, Cousin rises to symbolic nature of Art. "The end of art is the expression of moral beauty by the assistance of physical beauty. The latter is for art only a symbol of the former. In nature this symbol is often obscure. . . Art can be more pathetic than nature and pathos is the sign and measure of beauty of the highest class."

(Du Vari, de Beau, Du Bien)

Judgement in Literature—Worsfold and *Introduction to the study of literature*—Hudson. Ref. : Bosanquet : *History of Aesthetic*, and W. Knight : *The Philosophy of the Beautiful*. विभावेनाहृतो योऽर्थस्त्वनुभावेन गम्यते ।

वागङ्गसत्त्वाभिर्नयैः स भाव इति संज्ञितः ॥ वागङ्गमुखरागैश्च सत्त्वेनाभिनयेन च ।
कवेरन्तर्गतं भावं भावयन् भाव उच्यते ॥ *Nāṭyaśāstra*. सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थ-
वस्ति निःस्यन्दमानां महतां कवीनाम् । अलोकसामान्यमभिव्यनक्ति परिस्रुतं
प्रतिभादिपम् ॥ 'Dhvanyāloka', I, 6.

distinguishes between the actual, the visible symbol (वाच्यार्थ) and that which goes beyond it. The visible does not exhaust the art; it is the invisible beyond the material symbol which gives the true art-relish, like the charm and beauty of the fair one which are beyond the mere ornaments or the lay-out of her limbs. The principle of Dhvani is the discovery of a new function of language-symbolism, or for the matter of that, of all arts. The powerful suggestion of a word, sentence, its meaning or sometimes even a suffix or prefix, takes the mind away from the actual towards an aesthetic form animating emotion and imagination. This suggestive power which holds the mind in an ecstatic state of contemplation, melts the being in a gusto of pure joy, is characteristic of all art-media. A single touch of melancholy colour in a work of painting, some feeble yellow near the sun-lit belt of evening cloud over the sea, one note of a love-mad melody, or a grimace near lower lip in a statue, may, by its suggestive power, throw the mind in an intensely rapturous state and produce a vivific aesthetic emotion.

The greatness of artist's creative genius lies in his inventing highly suggestive symbols. The Principle of Suggestion explains the *modus operandi* of all artistic creation and enjoyment and art's tremendous revealing power through concealment. Aesthetic responsiveness of the connoisseur means his culture and capacity to receive the suggestions. The several elements in art and its medium only increase the suggestive force of the symbols. Music, metre and the powerful use of a metaphor in Poetry, even the 'situations' tinged with deeply pathetic emotions, all closely follow the suggestion, and rise and fall, run and skip, ring and resound, with the changing aesthetic experience. A work of painting, or sculpture has its own music and metre, its mood and situation, and, by its suggestion unlocks the same emotional rapture.

That the secret of suggestion in art was clearly conceived by Dhvanikara is a patent fact. He spared no efforts and showed no small inventive genius in establishing the suggestive function of language over and above the primary and implicative functions. But the learned atmosphere of the age was rife with speculation in grammatical Philosophy under whose influence the psycho-aesthetic basis of Suggestion could not be discovered. The elaborative mind of the middle ages indulged in the niceties of its countless distinctions and scholastic wrangling.

The recent development in Psycho-aesthetics throws light on the complex nature of suggestion. We look at the mountain and it seems to rise without actually rising. We look at the setting sun, and he appears to be melancholy. We hear a tune and we feel a pathetic stir. The physiological explanation, based upon the economics of nervous energy, does not reveal the psychological significance. Even the geometrical theory of beauty extends the old principle of debit and credit to mental energy. The merit of these explanations is that they emphasize the negative side of aesthetic experience and prove the reality of the Ugly. But these are no positive contributions to the understanding of the Beautiful.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ The view incidentally lends support to the Revised James Lange theory of Emotion. Anubhāvas are the physiological reverberations vivifying the emotion (अनुभावयन्ति-अनुभवविपरीकुर्वन्ति इति अनुभावाः *Kāvya*. But an emotion is never alone: Besides the bodily ensuants, there is a general emotional resonance, an awakening of general emotional energy besides the physiological energy awakened through visceral and glandular action, which together gives to the emotion a sustaining power. It is thus an improvement upon the so-called James-Lange theory. The whole discussion in Bharata is of great psychological interest for a sound theory of Emotion and in many respects is an improvement upon McDougall.

Dr. De and Dr. Sankarana have rendered Dhvani as Suggestion. But the term is burdened with many associations and is commonly abused. A more suggestive rendering of Suggestion can be the principle of Resonance. Another one free from any associations can be the Principle of Sonus. My reason for this new rendering is that Dhvani is based upon an empathic activity. Empathy is a psycho-aesthetic tendency of the mind, not different from mental resonance.

The recent discovery of a new, pervasive function of consciousness *Einfühlung*, Infeeling or Empathy, has made the process of aesthetic experience intelligible to us. Now Empathy is neither the projection of the Ego into the Alter, as the Metaphysicals suppose, nor is it primitive sympathy or "inner mimicry" of McDougall and others. It has some resemblance with mimesis which is said to be at the root of emotional transference, thought induction and imitation. But it is distinct and more fundamental, for without it, perception will remain a jejune congeries of sensations. In perceiving a mountain, a tree or a tower we raise our eyes, adjust muscles and tendons. We fix our gaze and attention. Memories are awakened which arouse expectations, hopes and disappointments. As consciousness, like an electric current of sparks, flows on alternating between moments of tension and relaxation, there is measuring, comparing, reflecting, moving, referring of attention interlaced by instants of passive receptions of sensations. "The present and particular raising and lifting is merely the nucleus to which gravitates our remembrance of all similar acts of raising or rising which we have ever accomplished. And not merely the thought of the present rising but also the thought of future rising. All these risings, done by ourselves or watched in others actually experienced or merely imagined, have long since united in our mind, constituting a sort of composite photograph whence differences are eliminated and wherein all similarities are fused and intensified : the general idea of rising. . . It is this universally applicable notion of rising which is started in our mind by the awareness of the particular present acts of raising involved in our looking at the mountain; and it is this general idea of rising i.e. of upward movement which gets transferred to the mountain along with our particular present activity of rising. . . and which thickens and marks and enriches that poor little thought of a definite raising with the interest, the emotional full-

ness gathered and stored up in its long manifold existence. What we are transferring (owing to that tendency to merge the activities of the perceiving subject with the qualities of the perceived object) from ourselves to the looked at shape of the mountain is not merely the thought of rising, but the thought and emotion which long have been accumulated in our mind. And it is this complex mental process, by which we invest that inert mountain with the stored up and averaged and essential modes of our activity. It is this process whereby we make the mountain raise itself, which is *Einfühlung* or Empathy."

Empathy is thus the most pervasive elementary psychological process in which the merger of the subject's activities in the qualities of the object takes place through an inversion or transference. In form-perception there is an intense interplay of past, present and future on which account there are the feelings of tension and relaxation (Wundt) Lee calls it a "Microscopic psychological drama" or a "drama of the Soul molecules." This indicates an important fact of Psycho aesthetics that satisfaction or dissatisfaction consists in "what are, directly or indirectly, activities of our own."

Prof. Whitehead and Lee are unanimous at the point that the cognizance of a Thing is a primary mental act which does not require a highgrade organism. To withhold mind from Thing and to hold it on to the Form or Shape (Lee) requires further effort and culture of the mind of which artist alone is capable. "There is an aspect, something over and above the quality of the colours (or in a piece of music, of sound) in which that aspect at any particular moment, embodies for your senses something which can be detached from the particular colours or sounds and re-embodied in other colours and sounds, existing meaning in a curious potential schematic condition, in our memory. That something is Shape."

It is the Form⁴⁹ we contemplate in aesthetic experience. As the microscopic psychological drama of Form-contemplation becomes intense an inversion, merger or transference takes place through *Einfühlung*. The artist's business is to use effective symbols to arouse a commotion in the "soul molecules," that is to use those shapes, tunes and words (in their harmonic and rhythmic arrangement so that the debit of nervous energy may not exceed its credit, and yet may be intense) which are keys as it were, to unlock the floodgates of mental activity. This is, indeed the secret of the Principle of Aesthetic Suggestion (Dhvani).

There is the primary Law of Attention that its "concentration perseverance and duration" in a constantly flowing mental stream is impossible under unvarying monotony of experience. The mental life requires continual refreshment and constant renewal. In aesthetic contemplation, therefore, each symbol is the active centre of radiation of many thoughts and feelings. The symbol is thus the concentration of condensed emotional experiences, round which the rapid movements of centripetal and centrifugal attention takes place. It is in this way that Suggestion works and holds the mind to a reiterative act of aesthetic contemplation. The principle of Dhvani (or the Principle of

⁴⁹ This may lead to extreme Formalism in art which likens art-contemplation to mathematical absorption in abstract relations. Kant established the Ethical Imperative in conduct, Rational Imperative in knowledge, and Aesthetic Imperative in emotional life. But his approach in reconciling the a priori and a posteriori led to a sharp dualism of matter and Form everywhere.

The truth of the matter seems to be that we have not to choose between gross Naturalism and pure Formalism, nor to find a half-way house between the two. We have to reject both—a priorism and a posteriorism in Aesthetics as in Ethics and Epistemology. We should bank upon the duality of 'symbol' and its 'meaning.' The outstanding contribution of recent thinking on this problem (Direct Realism) is that the most primordial and pervasive functioning of the human Psyche is 'symbolic' in nature. The mind is constantly creating 'symbols' for 'meanings' and discover 'meanings' for 'symbols' through 'symbolic reference'.

Soraeus); based upon the Psychology of *Einfühlung*, explains why "a thing of beauty is joy for ever and its loveliness increases." The beautiful is the inexhaustible reservoir of joy and charm because the Beautiful is the symbol suggesting and initiating an 'oceanic' feeling and harmonic movement, centripetal and centrifugal, in the current of life—soul and body.

Symbolism, like Empathy is another fundamental fact of mental life. There is in Art, an intensely communicative 'symbolic reference' between the 'symbol' and its 'meaning.' The 'meaning' is the 'immediate perception.' "The sound waves by their causal efficacy may produce in the body a state of pleasurable aesthetic emotion, which is then symbolically transferred to the sense-perception of sounds." Even the ultra violet rays of the sun and the sounds below the limit of audibility have a decided emotional effect and add an emotional tinge to our perception. "This whole question of the symbolic transfer of emotion lies at the base of any theory of the aesthetics of art. For example, it gives the reason for the importance of a rigid suppression of irrelevant detail. For emotions inhibit each other or intensify each other. Harmonious emotion means a complex of emotions mutually intensifying. Each little emotion refuses to accept its status as a detached fact in our consciousness. It insists on its symbolic transfer to the unity of the main effect." (Whitehead).

The Dhvanikāra seems to be fully alive to the aesthetic significance of Symbolism. He details the negative conditions which hamper the complete realisation of a harmonious Rasa in Art. Such conditions are, for instance, as arousing suggestions of an opposite emotion, detailed description of some topic connected with the Rasa in question, cutting down the suggestions before it reaches its climax or its premature manifestations. He continues in this vein till he gives us an idea of a harmony of emotion in which all ele-

ments have been organically fused together. Following this line of his thought, he clearly suggests the Theory of Aesthetic Appropriateness, which was later worked out completely by Kṣemendra in his *Aucityavicārcarā*.

The Dhvanikāra also hints at a form of associationism which is a powerful source to suggestion. The relation between a symbol and its aesthetic meaning is not a natural or normal relation. It is not *autpattiks* but *aupādhika* or conditional. Mostly a symbol in art is enriched in its suggestive force by falling into a context or *prakaraṇa*. For example, a lady informs a certain person frequenting a certain shady bower of trees to do so freely now that a dog that barked there has been killed by a lion in a near cave. The man, unless he is acquainted with the character of the lady, will not catch the suggestion that the place where he frequents is the meeting place of her lover, and that her persuasion really means dissuasion.

Though the Dhvanikāra goes beyond the mechanical Laws of Association (those of contiguity, contrast or similarity) and hints at the Law of continuity of Interest (G. F. Stout), he is not well aware of an unconscious symbolism⁵⁰ established by Psycho-analysis in all Art and Religion. The study of Shakespeare's⁵¹ dramas has revealed the working of such symbolism. For the presentation of the beautiful objects and aspects, all artists employ the symbols of eternal effulgence, as sun, moon, star etc. For each type of mood and climate of the art-emotion, the artist uses symbols of a certain sort, moved as he is by the law of his genius. This native function of the unconscious mind in inventing an art-symbolism was not thought of.

It may be noted, in conclusion, that each symbol, however suggestive wears⁵² out and grows stale by repeated use.

⁵⁰ Jung : *The psychology of the Unconscious*.

⁵¹ Shakespeare : *Criticism*.

⁵² McDougall construes this fact to mean that the activating-energy behind aesthetic appreciation is curiosity-impulse. Half the charm

Our language is full of such suggestive symbols, which once in their hey-day were keys to intense poetic emotions, but now the aesthetic needs of daily life have made them very common and jejune. The exercise of 'neurone-connections ready-to-act in a certain way' is felt as pleasureable when there is constant renewal and increase in complexity. A metaphor once so luminous and emotion-provoking is now felt as cold and contemptible through extreme familiarity. Art, therefore requires a never-ceasing inventiveness and some other aesthetic and non-aesthetic elements to keep it eternally fresh.

OTHER ELEMENTS IN ART

Deceived by otherwise the brilliant metaphor of Kāvya-puruṣa, the Indian theorists tried to arrange everything

of the beautiful, he says, lies in 'newness'. As soon as novelty exhausts, it becomes insipid. This, however, cannot mean that the beautiful is novel or that novelty is beauty. In a complex aesthetic experience, the instinctual emotions enter as important qualifying factors. That is the basis of the division of Rasas in Bharat theory. The अद्भुत is the Rasa in which the feeling of wonder predominates. But रसे सारश्चमत्कारः cannot mean that in all Rasas admiration (for the author artist, McDougall says) is the essential element. Admiration is not चमत्कार which lends novelty to an impression. It appears that McDougall heads towards Naturalism, in spite of himself.

Some form of Naturalism, however, is ultimate. A Naturalism that posits an aesthetic emotion, lying at the heart of our instinctive and emotional life, may not be objectionable.

The Principle of Dhvani (Sonus) involves an Aesthetic Paradox: The material of artistic creation is of necessity symbolic and metaphoric in Nature. Hence artistic expression is through concealment and impression. An open emotion sounds vulgar, voluptuous and shallow. The modus of artistic traffic of an ordinary feeling is essentially a way of hidden and sudden disclosure.

The artist works under this strangely true Paradox. While aiming to create an intense harmony and rhythm of life by his work, he constantly keeps his eyes away from it and looks for vivific symbols of art-emotions. Emotions, Plot, Figure, Symmetry and Form, cadence and crescends, even a gamut and grimace, become in the hand of an artist the vehicles of a deep harmony and rhythm. The reason for this paradox seems to be that, art, in order to affect our total personality, must employ

about it. Consequently, the *alaṅkāras* are regarded as ornaments of the body of Art, the *guṇas* are the excellences like heroism, etc., belonging to the soul, and so on, till every element is appropriately allocated. This explains why we have not developed psycho-aesthetic basis for several art-elements, save in sometimes genial flashes.

Underlying the whole theory of poetic Embellishment, the nature and function of Figures in Art, there is a sound Psycho-aesthetics. Ruyyaka clearly realised that a figure is full of a special type of artistic charm and thrill (विच्छित्तिविशेष). Such a figure which is only the true figure, springs from the productive imagination of the artist (विच्छित्तिश्च कविप्रतिभोल्लास-रूपवत्). "The Dhvani theorists have either dismissed the poetic figures as mere वाक् विकल्प or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. Kuntala justifies the poetic figures because of some inherent charm of the strikingness (वैचित्र्य) in them irrespective of their relation to the unexpressed sense. But he justifies an *alaṅkāra* only when it involves विच्छित्ति, वैचित्र्य or वक्रत्व.... It is विच्छित्ति due to an act of poetic imagination कविप्रतिभानिर्वर्तित. Thus the so-called *alaṅkāras* of orthodox are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile imagination of the poet." (De)

Kuntala's contribution is important in that he conceives the *modus operandi* of aesthetic imagination to be a deviation from its ordinary working. He gives it an unhappy name वक्रत्व borrowed from Bhāmaha and Ānanda. His point was not to discuss the essence of aesthetic creation or enjoyment, for he took *Rasa* and suggestion to be granted. His was to tell us that *Rasa* or *alaṅkāra* results from a special

a complex and intense process of creation. A direct expression, that which is not hidden and sudden, leaves us cold; and, by reason of its simplicity, it does not touch the deepest springs of our inner life and does not start an intense mental and bodily resonance.

mode of imaginative activity, and it is (negatively)⁵³ not its ordinary course. He touched upon the important point, so grievously overlooked by all, that Rasa does not manifest itself by the working of isolated excitants or ensuants but springs from a well developed 'Plot.' The vibhāvas themselves derive their meaning and force from being organically placed in a 'situation.' Rasa, therefore, not an isolated experience, but the harmonious development of an emotion tracing a psychograph through 'crisis,' 'climax' and 'denouncement,' must keep close to the ebb and flow of the 'plot' and, hence may be regarded as प्रबन्धवक्ता. Even in a kind of poetry known as मुक्तक, the Rasa is realised only when, and to the extent to which, there is a 'situation' developing into a full 'plot.'⁵⁴ In fact, the Rasa-theorists missed much in teaching that it is 'emotion' which makes a situation or 'vastu' aesthetically enjoyable. Kuntala, in his doctrine of प्रबन्धवक्ता, hits at the head of the nail in that he holds the 'plot' or 'the situation' to be the source of emotion. A piece of painting or a statue is not a detached or static view of something, but it is brimful of a 'story,' and, by its inherent suggestive power, it extends our vision to the past and the future. The essence of aesthetic emotion is the प्रबन्धवक्ता. Appayya Dikṣita rightly reduces all figures to simile, or, its more condensed form, metaphor. In this he shows his clear grasp of the function of creative imagination in Art, on which metaphor is based. We define⁵⁵ the indefinable spiritual qualities, deep passions and subtle shades of aesthetic experience in terms of the tangible and concrete, and, thus

⁵³ The theory of vakrokti is negative. Accordingly, all art-elements alaṅkāra, Riti, Rasa and guṇas, etc. are different ways in which the artist deviates from the ordinary course of thinking. But Kuntala, aware of his negative approach, adds that the deviation must be full of charm.

⁵⁴ The "whole-making tendency" of the soul, as pointed out by Driesch or by the Gestalt School, not only applies to intellectual, but to emotional life as well.

⁵⁵ J. Middleton Murry—*Metaphor*.

'give to airy nothings a local habitation and name.' Metaphor functions to concretise, to produce an overwhelming sense of reality, and thus intensifies our feeling of the inner and outer experience. Metaphor is thus the primitive and primary fact of our consciousness, and, is as 'ultimate as speech and thought' itself. This is the only means of exploring, 'mapping and chartering the uncharted regions of our spiritual depths'. A creative genius discovers deep-lying similarities and thus articulates our own dumb consciousness. A true metaphor is the discovery of an illuminating truth which finds resonance in all souls.

The artist's genius which creates symbols, ringing with meaning and quick with released sparks of our subliminal fire, must needs work metaphorically. The Alāṅkāra School of Bhāmaha, Kuntala and Ruyyaka builds itself on this basic fact. Those—and they are many,—who have regarded the figures as merely decorative devices, and, therefore, quite dispensable, have only superficially understood their function. All symbolic functioning of the mind is reducible to the metaphor or to causation which brings about 'Immediate apprehension.'

There is, however, another function of metaphor, namely, to idealize, and, thus to intensify our sense of things. The process of idealisation (अतिशय) is the process of imagination. Ever since Aesthetic was psychologised (Addison, Bacon etc.) this creative function of imagination in giving us more perfect beauties and harmonies than Nature could produce, has been emphasized. The view is so plausible and it has raised vital issues. We ask for a limit of idealisation and reply that it should not 'overshoot the tangible.' In a subjective treatment of nature the questions of "pathetic fallacy" or (Holmes proposes Sympathetic illusion) and that of "poetic truth" inevitably arise. This Atiśaya (idealisation) theory of metaphor seems to oppose the exploratory function of imagination.

The 'talisman of creative imagination', it seems, lies in, not creating Atiśaya, but filling the symbolic image (explored by imagination) with emotion and, thus awaken it to life and reality. The Atiśaya theory of Alaṅkāra labours under Representationism in Art, and, is an artifice to escape from Naturalism to which it leads. Jagannātha sees prophetically that कविप्रतिभा is the 'mother' of metaphor, which is full of चमत्कार⁵⁶ (aesthetic emotion). The source of चमत्कार is not imitation or idealisation of Nature, but the realisation of "the god like mysteries of God's universe" and filling these "mysteries", the concealed aspects and similarities of Nature—with emotional rhythm and harmony. Nature thus contains metaphors as truly as scientific laws and abstract ideas.

Only in Art, the object "passes out of the coldness of the merely notional region into the atmosphere of the life-giving imagination. Vitalised there, the truth shapes itself into living images which kindle passion and affections and stimulate the whole man. This is what has been called the real apprehension of truths, as opposed to the merely notional assent to them."⁵⁷

This view of metaphor can find some meaning in such ideas as "aesthetic mysticism"⁵⁸ "Transcendentalism of Art"⁵⁹ and "the revealing power of poetry", and assigns

⁵⁶ McDougall asks : what is the conative energy subserving the most purely intellectual appreciation of the beautiful object ? He replies : The conative root is the impulse of curiosity. Committed to his now exploded theory of emotions, McDougall relates admiration feeling to the instinct of curiosity which provokes fuller exploration. But चमत्कार is not admiration due to intellectual curiosity which explores 'relations.' It is admiration due to emotional curiosity which seeks rhythm and harmony. McDougall cannot conceive 'pure emotion' which is beauty—emotion (चमत्कार).

⁵⁷ Principal Shairp—quoted in "*Judgment in Literature*."

⁵⁸ Aesthetic mysticism of Yeats. "*Modern Tendencies in English Literature*." Amiya Cakravarty.

to "art-emotion" a metaphysical role. We can divide all art-theories into "egocentric" and "Alter. centrie". The latter are those which teach that artistic expression begins in mimesis of Imitation. All these theories may be styled as variants of Representationism. The "Ego-centric" theories teach that art-creation flows out into external symbols from the brimful of emotion and imagination. The metaphor is true only in the "Ego-centric" theory. The Rasa-and Dhvani School views the metaphor from this standpoint.

The source of suggestion, symbolic reference and metaphor is the same, namely, Empathy. The "Cubic suggestion" and "Chromatic effect" of a metaphor, for that matter of harmonious total impression or imagery, is only its "Pictorial Quality" चित्र. The Indian theorists have contemptuously called such an Art "pictorial" (चित्रकाव्य) in which the poetic passion has not reduced the rambling images into an organic unity. The characteristic of creative imagery is the "maximum"⁶⁰ independence of each metaphor combined with its complete and pervasive subordination" to form "a great river"⁶¹ of life and beauty". Such an organic unity and movement of art-emotion springs from unity and fullness of imanative act taking its birth in poets passion.⁶² The psychology behind it is the same centripetal and centrifugal action of Einfühlung.

The syncretic tendency soon absorbed the Alankāra School by conceding to metaphor a functional role in

⁵⁹ This is the characteristic of Tagore's Art and that of Mahadevi Verma.

⁶⁰ Ref. J. Middleton Murry—*Metaphor in "Shakespear-Criticism"* 1919-35.

⁶¹ *A History of English Literature*—Legouis and Cazamian. Shakespeare.

⁶² "Coleridge: Images, however, beautiful, though faithfully copied from nature and as accurately described in words, do not of themselves characterize the poet. They become proofs of original

Aesthetics. The Guṇa and Rīti Schools of Daṇḍin and Vāmana respectively are champions of "craftsmanship" and "design" in Art. Daṇḍin, like W. Morris, lays down that "craftsmanship" is all, and, defines Art as "the beautiful collocation of words and ideas". But like, the moderns, he does not overemphasize the "colour-effect," or the 'mathematics' governing the 'design' 'form' and 'symmetry'. His "conception of Gunas covers not only lucidity of style, sweetness, the liquid movement and other qualities of expression but also the grandeur, felicity and richness of ideas." (Sankaran). Very soon, therefore, as the psychological interpretation began in India the Guṇas came to be regarded as different modes of the experience of Rasa-emotion. Their number was reduced to three. In Mādhurya, which is our experience in Vipralambha Śṛṅgāra and in 'Pathos', the heart 'melts'. In the language of modern Psychology, there is a strong rush of large liquid fire from our subterraneous life, 'Eros', into the conscious, which produces a thrill of joy by breaking⁶³ all barriers of the 'Censor', the cause of all forms of anxiety. In ojas (vigour), there is Dīpti or Vistāra, it is a feeling of expansion and illumination of the erotic urge fixing tenaciously upon some objects. In prasāda, there is vikāśa or flowering of the heart, as in laughter, wonder etc. If we interpret Prasāda with our stand on McDougall's theory of Laughter, it means a sort of purging the stream

genius only in so far as they are modified by a predominant passion, or by associated thoughts and images awakened by that passion, or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or succession to an instant, or lastly when a human and intelligent life is transferred to them from the poet's own spirit.

⁶³ This is no regression or morbid mentality seen in introversion. In vipralambha, we stand, face to face, as if on the shore of a vast and violent ocean bellowing with libidinal fire. Our Nature's weakness puts a pall of fear and alarm over our own 'oceanic' being and thus causes 'regression' and 'anxiety.' A man, in full mental health, will grow to realise this vastness. Also in 'Pathos' we grow to realise the eternity of Time. There is thus 'progression,' and even 'sublimation,'

of conscious life of the tinge of uneasiness produced by a mildly painful situation.

Thus the Guṇas are defined as intensifiers of aesthetic emotion. The Rīti School is also dismissed by making Rīt (पदसङ्घटना) as subservient to art-emotion. Metre and music, rhythm and harmony, all enter into Art to 'emotionalize' the 'Id' and to make it flow out into symbols with brilliant effusions. 'Śakti'⁶⁴ is the energy which the artist wields to stimulate the whole man'.

Luckily the question of the relation of morality and Art did not arise in India. Starting with the Upaniṣadic conception of Rasa and ānanda, Indian Aesthetics avoided the narrowness of its ideal and of ethical virtue⁶⁵. Pure joy is the ideal of Art, and has nothing to do with instinctual satisfaction to which alone moral distinctions apply. Moreover, pure joy of 'platonian and contemplative order' is the lot of man in those rare but treasureable moments when life returns to primal harmony and to its unfettered rhythmic music from a rough-and-tumble existence. The moments of 'tension' in the stream of consciousness consume vital energy which the moments of 'relaxation' replenish. It is in these 'moments of relaxation' that the spring of beauty and comfort filters into the soul. Lee, therefore, rightly says that half of our life is made up by aesthetic experience. This is in tune with the general arrangement of Nature, such as we find in pupillary reflex.

⁶⁴ (?)

⁶⁵ Cf. McDougall's distinction between 'Pleasant' and the 'beautiful'. Perceiving that is adequate and undisturbed is always pleasant; but the beauty of any such simple impression depends upon its setting, upon relations between it and other things which give it significance, meaning and power to interest us, to provoke us to activity, to striving that aims at complete apprehension." *The Energies of men*. P. 168.

F. 24

The recent psycho-aesthetics has established the independence as well as inter-dependence of art-emotion. In India, it was metaphysics which achieved the same end. In ānanda, there is melting of all individualising factors. Morality, depending upon sense of responsibility, is one such factor. Individuality is not primal. The march of civilization proves that man has gradually acquired his individuality. But individuality does not seem to be the finâle of human evolution, for, to reconcile the 'conflict,' the Ego and the Alter have to be fused into a dynamic union. In Ānanda experience, the soul enjoys its pure Emotion, which is "beyond the pleasure pain principle" and the "good-bad order" of things. The development of Indian Aesthetics has consisted in more and more drawing from this metaphysical conception of Ānanda.

This leads us to a view of aesthetic culture. Whatever, in Art and in life, reduces Rasa is Ugly. The finâle of social and politico-economic order is the realisation of ānanda, in its aesthetic sense, unfettered by any irrational barriers and unsuppressed by economic inequalities. The forces that disrupt this harmonic tendency towards ānanda are evil and hateful, therefore, ugly, and are countered by fearful revolutions. The aesthetic explanation of the present-day unrest is that a new vision of Beauty, Harmony and Rhythm of life, has fired up the imagination of the people, fed up as they are of an ugly disharmony. The Theory of Beauty, with its stand on Harmony and Rhythm of Emotion, has to teach all, the philosopher, the politician, the economist and the visionary Artist.

VĀLMĪKI'S ĀŚRAMA LOCATED IN OUDH*

By SARDAR M. V. KIBE

IN Bāla-Kāṇḍa, Sarga 2 and stanzas 3 and 4, it is clearly mentioned that Vālmiki after meeting Nārada :—

जगाम तमसातीरं जान्हव्यास्तु विदूरतः ॥ 1-2-3

स तु तीरं समासाद्य तमसाया मुनिस्तदा ॥ 1-2-9

The 49th Sarga of the Uttara-Kāṇḍa is designated as वाल्मीक्याश्रमप्रवेशः. The disciples of Vālmiki found Sītā crying, which they reported to him as follows :—

नद्यास्तु तीरे भगवन् वरस्त्री कापि दुःखिता ॥¹

आश्रमस्याविदूरे च त्वामियं शरणं गता ॥²

In the 65th Sarga of this Kāṇḍa the following occurs—

द्विरात्रमन्तरे गूर उष्य राघवनन्दनः ।

वाल्मिकेराश्रमं पुण्यमगच्छद्वा समुत्तमम् ॥³

This refers to the route taken by Śatrughna to invade Lavaṇāsura who had taken possession of Mathurā. Here, at the Vālmiki Āśrama, Śatrughna stopped after two days of journey from Ayodhyā.

Thus—उवास मासं तु नरेन्द्रपार्श्वतस्त्वथ प्रयातो रघुवंशवर्धनः ।⁴

So from the vicinity of Rāma, Vālmiki's place was at a distance of two nights or halts. In Sarga 45 of this Kāṇḍa regarding the destination of the exile of Sītā, Rāma says :—

आरुह्य सीतामारोप्य विषयान्ते समुत्सृज ।

गङ्गायास्तु परे पारे वाल्मिकेस्तु महात्मनः ॥⁵

*For the purpose of this article I am using an edition of the Rāmāyaṇa published and printed at the Madras Law Journal Press, Madras,

¹ 7-48-4

² 7-48-6

³ 7-64-2

⁴ 7-64-14

⁵ 7-45-17

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ।

तत्रैनां विजने देशे विसृज्य रघुनन्दन ॥⁶

This clearly establishes that the Vālmīki's Āśrama was on the banks of the Tamasā river.

There is more distance between Ayodhyā and this river, besides that indicated by Śatrughna's journey. There is another trace in 1—5—7 where describing the extent of Ayodhyā it is said :—

आयता दश च द्वे च योजनानि महापुरी ।

श्रीमती त्रीणि विस्तीर्णा सुविभक्तमहापथा ॥⁷

That is to say the महापुरी "Great City" was spread over 48 (or 72) miles and the city was spread over 12 (or 18) miles. The word श्रीमती refers to महापुरी, which was divided by big roads, while the rest of the country, the kingdom, was not सुविभक्त well-partitioned—by महापथ—big roads. Beyond this was desert (7-45-18) (supra).

Considering that in ancient times the kingdoms were more or less centered in big cities, the small extent of Rāma's kingdom is not extra-ordinary.

Another support to the distance shown above is to be found in the description of the route taken by Lakṣmaṇa to reach the Vālmīki Āśrama from Ayodhyā. After leaving Ayodhyā, he halted for the night on the banks of the Gomatī.

ततो वासमुपागम्य गोमतीतीर आश्रमे ।⁸

and next day, he reached Vālmīki's Āśrama which was on the other bank.

प्रभाते पुनरुत्थाय सौमित्रिः मूलमव्रवीत् ।

योजयस्व रथं शीघ्रमद्य भागीरथी जलम् ॥⁹

⁶ 7-45-17

⁷ 1-5-7

⁸ 7-46-19

⁹ 7-46-20

On his return journey, Lakṣmaṇa stopped at the Gomatī for the night.

तत्र तां रजनीमुष्य केशिन्यां रघुनन्दनः ।

प्रभाते पुनरुत्थाय लक्ष्मणः प्रययौ तदा ॥¹⁰

Here केशिनी appears to be another name for the Gomatī, as is indicated by another reading in the foot-note. From here Ayodhyā was at a distance of half a day's journey.

ततोऽर्धदिवसे प्राप्ते प्रविवेश महारथः ।

अयोध्यां रत्नसम्पूर्णां हृष्टपुष्टजनावृताम् ॥¹¹

In the second Sarga of the Bāla-Kāṇḍa, it is mentioned that the banks of the Tamasā were far away from the Ganges.

जगाम तमसातीरं जान्हव्यास्तु विदूरतः ॥¹²

But in order to suit what is stated in the Uttara-Kāṇḍa, as will be shown later, this, विदूरतः "far away" in some readings, as is stated in the foot-note, has been changed into "जान्हव्यास्त्वविदूरतः" "not far away from the Ganges." But this is quite unacceptable considering the geographical location of the Gomatī and the Tamasā within 14 miles to the west of Ayodhyā.

The Ganges in the following lines must be a general term for any river for Sītā was misled in making her believe that she was being taken to the banks of the Ganges, the holiest of the rivers of India.

Directing Lakṣmaṇa to exile Sītā, Rāma says:—

गङ्गायास्तु परे पारे वाल्मिकेस्तु महात्मनः ॥¹³

तत्रैनां विजने देशे विसृज्य रघुनन्दन ॥¹⁴

शीघ्रमागच्छ¹⁵

¹⁰ 7-52-1

¹¹ 7-52-2

¹² 1-2-3

¹³ 7-45-17

¹⁴ 7-45-18

¹⁵ 7-45-19

But this is geographically incompatible with the contiguous statement of Rāma :—

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ॥¹⁶

The first surmise that Sītā was being misled by the mention of the Gaṅgā will be clear from the following: Lakṣmaṇa says to her—

त्वया क्लिष्टं नृपतिर्वरं वै याचितः प्रभुः । नृपेण च प्रतिज्ञातमाज्ञप्तश्चाश्रमं प्रति ॥
गङ्गातीरे मया देवि ऋषीणामाश्रमान् शुभान् । शीघ्रं गत्वा तु वैदेहि शासनात् पार्थिवस्य नः ॥

अरण्ये मुनिभिर्जुष्टे अपनेया भविष्यसि ॥¹⁷

This pleased her as is clear from the line—

प्रहर्षमतुलं लेभे गमनं चाप्यरोचयत् ॥¹⁸

Further

सीता सौमित्रिणा सार्धं सुमंत्रेण च धीमता ।

आससाद विशालाक्षी गङ्गां पापविनाशिनीम् ॥¹⁹

Being so near the final act of exiling Sītā, which was not known to Sītā, Lakṣmaṇa broke down. What was Sītā's belief is described in the following stanzas :—

जान्हवीतीरमासाद्य चिराभिलषितं [मम ।

हर्षकाले किमर्थं मां विषादयसि लक्ष्मण ॥²⁰

तारयस्व च मां गङ्गां दर्शयस्व च तापसान् ॥²¹

तत्र चैकां निशामुष्य यास्यामस्तां पुरीं पुनः ॥²²

Lakṣmaṇa did not disillusion her, but—

गङ्गां संतारयामास लक्ष्मणस्तां समाहितः ॥²³

It was only when he reached the other bank of the Ganges that he broke the disastrous news to her—

ततस्तीरमुपागम्य भागीरथ्याः स लक्ष्मणः

उवाच मैथिलीं वाक्यं प्राञ्जलिर्वाप्यसंप्लुतः ॥²⁴

¹⁶ 7-45-18

¹⁷ 7-46-7 to 9

¹⁸ 7-46-10

¹⁹ 7-46-23

²⁰ 7-46-26

²¹ 7-46-29

²² 7-46-30

²³ 7-46-34

²⁴ 7-47-3

On his return Journey, as has been shown above, he stopped at the Gomatī but there is no mention of the Gaṅges (7-41 and 52-31-1 respectively),

It is possible that Gaṅgā and Bhāgīrathī in (7-47-34) and Jānhavī in (7-46-34),

तदेतज्जान्हवीतीरे ब्रह्मर्षिणां तपोवनम् ॥²⁵

अर्धमादाय रुचिरं जान्हवीतीरमागमत् ॥²⁶

the first in the mouth of Lakṣmaṇa and the second in that of Vālmiki, must all refer to the Tamasā, as common nouns, because Lakṣmaṇa says that on the banks of the Jānhavī²⁷ was the abode of Vālmiki. So also after arriving at the banks of the Jānhavī it is said—²⁸

स्वमाश्रमं शिष्यवृत्तः पुनरायान्महातपाः ॥²⁹

Because Rāma's direction to Lakṣmaṇa is clear enough—

आश्रमो दिव्यसंकाशस्तमसातीरमाश्रितः ॥³⁰

It is clear that Vālmiki's hermitage was close to the Tamasā. This is also supported by the quotations from the Bāla-Kāṇḍa.³¹ It may be that the Tamasā was a bigger stream in those days than now.

²⁵ 7-47-15

³⁶ 7-49-9

²⁷ 7-47-15

²⁸ 7-49-9

²⁹ 7-49-24

³⁰ 7-45-18

³¹ Vide 1-2-3 *supra*.

FULL LIGHT ON THE REAL SITE OF THE BHARADVĀJĀŚRAMA*

(Continued from p. 204)

By R. M. SHASTRI

3. At Śrngaverapura

DR. Katju has observed that Rāma “travels for two days and reaches in the evening of the second day the bank of the Ganges. The description and eulogy of the Ganges by Val-

*Owing to unavoidable circumstances the proofs of the foregone portion could not be shown to the author, who now requests his readers to make the following corrections therein :—

(P.189) line 10—*comma* after ‘Ghosh’; l.12—*commas* after ‘C.E.’ and ‘Engineer’; l. 15—substitute ‘in’ for ‘the’; l. 16—‘fathered.’

(P.190) l. 18—*comma* at the end; l. 27—*comma* before ‘after.’

(P.191) l. 5—‘gentlemen’; l.31—‘view-points.’

(P. 192) l.9—‘All-India’; l. 13—‘)’ before ‘and’; l. 21—*comma* after ‘which’; remove ‘(’; l. 27—‘all sides¹²)’ was lodged . . .’; from the text, ll. 27-28, transpose the reference, ‘N.W.R., 104.29; *Vulgate*, 91.29-30.’, to make footnote No. 12 in l. 35; l. 33—‘North-Western’; l. 34—‘Gorresio’s.’

(P.193) l. 12—*comma* before ‘below’; l. 20—‘V.-R.’

(P. 194) l. 8—‘North-Western’; l. 9—‘V.-R.’ l. 29—‘Paramasiva Iyer’; ll. 33-35—‘speeches of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru and Sri Rajagopalacharya delivered in July, 1939, happening’

(P. 195) l. 30—‘the Qilā (meaning ‘fort’)’; ll.13 and 34—re-number f.n. 12 as 13; omit f.n. 13 and read its matter in the text, l. 13, as follows: ‘*Bhārata*, September 2, 1945.’

(P. 196) l. 4—‘or that of the’; ll. 21 and 24—‘Confluence’ with a capital C, and so also ll. 4, 13, 17, 20 and 33 of p. 197; l. 26—‘(a stream of)’; l. 28—‘posed¹⁵. But in what sense could the Āśrama be shifting . . .’; l. 32—‘VI. xiv. 12).’ l. 33—‘15 *Vide*,’; l. 34—*comma* before ‘Vol.’

(P. 197) l. 12—‘Pāṭhaśālā’; l. 16—‘newfangled theory.’

(P. 198) l. 3—insert double inverted commas, “, before ‘according’; l. 10—‘mentioned in the *Vulgate*, II. 31.22 or the N.W.R., 34.16. Or, it may be’; omit footnotes 17 and 18, *i.e.*, ll. 32-33 altogether; ll. 14 and 34—re-number f.n. 19 as 17; l. 29—*comma* before ‘or’; ‘reply, like those quoted’; l. 34—‘*Cf.*,’ with a capital C.

miki at this place is exceedingly beautiful, elevating and captivating. We are not told about the exact spot where Ram Chandraji halts for the night. It is only stated that he was on his way to Shringverpur. We are not told as to whether this place was on the right or the left bank of the Ganges"—(paragraph 3). And, again, towards the close of his article, the learned doctor has written, "I have said above that the Ramayana does not specifically say where coming from Ayodhya Ram Chandraji crossed the Ganges. It is only said in passing that he was going towards Shringverpur. According to tradition the modern Singraur,

(P. 199) re-number footnotes 20, 21 and 22 as 18, 19 and 20, and so also the corresponding figures on the textual words in ll. 5, 8 and 9; l. 8—read 'Further' in place of 'Subsequent'; l. 15—omit the figure 23; read l. 21 as follows: 'Daṇḍaka forest,'²¹—(*Ayodhyākāṇḍa*; 92.3),—the reference being to ...; l. 30—add '19.53;' after 'N.W.R.'; l. 31—add '11.27;' and '19.11;' before '19.23;' l. 32—add '26.23;' before and '53.17;' after '30.39'; transpose the last part of f.n. 22 (now 20), viz., 'In the N.W.R., 96.3 = *Vulgate*, 84.12,' to the text, l. 9, before 'Sumantra'; re-number f.n. 23 as 21; omit f.n. 24, the contents of which have already been transposed to the text, l. 21.

(P. 200) l. 1—'a forester,'²² whose'; l. 7—omit 'of'; l. 8—'friend was well acquainted with.'²³ And ...'; l. 13—insert the figure of 24 on 'nicated'; re-number footnotes 25 and 26 as 22 and 25, as also the corresponding figures on the textual words in ll. 1 and 14; omit f.n. 27; add f.n. 23 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 84.12; N.W.R., 96.3; Gorresio's edition, 92.3'; add f.n. 24 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 57.2, and 59.3 = N.W.R., 63.7-8; see also the commentaries on these passages.'; l. 19—'senger, whom Rāma, too, sent back from Śrīngaverapura to Ayodhyā explicitly²⁶ for Kaikeyī to be convinced of his own sojourn in the forest and of Daśaratha's truthfulness, though entirely against the charioteer's own resolve²⁷ to accompany and serve Rāma all along. This is ...'; add f.n. 26 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 52. 60-62; N.W.R., 55.23-24.'; add f.n. 27 as follows: '*Vulgate*, 52.38-58; N.W.R., 55.2-21.'

(P. 201) l. 2—'Romapāda,'; l. 20—'Rāma's.'

(P. 202) l. 1.—*comma* between 'were' and 'in'; l. 15—*comma* at the end; ll. 16-22—'queries like '(1) when ... particular occasion,'; l. 26—'shown the place' (omit 'in').

(P. 203) l. 6—'in the latter (vv. 6 and 29) the boy's blind ...'; l. 9.—'polymath'; l. 12—transpose the figure of 40 from the head of 'Kālidāsa' to that of 'and'; l. 23—'you'⁴²; l. 31—add 'and' after ';'; l. 34—'; read f.n. 43 as follows: '69. 43-44.'

(P. 204) ll. 7-8—'Ram Chaura,' 'Ram Ghat,' etc.

22 miles north-west of Allahabad, is the site of the ancient Shringverpur. In the first place it cannot definitely be said from the Ramayana that Ram Chandraji ever even reached Shringverpur. Then again the modern Singraur is on the Allahabad side of the Ganges. The Ramayana would make Shringverpur to be on the opposite side of the river. This must be so because it is not stated that after crossing the Ganges Ram Chandraji ever visited Shringverpur. On the contrary the country is referred to as uninhabited dense forest. Be that as it may, the distance between the modern Singraur and the present day Rajapur is about 40 miles more or less. It took Ram Chandraji two days' travelling to reach the confluence from the place where he crossed the Ganges. Thirty to 40 miles would be about that distance. It may be that in the ancient days the Ganges used to flow in the heart of what we call the Doaba tract of the Allahabad district and the river has now changed its course in a northerly direction with the result that the confluence has also shifted by many miles"—(paragraph 13).

Now, it passes all imagination as to how an author who lived at least in the third milennium before us could have told us "about the exact spot" of Rāma's halt in terms intelligible to us to-day and especially when his ideal hero, Rāma, had to pass his 14 years of exile in lonely forests⁴⁴ and to avoid to visit all human habitations, cities, towns and villages, of his times, which, too, have now mostly disappeared. The very fact that, although Rāma has the sight of the Gaṅgā in the *Vulgate*, Canto 50, verse 12, preceding the sublime eulogy of the great river (vv. 13-26), yet the author refers to his landing on the southern bank as late as in Canto 52, vv. 92-93,—all talk of Śrīngaverapura having come in between these limits covering almost 3 cantos

⁴⁴ N.W.R., 19.67; 20.20; 23.25; 26.3, 24; 28.29; 29.23—24, 29, 38; 32.8; 40.2, 5; 51.21-22; 56.16; 58.17; 62.5-8; 64.7-9; 66.11; [90.12,16]; 97.6.

(5½ of the N.W.R.),—proves beyond any shadow of doubt that the town of Śrīngaverapura as well as Rāma's halting place (which the tradition comes to our rescue to fix at Rāmacaurā,—an exact spot) were even then as now situated on the left bank or northern side of the Gaṅgā.

Dr. Katju perhaps did not know that Śrīngaverapura has been identified with Singraur by the eminent Archaeologist, General Sir Alexander Cunningham,⁴⁵ and that the identification does not rest on bare tradition, which a critic like him may find it convenient to lightly dispose of. As I have already said, it was no business of Rāma to visit any towns, even this capital of his devoted and dear friend, Guha, the chief of the Niṣādas.⁴⁶ When the latter said, "You are welcome. All this land is yours. I am only your servant: you are my master. Govern our kingdom and command us as it pleases you. This city is to be treated as your own capital, Ayodhyā,"⁴⁷ Rāma had to turn down his proposal, saying, "This is not the time for me to accept anything. You ought to know me to be wearing *kuṣas* and rags or barks, eat fruits and roots, and observe the Dharma as an ascetic living in the forest for 14 years by my father's command,"⁴⁸ and adding, "It does not behove me to stay in a man-haunted forest. I must dwell in a hermitage, the command being to that effect. Therefore, adopting the rule of ascetics for the good of my father, Sitā and Lakṣmaṇa, I will assume the matted hair before I go away."⁴⁹

Moreover, Rāma's visit or no visit to the town in question would be quite immaterial to our discussion, for which it is sufficient that there was a town named Śrīngaverapura

⁴⁵ *Archaeological Survey Reports*, vol. XI. p. 62 and vol. XXI p. 11.

⁴⁶ N.W.R., 51.9; 52.3-5; 95.7; 96.1-3; 98.5-7 = *Vulgate*, 50.33; 51.4-6; 84.6; 84.10-13; 86.5-7.

⁴⁷ N.W.R., 51. 15-16 and 12; *Vulgate*, 50.38-39 and 36.

⁴⁸ N.W.R., 51.21-22; *Vulgate*, 50.44-45.

⁴⁹ *Vulgate*, 52.66-68.

which in the absence of a claim from any other place and in view of the tradition strengthened by Cunningham's identification must have been modern Singraur, that as the capital of Guha's kingdom it lay on the north side of the Gaṅgā, and that Guha met Rāma somewhere near it. This is fully borne out by the above-quoted words of Guha, *viz.*, "This city is to be treated [by you] as your own capital, Ayodhyā," and by certain other passages of the *V.-R.* describing—Rāma to have reached Śrīngaverapura⁵⁰ in the evening,—Guha offering his 'own house'⁵¹ to Bharata to stay for the night, the latter having declined to accept the offer,—Bharata asking Śatrughna to send for Guha, of course, from his house in the city, to which he had gone only a few hours back,⁵²—and Guha, after having audience with Bharata, 're-entering'⁵³ his capital and calling out his men (*prati-praviśya nagarīm svajñātīn-idam-abravīt*) to take Bharata and his retinue safely on boats across the Gaṅgā. Except the town, the forester king Guha's territory, bounded on the south by the Gaṅgā and the Vatsa country, consisted entirely of the forest, which he is throughout described to be inhabiting or wandering over.⁵⁴ The existence of a town on the brink of the Gaṅgā and amidst an uninhabited dense forest neither involves a contradiction nor suggests even a remote possibility of its lying to the south of that river.

Dr. Katju has somehow taken to the fancy that the old course of the Gaṅgā lay through the Doaba and the old Confluence or the Bharadvājāśrama was at Rajapur (Dist. Banda), for Rāma spent two days in reaching that Āśrama from

⁵⁰ N.W.R., 50.16.

⁵¹ N.W.R., 96.7; *Vulgate*, 84.16.

⁵² N.W.R., 101.3; *Vulgate*, 89.2; and N.W.R., 100.30 (*Visarjē taścāpi Guhah svam-ālayam jagāma duḥkheṇa sabhānūjīvibhiḥ*).

⁵³ N.W.R., 101.14 (*nagarīm*); *Vulgate*, 89.8 (*nagaram*).

⁵⁴ N.W.R., 51.24; 52.6; 96.14; 97.17; 98.8; 102.2; *Vulgate*, 51.7; 85.5; 86.1,8.

Guha's territory, the time being equal to cover the distance between Śrngaverapura and Rajapur. For converting his fancy into a fact to be admitted on all hands he has made out a *prima facie* case, which I propose to be examined rather minutely. His assertion that "modern Singraur is on the Allahabad side of the Ganges" (meaning the south bank side) is an open perversion of truth. It is a queer logic to first coin or mutilate facts and then to make use of or apply these self-coined or mutilated facts in favour of one's own contention.

From Allahabad Singraur is 22 miles if one goes *via* Phaphamau and Ram Chaura Road, crossing the Gaṅgā at the northern limit of Allahabad; but if we take to the direct route of the south bank of the said river opposite Singraur and cross it there, the distance is reduced to about 18 miles only. That the latter exactly was the track of Rāma and Bharata in their journeys will be seen from the sequel.

* * * * *

Next, Dr. Katju writes, "After spending the night on what I may call the Ayodhya side bank of the Ganges, he crossed it by boat the next morning. Here after alighting from the boat Ram Chandraji, Lakshman and Janki had to travel on foot. The poet describes the country as a dense uninhabited forest. He does not mention any habited localities. We are not told of the direction in which the travellers were going. It is only stated that they crossed the river to the south. After a whole day's journey the night fell and the party stopped under a big tree"—(paragraph 4).

Now, that (1) Rāma crossed the Ganges 'the next morning,' that (2) we are 'not told of the direction' in which the travellers were going, and so on (meaning that the poet gives no information whatsoever about the direction of the party's journey beyond the fact of their landing on the 'south bank' after crossing the Gaṅgā in boat), and that (3) after 'a whole day's journey' the night fell, are observations or assertions

entirely opposed to the facts gathered after a search of the *V.-R.* There would have been no misrepresentation and consequently no occasion for contradiction or criticism if only the faulty expressions, 'next morning,' 'not told,' and 'after a whole day's journey,' were substituted by the accurate ones, 'next day,' 'vaguely told' or 'told in uncertain terms', and 'before they could cover any appreciable distance on that day.' For, in fact, (1) Rāma's crossing of the river, *i.e.*, landing on the southern bank, was preceded by his numerous other activities extending over several hours, and, could have taken place not long before midday, the probable time being about 11 A.M.; (2) there are some implications and positive indications of the direction the travellers were going in, which we can well nigh fix accordingly; and (3) if we mark the details given in the *V.-R.*, it would follow that the party on that day, in the time remaining after their forenoon engagements as also the hunt which the two brothers devoted themselves to in the afternoon, did not, in any case, walk for more than 3 miles or so. It can hardly be called a 'journey,' muchless 'a whole day's journey.' The following detailed deliberation shall establish the truth of these remarks and give a total lie to the above statements of our respected leader, Dr. Katju :—

'Next morning,' according to English usage, should, if used not vaguely but definitely, mean either, in general, the hours of the next day beginning after the zero hour at 12 p.m. (midnight) and ending before the forenoon or, in particular, the 'morning-watch' between 4 and 8 a.m. The expression can hardly or very loosely denote the last *ante meridiem* hour or hours immediately preceding noon, for which the term 'forenoon' is in vogue. Now, according to the *V.-R.*, Rāma went into exile after the lapse of the *Śisira*⁵⁵ (*i.e.*, during the *Vasanta* season, according to

⁵⁵ *N.W.R.*, 60. 7; *Vulgate*, §6.6.

Govindaājā), in the month of *Caitra*,⁵⁶ on the day when the moon entered the *Puṣya* constellation.⁵⁷ The last detail refers itself to the bright fortnight (*Śukla-pakṣa*). But as regards the bright fortnight of any particular month the North and South Indian calendars have the difference of full one month, the dark fortnight (*Kṛṣṇa-pakṣa*) of the month being identical in both cases. So, *Caitra-Śukla* of the Southerners is really *Phālguna-Śukla* of the North Indians. Thus, Rāma left Ayodhyā in the *Puṣya nakṣatra*, occurring either on the 9th-10th of our North Indian *Caitra-Śukla* or 27 days earlier, if the South Indian Calendar were followed, i.e., about the 13th of our *Phālguna-Śukla*. In the first case the Sun rose 5.43 to 6.6-7 A.M. and in the second at 6 to 6.12 A.M. on the third day of Rāma's leaving Ayodhyā, i.e., on the day Rāma had to cross the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgaverapura. Let us take the average time of the Sun-rise to be about 6 A.M. for the rough calculation of the actual hour of Rāma's crossing of the Gaṅgā.

During his journey up to Citrakūṭa, Rāma is seen generally getting up at dawn, saying his prayers at daybreak and leaving his halting place after the Sun-rise.⁵⁸ From his first halt, alone, Rāma had to start in the last part of the night, lest the devoted people of Ayodhyā might further accompany him.⁵⁹ The day broke only on his way, when he performed his *Sandhyā*; and when the Sun had risen (*abhyudite ravan*) he mounted the chariot and set out.⁶⁰ In the third halt under a large *vaṭa* near the lotus-lake named Sudarśanā in the

⁵⁶ N.W.R., 5.4; *Vulgate*, 3.4.

⁵⁷ N.W.R., 5.26; 6.2, 19-20, 31; 9.7; 10.4; 13.39-40; 19.38-40; 29.22-23 = *Vulgate*, 3.40; 4.2, 21-22, 33; 7.11; 8.9; 11.25-29; 18.35-38; 26.22-23; see also Rāma's *Tilaka* on the *Vulgate*, 116.2.

⁵⁸ N.W.R., 53.1-2; 58.1, 37; 59.2; 60.1-4; 98.26-27 = *Vulgate*, 52.1-2; 54.1, 36, 38; 55.1; 56.1-4; 86.23-24.

⁵⁹ N.W.R., 47.1-2; 48.2-8, 11, 15-20, 26-31; 50.1 = *Vulgate*, 45.1-2; 46.2, 10, 13, 17-21, 30-39; 49.1.

⁶⁰ N.W.R., 50.1-2; *Vulgate*, 49.1-2.

forest⁶¹ 'not very far' from Śṛṅgaverapura on their way to the Bharadvājāśrama, the party left their resting place when it was clear sun-shine (*vimale'bhyudite sūrye tasmād vāsāt pratasthire*).⁶² At Śṛṅgaverapura itself, i.e., in the second halt, when the night was over and it was day-break, Rāma addressed Lakṣmaṇa, saying, "It is now the time of the Sun-rise, the goddess Night has gone away" (*Bhāskarodaya-kālo'yaṁ gatā bhagavatī niśā*), whereupon the latter called in Guha and Sumantra.⁶³ We find almost the same thing when Bharata with his army goes in quest of Rāma. After passing his night on the left (i.e., north) bank of the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgaverapura, Bharata got up at dawn and woke up Śatrughna, saying, "O Śatrughna, get up : the night is over : see the Sun rising so as to make the lotuses open : get Guha, the king of Śṛṅgaverapura, fetched soon, and he will take this army across the river."⁶⁴

In case of Rāma's hour of leaving his halting place at Śṛṅgaverapura, further light is thrown by Guha reporting to Bharata that in the morning, when the Sun had risen, he got the matted hair prepared [by Rāma], and thereafter he comfortably took them across to the other bank of the Bhāgīrathī (*prabhāte'bhyudite sūrye kārayitvā jaṭās-tataḥ : asmin Bhāgīrathī-tīre sukhaṁ santāritau mayā*).⁶⁵ The *Vulgate*⁶⁶ reads the report as follows : "In the morning, when there was clear sun-shine, I got the matted hair prepared [for the brothers] and took both comfortably across the yonder bank of the Bhāgīrathī (*prabhāte vimale sūrye kārayitvā jaṭā ubhau : asmin . . . mayā*)." These words require no comment and very clearly indicate the time when the preparation of the *jaṭās* could have been commenced.

Taking a stock of all the incidents described by Vālmīki before and after the preparation of the *jaṭās* until the party

⁶¹ N.W.R., 56.30-35.⁶² N.W.R., 58.1; *Vulgate*, 54.1.⁶³ N.W.R., 53.1-4; *Vulgate*, 52.1-4.⁶⁴ N.W.R., 101.1-3; *Vulgate*, 89.1-2.⁶⁵ N.W.R., 98.26-27.⁶⁶ 86.24.

landed on the southern bank, we may easily fix the probable hour of their river-crossing. The present topic covers 127 verses of Cantos 53-56 of the *N.W.R.* or 102 verses of the unusually big Canto 52 of the *Vulgate*. Thus :—

Just at the Sun-rise time, which we have taken to be about 6 A.M., Rāma sounded Lakṣmaṇa, who called in Guha and Sumantra, the charioteer. Then, Guha asked his minister or men to bring the best boat and it was brought.⁶⁷ It should not be forgotten that the Inḡudī tree of Rāma's resting place, though according to the *N.W.R.*, 51.5, 'not very far from the river' (*avidūre hyayam nadyāḥ*) must have been beyond the highest flood-mark of the rains; and, therefore, about an hour would be required for Lakṣmaṇa to call in Guha, for the latter to summon his assistants, and, according to *N.W.R.*, 53.6, for them to come, go over to the ferry, take out the boat and bring it to a proper place and return to Guha to inform him that it was ready (*taṁ niśamya samādeśaṁ sannivṛtya gaṇo mahān : upohya nāvāṁ rucirāṁ Gubāya pratyavedayat*). Thus, it ought to be about 7 A.M. before any other thing could be done.

Then, Guha reported to Rāma that the boat was ready and the two brothers, fixing their quivers and swords on their persons, walked together with Sītā towards the river.⁶⁸ But just when they were starting, Sumantra humbly turned to Rāma⁶⁹ and engaged him in a rather long parting and pathetic discourse (covering 80 verses of Cantos 53-55 of the *N.W.R.* = vv. 12-64 of the *Vulgate*), persisting on to take the latter back to Ayodhyā or himself to accompany the party to the forests.⁷⁰ Then, the contents of Canto 54 of the *N.W.R.*, which is entirely missing from the *Vulgate*, tantamount to Lakṣmaṇa's outburst⁷¹ and Rāma's pacificatory

⁶⁷ 53.5-6 = 52.5-7.

⁶⁸ 53.7-8 = 528-11.

⁶⁹ 53.9 = 52.15.

⁷⁰ 53.10—55.21 = 52.12-58.

⁷¹ Briefly, reported by Sumantra at Ayodhyā, in the *Vulgate*, 58.26-33.

appeal, both serving as their respective messagess, would require some additional time. Then, Rāma explained to Sumantra the various reasons for which it was proper for the latter to return to Ayodhyā and not to accompany the former any further.⁷² In its natural course this big conversation would practically require about an hour more; and it means not less than 8 A.M. already so far.

Then, Rāma asked Guha to fetch the banian-gum,⁷³ with which Rāma (a prince having no practice like that of a professional or even an amateur) prepared the matted hair not only for himself but for Lakṣmaṇa as well, and then both assumed the full dress and form of hermits.⁷⁴ Thus, Guha, at about 8 A.M., went to bring the banyan-gum [in sufficient quantity] and should have returned after some time, which coupled with that required for the *jaṭā*-making for the brothers on the part of Rāma and for affixing the matted hair and other things that changed the princes into hermits on their persons should moderately come to about two hours. So it was about 10 A.M. already before they could go to or leave for the actual river bank.

Then, Rāma, exhorting Guha about the state-craft,⁷⁵ went together with Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā to the river, where he found the boat and asked Lakṣmaṇa to get himself and Sītā into it in no hot haste.⁷⁶ He did accordingly and Rāma followed them.⁷⁷ While still on the northern bank in the boat, Rāma made the *jaṭa* of (*i.e.*, repeated, ordinarily not less than 108 times,) some particular Vedic *mantra* or⁷⁸ presumably *mantras*, and all the three, sipping water, offered their obeisance to the sacred river.⁷⁹ Then, Rāma took leave of Sumantra as well as Guha and his ministers, who were all

⁷² 55.22-26 = 52.59-64.

⁷³ 56.1-2 = 52.65-68.

⁷⁴ 56.3-5 = 52.69-71.

⁷⁵ 56.6 = 52.72.

⁷⁶ 56.4-5 and 7-9 = 52.73-75.

⁷⁷ 56.10-11 = 52.76-77.

⁷⁸ According to the commentators, *Sukla Yajurveda-Samhitā*, 21.6, but presumably also 21.7. The former is a *triṣṭubh* and the latter a *gāyatrī*, both amounting together to 70 syllables.

⁷⁹ 52.78-79.

left on the northern bank, and asked the boatmen to row.⁸⁰ Reaching in the middle of the stream, Sītā offered her own prayer, promising to worship the sacred river and other deities on the banks after the safe return of Rāma.¹⁸ And no sooner had she finished than did she speedily reach the southern bank.⁸² These last things also mean not less than an hour.

Thus, the party crossed, *i.e.*, alighted on the southern bank of the Gaṅgā almost in the noon, and not before 11 A.M. in any case. It is, therefore, wrong to say that they did so "next morning."

4. From Śrīngaverapura to Prayāga

The princes reaching the south bank left the boat and offered their obeisance to the Gaṅgā with full concentration⁸³. The soil on which Rāma landed just after crossing the Gaṅgā represented a tract of the Vatsa-deśa (*Vatsān*), which the poet describes as prosperous or flourishing (*samrddhān*), happy (*muditān*) and having successive stretches of fruitful crops (*śubha-sasya-mālinaḥ*)⁸⁴, a clear antithesis of the forth-coming 'uninhabited dense forest.'

But before they should move further, Rāma struck a note of caution and asked Lakṣmaṇa to be vigilant for the safety and protection of the party whether they were in the inhabited or uninhabited country (*sa-jane vi-jane'pi vā*), informing him that Sītā, who that very day was going to enter the rough forest devoid of human beings, fields and groves, would immediately be acquainted with the pain of forest-dwelling⁸⁵. Upon this Lakṣmaṇa led and Rāma followed

⁸⁰ 56.12 = 52.80.

⁸¹ 56.13-20 = 52.81-91.

⁸² 56.21 = 52.92.

⁸³ *Vulgate*, 52.93 and N.W.R., 56.24.

⁸⁴ *Sa loka-pāla-pratima-prabhāvas-tīrtvā mahātma varado mahā-nadīm : tataḥ samrddhāncchubha-sasya-mālinaḥ kṣanena Vatsān muditān-upāgamat. — Vulgate*, 52.101.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 93-98.

Sītā and thus they went on⁸⁶. Poor Sumantra having fixed his constant gaze at Rāma, who was now on the other (south) bank of the Gaṅgā, with his sight no more helping him on account of the [growing] length of the distance, shed tears in affliction.⁸⁷ There (*i.e.*, while still in the Vatsa country,—so also the commentary ‘*Śiromaṇi*’) the two brothers killed the four large sacrificial animals, and taking their holy part (fit for the evening offering), while themselves being hungry, they rushed in time for their [nocturnal] stay to the large tree⁸⁸ of *nyagrodha* (*i.e.*, *vaṭa* or banyan)⁸⁹ [which from their hunting area situated in the prosperous, happy and rich-in-crops country-side of the Vatsadeśa they must have spotted as an outstanding feature] of the desolate big forest⁹⁰ referred to already by Rāma as being devoid of fields and groves.

Thus, we see that the party were occupied, in the forenoon, with the river-crossing, etc., and, in the after-noon, solely with the hunting business and did not cover much ground in their Prayāga-ward journey for want of time as well as energy, having taken nothing but water⁹¹ for these three days and two nights.

Topographical considerations, too, lead us to the same conclusion. Sumantra standing on the prominent north bank saw the three travellers going a little distance in the Vatsa country; and just after he became helpless to see them any more the brothers were engaged in hunting. During the hunt, too, they could not have gone far away consequently leaving Sītā alone or behind at some distance from themselves. Thus, their hunting area could not be much more than about a mile or so both from Sumantra in the West-

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 102.

⁸⁹ *Vulgate*, 53.33.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹¹ *N.W.R.*, 48.8; 51.26; 99.19-22; *Vulgate*, 46.10; 50.49; 87.18-19; cf. also the *N.W.R.*, 56.38.

North as well as the large *naṭa* tree in the adjoining big forest to the East. Therefore, the whole space covered by the party on the day in question can fairly be measured with the above chain of reasoning to have been two to three miles only. Similarly, we may infer that Rāma did not go into the interior of the Vatsa country further than its border he had unavoidably to pass through in order to penetrate the great forest leading to Prayāga, there being no other way from Śrṅgaverapura south ferry. This also proves the futility of the surmise that Prayāga or the sacred Confluence was situated somewhere near Rajapur in the Banda district. For in that case Rāma's whole way from Śrṅgaverapura to Prayāga must have lain entirely through the Vatsa country rich in successive fields of crops and happy populace instead of the big rough forest devoid of human beings, fields and groves, as admitted by the narrative of Vālmiki and borne out by Dr. Katju.

It is idle to expect of the party, bound by nature of its mission to travel over and stay at lonely and uninhabited places only, to have come across "any habited (!) localities" or to expect of Vālmiki to describe such localities irrelevantly at any length. We have already seen how Rāma in his meeting with Guha gave clear expression to his vow of avoiding all associations opposed to strict hermit life. The same spirit is running over to *Vulgate*, 52.98 and 54.24-26, and with a greater emphasis to the latter passage, where Rāma gives his grounds to reject the first offer or proposal from even such a great and holy personage as the Sage Bharadvāja and to give preference to the latter's second suggestion favouring residence in Citrakūṭa. For the same reason Rāma did not go over to Sugrīva's city.⁹² Thus, the travels of Rāma, who so scrupulously observed the rule obtaining among ascetics and avoided to pass through or visit any human habitations, should naturally have led

⁹² *Kiṣkīndīā-kāṇḍa*, 26.9-10.

through uninhabited forests and on rather unfrequented pathways. The significant adjectives of the Vatsa-deśa leave no room for the existence or inclusion of any "dense uninhabited forest" in it. Vatsa-deśa had, in later (*i.e.*, post-*Rāmāyaṇa*) times, its capital at Kauśāmbī (modern Kosam). And, from Rāma's landing place on the southern bank of the Gaṅgā at Śṛṅgaverapura right up to Mahewa Ghāt on the northern bank of the Yamunā opposite to Rajapur, the whole of the present Doaba to the West of the land, between Singraur in the North and Sarai Aqil in the South—comprising the present parganas of Chail, Karari, and Atharban (and perhaps also Kara, which according to an 11th century inscription was under the Kausāmba-maṇḍala⁹³)—constituted the Vatsa-deśa. From this Consideration it also follows that the party could never have travelled in the southern or south-western direction, in which Rajapur lies from the Śṛṅgaverapura ferry, and so the Confluence could not be situated at or near about Rajapur (District Banda).

Govindarāja, the reputed Rāmānujīya commentator of the *V.-R.*, has incidentally made a wrong statement as follows :—

"The reading *Matsyān* in place of *Vatsān* is due to the scribe's mistake. For the position of the countries is like this. Vatsa-deśa is the province (pradeśa) of Prayāga, between the Gaṅgā and Yamunā (*Gaṅgā-Yamunayor-madhye Prayāga-pradeśo Vatsa-deśaḥ*). To its west is Pañcāla. Śūra-sena-deśa is on the south bank of the Yamunā. To its West is the Matsya-deśa⁹⁴.

⁹³ *JRAS*, 1927, p. 694. Besides the Province or Division (*maṇḍala*) of Kauśāmbī, the district (Pattalā) of Kauśāmbī, also occurs in another inscription (*JRAS*, 1927, p. 696), recording the building of a temple of Siddheśvara (Mahādeva) by a certain Śrīvāstava Thakura in the village of Mevahaḍa (modern Meohad) in the district of Kauśāmbī, at 7 miles from Kosam. The inscription is dated Śaṃvat 1245, *i.e.*, 1188 A.C.

⁹⁴ On the *Vulgate*, 52.101.

“ [They went on seeing the beautiful] parts of the country (*deśān*), *i.e.*, the parts included in the Vatsa-deśa (*Vatsadeś-āvāntara-deśān*). ”⁹⁵

Govindarāja was a South Indian and as such he has only pleaded his ignorance of the North-Indian Geography of ancient times. In the age of the Rāmāyaṇa (*i.e.*, in the hoary times Vālmīki has portrayed), Prayāga represented no towns, no villages and no cultivated land in the fiscal sense, for which it should have formed part of the Vatsa-deśa or, for a matter of that, of any other political province or state. As will be shown in the following pages, its major part consisted of a great forest. This is also admitted by F.E. Pargiter, who has written as follows :—

“ Prayāga is described in a great forest.⁹⁶

“ It will be seen that, according to the Rāmāyaṇa, sacred Prayāga (Allahabad) was only a clearing in a forest which covered the end of the Ganges and Jumna doab and the tract southward, while north of it was planted a Nishāda Kingdom with its capital at Śringaverapura on the Ganges.⁹⁷

“ He crossed the Ganges at Śringaverapura by boat, and entered the forest on the other side. Journeying through the forest they reached Prayāga next day, and Bharadvāja’s hermitage there. More particulars are given of this part of the country in connection with Bharata’s quest of Rāma. King Guha ferried Bharata and his troops across in boats. The forest is described as scarcely penetrable, and even scarce of water for a large body of men. It appears to have been called Prayāga Forest.⁹⁸

“ Bharadvāja’s hermitage at Prayāga is described as a clearing in the forest about a “ Krośa ” in extent.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Do, 54, 2-3.

⁹⁶ *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*, p. 276.

⁹⁷ *JRAS*, 1894, *Geography of Rāma’s Exile*, p. 233.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 238.

" the fact remains clear (p.239) that, the hermitage site was but a small cleared spot with the forest all round. From Bharadvāja's hermitage Rāma crossed the Yamunā, and went to Mount Citrakūṭa. To cross that river he used a raft. This is noteworthy, for we have seen there were plenty of boats at Śringaverapura, and it offers a further indication how completely Prayāga must have been shut off by forest from the common resources of civilization¹⁰⁰.

"About a Krośa across the Yamunā Rāma entered a forest which appears to be called "Nīla."¹⁰¹

"The forest of Citra-kūṭa does not appear to have been isolated. The narrative suggests that the Nīla forest joined the forest on this hill, and the short distance indicates that there could have been no large tract of inhabited country there. We have found that a real forest existed in the doab between Śringaverapura and Prayāga, where also there was no room for much cultivated land . . . These facts may justly be placed together, and they show that forests practically continuous extended from Citra-kūṭa, across the Jumna, over and around the south end of the doab, and crossing the Ganges ended in a forest that divided the realms of Ayodhyā and Kāśī (Benares)."¹⁰²

Thus, it will be clear that, besides the land between the Confluence and the Bharadvājāśrama and between the latter and the vast Prayāga Forest, Prayāga comprised mainly the last-named part known as Prayāga-vāna¹⁰³, which, as will be seen in the sequel, was a penance-grove (*tapo-vana*). There is a clear mention in the V.-R. of the extent of the land coming under Prayāga or Bharadvāja's recluse juris-

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 239.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁰³ N.W.R., 58.5-8 to be read with 22-23; 63.3; 101.27; 102.4-6, 14, 18-23; 104.50; *Vulgate*, 54. 52-8 and 22 to be read with 32, 34; 59.3; 89.21; 91.48.

diction. . . The poet, in course of describing the entertainment of Bhārata and his army by Bharadvāja, says that the land all around extending up to 5 *yojanas* (i.e., 20 *krośas* or about 45 miles) turned into a sodded level¹⁰⁴ resembling a vast gemmed pavement (*habhūva hi samā bhūmih samantāt pañca-yojanā : śādvalair-babubhiś-channā nīla-vaidūrya-sannibhaiḥ*). The N.W.R. reads *su-samā* and *pañca-yojanam* in place of *hi samā* and *pañca-yojanā* of the *Vulgate*, meaning that for 5 *yojanas* all around the land became well-levelled and covered with innumerable turfs resembling the bluish green *Vaidūrya* gems. But there is no difference between these versions on the point of the extent of 5 *yojanas* all around. And this is in perfect agreement with what we find in the *Purāṇas*, viz., that the *Prayāga Maṇḍala* extends over 5 *yojanas* (*Pañca-yojana-vistīrṇam Prayāgasya tu maṇḍalam*).¹⁰⁵ Over this vast area the human habitations, if any, were represented only by the inmates of the penance-grove (*tapovana*), who shared it in common (*vanam sādharmaṇam hīdam tapovana-nivāsinām*).¹⁰⁶ This great forest of *Prayāga*, too, is called by the poet as an *āśrama-pada*¹⁰⁷, which Principal V. S. Apte in his *Practical Sanskrit English Dictionary* has translated as 'a hermitage (including the surrounding grounds), a penance forest.' And as such it has been distinguished from the *āśrama* (hermitage) proper of the great Sage Bharadvāja extending over a *krośa* only.¹⁰⁸ It was this whole vast area of 5 *yojanas* between the *Gaṅgā* and *Yamunā* which the *Purāṇic* accounts have called the Altar of *Prajāpati* (*Vedīr-eṣā Prajāpateḥ*), the Field of *Prajāpati* (*Prajāpateḥ Kṣetram*) and the Land of the Divine Sacrifice (*Devānām*

¹⁰⁴ *Vulgate*, 91.29; N.W.R., 104.29.

¹⁰⁵ *Matsya*, 108.9 and 111.8; *Padma*, *Ādikhaṇḍa*, 45.8 and 48.10.

¹⁰⁶ N.W.R., 58.23.

¹⁰⁷ N.W.R., 102.18-19.

¹⁰⁸ N.W.R., 102.22-23.

yajana-bhūmih),¹⁰⁹ as was meant by the word “Prayāga,” i.e., the vast area of the primal sacrifice, now reduced to its easternmost extremity.

Politically, however, bounded though as it was by the three ancient kingdoms of Ayodhyā in the North, Kāśī in the East, and Vatsa in the West, the whole vast area of “Prayāga” was practically a “No-Man’s Land.” The *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* furnish us with the proof of its being associated with the first-named two states rather than the last one. The kings of Mithilā, Kāśī, Kekaya, Aṅga, Kośala and Magadha, who were either related to or on friendly terms with the house of Ayodhyā, as well as the dependent Eastern, Northern, Western, Southern, Mleccha, Yavana, Śaka and Hill-Frontier kings find their mention in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. But any king of Vatsa is not similarly mentioned in it. On the other hand, the *Mahābhārata*¹¹⁰ describes how Vītahavya, the Haihaya king of Vatsa-deśa became a Brahmarṣi, seeking refuge in the Bhārgavāśrama that belonged to Bhṛgu and his descendants. Divodāsa, the king of Kāśī, fled after sustaining a crushing defeat from the Haihayas of Vatsa and sought shelter at the hermitage of Bharadvāja. Bharadvāja performed the *Putreṣṭi* sacrifice for Divodāsa, who, as its result, had a wonderful son, Pratardana. Already equipped with the Veda, Science of Archery, and Yoga by the special favour of Bharadvāja, Pratardana killed all the royal descendants of the Vatsa king, Vītahavya, who fled to the Bhārgavāśrama, embraced Brāhmaṇahood and became a Brahmarṣi. Bharadvāja, accompanying his preceptor Vālmīki to the bank of the river Tamasā, the scene of the lamentable death of the Krauñca bird, is also associated with the origin of the *Rāmā-*

¹⁰⁹ *Matsya-purāṇa*, 104.5; 108.9; 110.4-8; *Padma-p.*, *Ādikhaṇḍa*, 41.4-5. 45.8; 47.4-8; *Mahābhārata*, *Vanaparvan*, 83.73-82.

¹¹⁰ *Anuśāsanaparvan*, ch. 8.

yaṇa.¹¹¹ Bharadvāja's great interest in the Ayodhyā house, which was on excellent terms with the Kāśī house, the enemy of the Vatsa kings, to whose relation with the former house the *Rāmāyaṇa* bears to testimony, need not be recounted here. If we compare and connect together the accounts of the origin of the Medical Science as found in the Caraka¹¹² and Suśruta traditions, we may find a further connection between the royal house of Kāśī and Bharadvāja. So Kāśī and Vatsa were protégés of the Bharadvājāśrama and the Bhārgavāśrama respectively, and the two *Āśramas* had a sort of rivalry on account of their divided sympathies with the two royal houses. Thus, the Bharadvājāśrama could have nothing in common with the Vatsa-deśa, and the whole country, land or forest of Prayāga connected with Bharadvāja must have been independent of and separate from the Vatsadeśa.

Therefore, Vatsa-deśa as a political unit must have had its hands off the spiritual jurisdiction of Bharadvāja over the whole of ancient Prayāga, the vast area of primal sacrifice, lying between the 'renowned sacred Confluence'¹¹³ of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā in the East and the westernmost point of the great penance forest¹¹⁴ of Prayāga extending up to the vicinity of Śrīngaverapura and touching on the small strip of the Vatsadeśa in the West.

In the beginning of the present section I have summarised the last portion of Canto 52 of the *Vulgate* version of the *V.-R.*, Ayodhyākāṇḍa. We have also referred to the end of Canto 53 in connection with the large *nyagrodha* (*vaṭa*) tree in the solitary big forest under which the party had to spend their third night from Ayodhyā on their way from Śrīnga-

¹¹¹ *Bālakāṇḍa*, Canto 2.

¹¹² *Sūtra-sthāna*, chapter 1,00 4-40; *Bhāvaṇa-prakāśa*, Prakaraṇa 1, vv. 35-54.

¹¹³ *N.W.R.*, 58.22; *Vulgate*, 54.22.

¹¹⁴ *N.W.R.*, 58.23; 101.27; 102.4, 6, 18—22.

verapura to the Bharadvājāśrama. The first verse of that Canto (*i.e.*, 53) records that reaching that tree [in time, as we know from 52.102] Rāma performed his *Sandhyā* and thereafter he conversed with Lakṣmaṇa. The conversation (vv.2—32) was about their present night being the first one outside human abode and about the reaction of his exile on himself and his kith and kin at Ayodhyā. Thereafter they went to sleep. This marks the end of the 53rd Canto as well as their third day activities. Thus, the *Vulgate* does not suggest any journey worth the name on their part on the day they crossed the Gaṅgā.

In the corresponding Canto 56 of the N.W.R., however, we have some more interesting and informing matter which is missing from the *Vulgate*. When the boat had started from the northern bank, Guha and the charioteer (Sumantra) who were standing there burst into tears at the sight of the two brothers, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa (v. 22). The boat, pushed on by force of the wind and urged by power of the [boatmen's] arms, taking both the princes, came to the other side (*i.e.*, southern bank). Reaching the bank the two heroes, best of men, left the boat and with full concentration or devotion prostrated themselves before the Gaṅgā (23-24). Thereafter, Rāma, accompanied by his wife and Lakṣmaṇa, started. Just then, the wise and long-armed Rāma, determined for the forest-abode, said to Lakṣmaṇa, "O son of Sumitrā, go ahead [of us], let Sītā follow thee, [and] I will follow from behind, protecting thee as well as Sītā. Today, for the first time, Sītā will experience the pain of forest-dwelling and have to face the roar of lions, tigers and boars" (25-28). This matter is the same as of the *Vulgate*, 52.93-97.

Hereafter the N.W.R. is less reticent and more lucid than the *Vulgate* and suggests the direction in which they were to travel by mentioning the other direction as follows :
"Both of them bow in hand *went on*, along with Sītā,

to that forest, avoiding to look (or, not looking) in the direction in which Sumantra stood.”¹¹⁵ Guha and Sumantra, knowing the brother princes to have gone out of sight, returned full of [pathetic] affection.¹¹⁶ [Thereafter] both [the princes] plunged into that forest rendered resonant by various [types of] birds and abounding in numerous blossoming tree.¹¹⁷

The two brothers had not gone far (*adūram-attha gatvā*) when they halted under a banyan tree abounding in hundreds of rooting branches. There, sitting at ease, they saw, not very far (*nā'tidūre*), a lotus lake (or tank or pond), ‘Sudarśanā’ by name, full of lotuses, covered over by swans and ducks, and adorned with ruddy geese.¹¹⁸ Showing it to Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa, Rāma selected this place for the party to stay for the night; and all the three, after the last three days, subsisted on lotus stalks and passed the night under the banyan tree.¹¹⁹ Then, Sumantra together with Guha, ‘seeing Rāma going on constantly, had his sight blocked by the increasing length of the distance’ and shed tears, with his soul distressed heavily.¹²⁰

The next Canto (*i.e.*, 57), like the 53rd of the *Vulgate*, reports that coming to that banyan tree Rāma performed his evening *Sandhyā* and conversed, with Lakṣmaṇa on their present night to be the first one like that of strict hermits cut off from their kinsmen and friends, and, with Sītā as well on the twofold reaction of his banishment. Thus, Canto 57 and the third day activities of the party come to a close.

¹¹⁵ N.W.R., 56. 28-29.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 31-33.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 34-38.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

From this version¹²¹ it is clearer still that the forest was not very far from the place whence Sumantra and Guha were looking at the party going on. Similarly, they reached the banyan tree in that forest 'without going far' (*adūram-atha gatvā*), and the lake 'Sudarśanā,' too, was situated therein 'not very far' (*nā'ti-dūre*) from the said tree. In fact, the lake was so very near the tree that Lakṣmaṇa is described to have soon descended down the former and plucked off and presented to Sītā lotuses with their stalks.¹²²

Thus, it is now an established fact that, the party made practically no or very little Prayāga-ward journey on the Gaṅgā-crossing day, and that its major part was to be made on the following day.

We have already shown why "the direction in which the travellers were going" from Śrīgaverapura south bank could not possibly be the South or South-west. But this, it may be argued, is merely a negative conclusion and so Dr. Katju's observation, *viz.*, "We are not told of the direction," etc., remains uncontradicted. To this we may reply that our inference yields a positive conclusion as well. Moreover, the *V.-R.* furnishes us with very definite and valuable information throwing a flood of light on this point. And lastly, the indication of the direction in which they were travelling, though given somewhat vaguely in that great work, is not wanting altogether as supposed by Dr. Katju.

Now, in order to know the exact direction in which the travellers were going, if we pay a little attention to the mention of the other 'direction' in the passage quoted above,¹²³ we must at once dismiss the North from which they had already come and crossed the Gaṅgā so that they arrived

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 28-30.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 36-37.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

at the southern bank¹²⁴ of that river. We have already eliminated the South or South-west. That direction would be irrelevant also because it would be just opposite to the 'direction' or spot of Sumantra who would see the brothers going on their way with their backs turned upon himself. There would be no necessity for the poet to say that "they went on, avoiding to look in the direction in which Sumantra stood," as Sumantra would not be automatically or by any stretch coming in the range of their sight, which they are meant to have strenuously avoided to cast at him. And, of course, Rāma's exalted character and exclusive devotion to his present mission or singleness of purpose with which he had already left his all other nears and dears, which fact the poet seems to be specially emphasising would absolutely leave no room for the alternative of their repeatedly, or even once, turning back and looking behind, to obviate which the poet might be said to have used the words quoted above. The West, too, is out of question, as it would lead them towards the present Kara-Manikpur and never towards Prayāga or the Confluence, even if the latter were at Rajapur (which is to the South-Southwest of Singraur), more especially because no bend or change of direction in course of their Prayāgaward journey is ever suggested by the poet. Therefore, the only remaining and possible direction is the East, almost parallel to the course of the Gaṅgā for a considerable distance from Śrīngaverapura to the Bharadvājaśrama or the Confluence at Allahabad.

The direction is covertly pointed out once again.¹²⁵ When Rāma was [still seen] on the south bank, Guha, being severely afflicted with pain, talked with Sumantra for a long time (*i.e.*, — as long as it took Rāma to go out of the range of his

¹²⁴ *Vulgate*, 52. 92-93; *N.W.R.*, 56. 21-22.

¹²⁵ *N.W.R.*, Cantos 61-63 = *Vulgate*, Cantos 57-59.

sight—according to the commentaries) and went home (when Rāma, of course, throughout going on along the southern bank, could not be seen any more).¹²⁶ The party's going to and staying with or reception by Bharadvāja at Prayāga up to their leaving for the mountain, *i.e.*, Citrakūṭa, was observed [and communicated to their king, Guha] by those [*i.e.*, spies] who dwelt there *i.e.*, at Śṛṅgaverapura [and had closely followed Rāma up to the hermitage of Bharadvāja].¹²⁷ Then, taking leave [of Guha and] yoking his horses to the car, Sumantra, having a deeply sad heart, went back to the city of Ayodhyā itself.¹²⁸ The distressed charioteer reached Ayodhyā, when the day was over,¹²⁹ or, according to Rāma's *Tilaka*, in the evening on the second day [after his return from Śṛṅgaverapura], or, according to Govindarāja's *Bhūṣaṇa*, in the evening on the third day [explained also as 'in the evening forming the third part of the day'].¹³⁰ He communicated to King Daśaratha the exact message of Rāma.¹³¹

At the bidding of the King, Sumantra further told him, "Both the heroes, O King, fastening *jaṭās* [to their heads] and wearing rags and barks of trees, have, after crossing the Gaṅgā, gone 'facing' [*i.e.*, in the direction of] Prayāga. Lakṣmaṇa goes in front, Janaka's daughter in the middle, and Rāma, guarding [both] goes in the rear. Seeing them going in that manner, I have had to return helplessly (*i.e.*, owing to their having gone out of my sight). Then, when I was returning, my horses, full of tears, constantly gazed at Rāma, kept neighing and cried out loudly. Then, O King,

¹²⁶ *Vulgate*, 57.1.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹²⁹ *N.W.R.*, 61.4.

¹³⁰ *Vulgate*, 57.5.

¹³¹ *N.W.R.*, 61.24; *Vulgate*, 57.25.

having folded my hands to both the princes, I hastened to you, realising the graveness of your situation. And I stayed there (*i.e.*, at Śrīngaverapura) for a whole day (*Vulgate*, 'for a number of days,') with Guha, in the hope that Rāma might probably call me again [through Guha's emissaries]¹³².

According to the above account in the poet's own words, Rāma was still on the 'southern bank' when Guha and Sumantra went back to Śrīngaverapura. Was Rāma, then, standing or sitting at the very place where he alighted from the boat? No. We have been already told that the princes after alighting on the southern bank, at once commenced marching on foot towards the forest lying on their way that led to Prayāga, not looking in the direction of Sumantra who stood in the same place as long as his eyes did not fail him in having even the last glimpse of them. So the return of Guha and Sumantra could possibly take place only when the party were still on the southern bank, marching along it all the time, until they reached a point where Sumantra's eyes could not see them at all. This description unmistakably shows that Rāma (with his brother and wife), after crossing the Gaṅgā, went on along the southern bank, of course, definitely from west to east, the opposite direction having been already eliminated as irrelevant in our discussion.

Again, when Sumantra says, "Both the heroes, O king, fastening *jaṭās* and wearing rags and tree-barks, have, after crossing the Gaṅgā, gone towards Prayāga," he means a sudden change in the direction of the Party's journey, which so far lay from the North to the South-West. Dr. Katju's Prayāga at Rajapur lying on their straight way from Ayodhyā to the Daṇḍaka forests *via* Śrīngaverapura would require a continuity of their journey in the same direction.

¹³² N.W.R., 63.1-8; *Vulgate*, 59.1-3.

In such a context the specific mention of their taking to the "Prayāgaward" course in "*Gāṅgām-uttīrya tau vīrau Prayāgā-bhimukhaḥ gatau*"¹³³ cannot but involve some incongruity or irrelevancy. It can be prevented only if an unexpected swerving from the previous direction be meant. Surely, this piece of information must have reacted on both the fond as well as the same aspects of the King's mind.

Then, again, how could Sumantra's horses, in course of returning to Śṛṅgaverapura, which lay, very near, on their way to Ayodhyā, fix their "constant gaze at, or, have in their continuous purview, Rāma," who was going along with Sitā and Lakṣmaṇa, all facing the direction of Prayāga, if the horses and the heroes were going not in almost parallel but opposite directions (as Dr. Katju means to say) and if Prayāga were not situated in a suddenly changed direction, almost due east of the place where Rāma had landed from the boat?

There is yet another reference to the 'direction' in the V.-R. After the party had to resume their journey from the place of their third halt under the banyan tree near the 'Sudarśanā' lake in the big forest, it says, "Staying for that night under that *nyagrodha* tree they started from that halt after the Sun had clearly risen (*vimale'bhya-dite sūrye*), having thereafter penetrated into the exceedingly dense forest, 'towards the direction' (*tām diśam-uddiśya*) where the sacred Bhāgīrathī embraces the Yamunā."¹³⁴

Again, further light is shed upon this point as well as our main subject, the actual position of the Bharadvājaśrama and its distance from Śṛṅgaverapura, by Canto 102 of the N.W.R. describing Bharata's journey to the said Āśrama which, we know, was made in close pursuance of Rāma's footprints. Unfortunately this fine supplement to Rāma's travel between Śṛṅgaverapura South ferry and the Bharadvājaśrama has been abruptly omitted by the

¹³³ N.W.R., 63.3.

¹³⁴ N.W.R., 58.1-2.

Vulgate consulted by Dr. Katju and the majority of his supporters and critics. It describes, in the words of Guha, the pathway Bharata was to adopt,¹³⁵ and, in the poet's own words, the actual journey of Bharata over the same.¹³⁶ It is, however, retained also in [canto 98 of] Gorresio's edition (representing the Bengal recension), that was used by Pargiter as is clear from the latter's references to and translations from the same given on pp. 237-38 of his nice article, *Geography of Rāma's Exile*, referred to above. Let us search out this part of the *Vālmīkiya-Rāmāyaṇa*.

We are already told that Bharata got up at early dawn from his bed [at Śrīngaverapura north bank] and at Sunrise woke up Śatrughna to send for Guha, the Chief of Śrīngaverapura [who for the night had gone home¹³⁷ along with his men], in order that the latter should ferry the army across the Gaṅgā¹³⁸; and that ultimately that whole army, after having been ferried by boatmen at (or, with the closing of) the *Maitra mubūrta* (i.e., the 3rd of the 15 *mubūrtas* of two *ghaṭikās* or 48 minutes' duration each, after the Sunrise), went away to the Prayāga-vana (Forest of Prayāga)¹³⁹. On the days when Bharata, 35 days after Rāma¹⁴⁰ left Ayodhyā, crossed the Gaṅgā, the Sun rose between 5.21 and 5.48 A.M. By adding the time of the first 3 *mubūrtas*, viz., 6 *ghaṭikās* or 144 minutes to it we get 7.45 to 8.12 A.M., when the said incident took place. Bharata crossed the river at so early an hour as compared with Rāma because unlike the latter he had no other engagements and also because he had to travel during a hotter day, about a month later, than his elder brother.

¹³⁵ vv. 4—13.

¹³⁷ N.W.R., 100.30.

¹³⁸ N.W.R., 101. 2-3.

¹³⁹ N.W.R., 101.27; *Vulgate*, 89.20 or 21.

¹⁴⁰ N.W.R., 67.16; 69.3; 70.68; 74.16; 77.16; 89.26; 90.1 and 4; 93.14; 94.1; *Vulgate*, 62.17; 63.4; 64.78; 68.21; 71.18; 77.1 and 4; 79.6; 82.32; 83.1.

¹³⁶ vv. 14—24.

Coming to the canto in question we find that Bharata having crossed the Gaṅgā together with his army and ministers said at the instance of his priest (Vasiṣṭha) to Guha (verse 1), "Through which country should we go to where Rāma is? O Guha, tell us the way: you always live in forests" (v. 2). Guha who knew the country where Rāma was then staying replied (v. 3), "O Kākutstha, hence you ought to go to the best forest of Prayāga, full of various birds and reservoirs of water having lotuses, etc. O best of men, the forest of Prayāga extends over a *pra-krośa*, i.e., an excessive or big *krośa*¹⁴¹ [in length]" (vv. 4-6). The reading in the printed edition is *prakrośa-mātram*. But if it be not treated as a printer's devil or scribe's mistake for *pra-krośa*, a word formed by adding *pra* before *krośa*, like *pra-dvāra*¹⁴², *prācārya* (the well-known instance of the *prādi-samāsa* in Sanskrit Grammar), etc., *pra-krośa* would be quite meaningless. *krośamātra* is a familiar expression in the *V.-R.*¹⁴³ To it the addition of *pra* gives the sense of 'intensity' or 'excess.' In translating vv. 4-6 and 18-20 or 14-22 here I am accepting the construction as understood by Pargiter. They are, however, open to be construed in another way as well, as I will show later on.

Guha continues to say, "Resting there you ought to go to the hermitage of Bharadvāja (6). O Prince, going there, offer your obeisance to that sage, conversant with *Dharma*, perfect in asceticism and well-known all over the three worlds (7). Having obtained his blessings and heard his 'thrilling' or 'agreeable' words (containing information regarding what you wish to know, *viz.*, Rāma's whereabouts), you, being thrilled with joy, shall go to see your elder

¹⁴¹ *Krośa* originally means "the range of the voice in calling or halooing." As a measure of distance it is equivalent to about 2 miles and a quarter. A *Pra-krośa* may cover 3 miles or a little more.

¹⁴² *N.W.R.*, 29.5.

¹⁴³ *N.W.R.*, 59.7, 19; 102.22; *Vulgate*, 55.8, 32; etc.

brother (8), after you have stayed there for the night and been entertained by him with rich reception; for as an affectionate host he, after seeing you, will detain you (*lit.*, will not let you go) for one night (9)." Telling this to and getting all praise from Bharata, Guha paid his respects to Bharata and his preceptor and returned with his kinsmen to his boat (vv. 10-14).

Bharata, too, went to the Prayāga Forest together with his army, appointing Sumantra to be their guide, enjoying the sight of fruitful trees and flowers and the sweet sounds of sylvan birds, and giving expression to the merits of Rāma, Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa and demerits of his own mother, Kaikeyī (14-17). Going a *yojana*¹⁴⁴ and a half he saw the great forest reputed as Prayāga (*i.e.*, the area of the primal sacrifice) [charming] like the Caitraratha (*i.e.*, Kubera's grove) (18). Entering that hermitage (or, penance forest), which yielded all the desired fruits (or, fulfilled all the desires or human aims) and which looked charming with lotus tracts or lakes, and in this way approaching that best abode of gods (or, best temple), Prayāga, Bharata circumambulated and worshipped the same (19-20). Then, all his mothers, Śatrughna and others also circumambulated it (21). Offering their obeisance and then coming out of that forest they saw the hermitage of the great sage of the Bharadvāja family, where the trees formed a thicket in a *krośa*'s extent (22-23). Having seen the hermitage, Bharata was exceedingly delighted (23). Comforting his army and stopping it outside, Bharata made up his mind to go to see the great Sage Bharadvāja (24).

The next canto (N.W.R., 103) contains the information that Bharata keeping his army at a distance (*Vulgate*, at a *krośa*) went on foot in silken garments to the Bharadvājāśrama together with his ministers headed by the Preceptor

¹⁴⁴ *Yojana* originally means "a stage or distance gone in one harnessing or without unyoking." As a measure it is equal to 4 *Krośas* or 9 miles.

(vv. 1-2). It had nice secondary gates, was neat and clean, had the beauteous plantain groves, abounded in tame reptiles and beasts, was embellished with groups of sacrificial altars or platforms, looked as an open door to heaven, and was shining with the sylvan beauty (3-4). Going not very far (*nā'ti-dūram tato gatvā*) he saw that [particular] *āśrama* (4). Entering that hermitage, Bharata accompanied by his priest saw that exceedingly magnanimous sage having firelike glow (5).

The *Vulgate*¹⁴⁵ tells us only that Bharata, crossing the Gaṅgā, at the *mubūrta* No. 3, went to the Prayāga Forest. The *Bhūṣaṇa* of Govindarāja takes the time indication to mean *either* that the army crossed the river during the third *mubūrta* whereafter it went to the Prayāga-vana, *i.e.*, crossing of the river—was an accomplished fact within the first 6 *ghaṭikās* (144 minutes) after the sunrise, *or* that it went to the Prayāga-vana at [the commencement of] the third *mubūrta*. The latter interpretation is adopted by the *Śiromaṇi*, which adds, "This indicates that the Gaṅgā-crossing was finished within the two *mubūrtas* (*i.e.*, 96 minutes) after the sun-rise.

The expression 'went to' (*pra-yayan*), however, is not very clear. It may mean either (1) departed from or left the Śṛṅgaverapura ferry and moved on towards the Prayāga-vana, or (2) proceeded to, *i.e.*, was already going on the way to the Prayāga-vana, or (3) 'reached' the first point in the Prayāga-vana. The ambiguity of expression, instead of being resolved or reduced, is further enhanced by the deplorable reticence of the *Vulgate*, which, in the very next stanza, as if in a jump, brings Bharata, who, just a moment back, has been at Śṛṅgaverapura, at once to the door of the Bharadvājāśrama.

¹⁴⁵ 89.21 (Govindarāja's text, 89.20).

We are further¹⁴⁶ told that at the sight of the Bharadvājāśrama Bharata stopped his whole army at the distance of a *krośa* and went with his priest to see the Sage. It¹⁴⁷ also records that Bharata, approaching the hermitage of the high-souled Brāhmaṇa (*i.e.*, Bharadvāja), the priest of the gods, saw the charming big forest of that best Brāhmaṇa, which had, beautiful huts surrounded by clusters of trees. Gōvindarāja remarks that the adjective 'big,' (*mabāt*) as applied to the Sage's hermitage forest signifies its great capacity to afford sufficient space for the whole army of Bharata to encamp.

The above account of the *Vulgate* does not, however, help us much in fixing the direction or distance from Śṛṅgaverapura of the Bharadvājāśrama, or of the Prayāga-vana, the only milestone between these two places. If we accept the view of the *Śiromaṇi* and the second interpretation of the *Bhūṣaṇa* and take 'went' to mean 'reached,' the distance between Śṛṅgaverapura and the Prayāga-vana can be no more than what may be covered within a *muhūrta* or 48 minutes, say about 3 miles more or less. But the *Vulgate* as well as the *N.W.R.* have clearly pointed out that the Bharadvājāśrama, instead of being particularly a small spot containing some building or buildings as we find it now-a-days, extended, in those times, over a 'big' forest, in a *krośa* (about $2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) in length, and abounded in huts surrounded by clustering trees.

Now, if we knit together the threads supplied also by the *N.W.R.* and Gorresio's edition, we find that Bharata's army, after going for a *yojana* and a half ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles) from the ferry of Śṛṅgaverapura, entered the forest of Prayāga proper, which extended over a *pra-krośa* (3 miles or so).

¹⁴⁶ *Vulgate*, 89. 21 or 22; and 90.1.

¹⁴⁷ 89.22 or 23.

Coming out of that (Prayāga) forest they saw the Bharadvājāśrama occupying a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) in length; and leaving his army behind at the same distance (at a *krośa*), i.e., at the place where the Prayāga-vana ended and Bharadvāja's great forest (*mahad vanam*) containing his huts commenced, Bharata with his ministers went to see the Sage in his hermitage. Thus, the total distance that Bharata and his people had to cover from Śṛṅgaverapura right up to the Bharadvājāśrama was $13\frac{1}{2} + 3 + 2\frac{1}{4} = 18\frac{3}{4}$ miles. And this wonderfully tallies with the actual distance between Singraur and Allahabad if one takes to the direct route on the South of the Gaṅgā as Rāma and Bharata did.

As already said, in construing certain passages of the N.W.R., I have not differed materially from Pargiter; but they may be better interpreted, as follows:—

Verses 4-5 and first half of the 6th form one sentence with *gamyatām* as the finite verb, and the concluding words, '*vanam prakrośa-mātram ca Prayāgasya naraṣabha*,' have to be taken only as a repetition in sense, of '*(itaḥ) Prayāgam Kākutstha (gamyatām) vanam-uttamam*,' made simply for adding up the particular detail of the distance of the said Prayāga Forest from the south bank of the Gaṅgā opposite Śṛṅgaverapura, as it was not feasible in the body of the latter, i.e., the first half of verse 4. In '*Prayāgasya vanam itaḥ prakrośa-mātram*' the distance is denoted by the same idiom as in '*tri-yojanam itas-tāta girir-yatra nivatsyasi . . . Citrakūta iti khyāto Gandhamādana-sannibhaḥ*,'¹⁴⁸ which I will discuss in the last section. The sentence thus means, "O descendant of Kakutstha, you ought to go to the excellent Prayāga Forest,—from here, the forest of Prayāga, O best of men, lying at an excessive or big *krośa* (about 3 miles or just a little more) only,—full of the flocks of various kinds of birds, and endowed with

¹⁴⁸ N.W.R., 58. 29-31.

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reservoirs of water that resemble their [own] series of lotuses, have good descents [into water] and little mud, are disturbed by birds' feet and are full [of water] and blocked by the dark-green mosses (4-6). Resting therein you ought to go 'towards' (*i.e.*, in the direction of) the Bharadvājāśrama (6)." This account reminds us of the surroundings of Rāma's third day halt near the lake 'Sudarśanā' in the big forest.

The translation of the further passages is now to be as follows:—

(7-14 *supra*, pp. 461-462).

"Bharata with his army went over to the Prayāga Forest (14) (15-17, *supra*, p. 462). Going through the great forest for a *yojana* and a half he entered the hermitage area or penance grove (*āśrama-padam*) like Caitraratha [the divine grove of Kubera] and saw the beautiful or sacred place of pilgrimage (*su-tīrtham*) known as "Prayāga," which grants the fruits of all [human] desires and looks charming with lotus-tracts (*paṅkaja-vanaḥ*) having abundant lotuses (18-19).¹⁴⁹ Approaching that excellent abode of gods, or, that best temple (*lit.*, Divine Place), Prayāga (*abbigamya Prayāgam tad deva-sthānam-anuttamam*),¹⁵⁰ Bharata circumambulated it and bowed down before it (20). All those mothers of him as well as Śatrughna went to, and with great devotion (*apramāṭṭāḥ*) circumambulated, that, *i.e.*, the 'Divine Place', Prayāga (21). Bowing down and coming out of that forest, immediately, or, adjacent to it (*anantaram*), they saw the

¹⁴⁹ सुमहद् वनम् अध्यर्घ्यं योजनं गत्वा, यथा चैत्ररथं तथा तद् आश्रमपदं प्रविश्य, सर्वकामकलप्रदं बहुपुष्करैः पङ्कजवनैः शोभितं प्रयागम् इति विख्यातं सुतीर्थं ददर्श—
(इत्यन्वयः) ।

¹⁵⁰ Compare the expression '*anuttamam deva-sthānam*' used for the extensive Prayāga-vana here in the Rāmāyaṇa with '*abbisamskṛtā devānām yajana-bhūmiḥ*' and '*Prajāpateḥ vediḥ*' or '*ḷeṣetram*' in the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas, denoting the whole maṇḍala of Prayāga covering 5 *yojanas*. cf. *supra*, footnote 109.

Āśrama of His Holiness (*bhāvitātmanah*), the great Sage of the Bharadvāja family, in the extent of a *krośa* having clustering trees" (22-23).

This construction, too, results in giving the same total mileage, though with a little inverted order of its items, viz., 1 *pra-krośa* (3 miles) + *adhyardha* (i.e., $1\frac{1}{2}$) *yojana* ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles) + 1 *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) = $18\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Its particular import, however, presents the difference on two points, i.e. (1) *pra-krośa* or 3 miles representing the distance between Śrīngaverapura South Ferry and the commencing point of the great forest, called the Prayāga-vana, as also borne out by the fact of 48 minutes spent in covering it according to the commentaries, *Śiromaṇi* and *Bhūṣaṇa*, on the *Vulgate*, and not the extent of that Prayāga-vana, which Pargiter understands to have stood after $1\frac{1}{2}$ *yojanas* from Śrīngaverapura and just before the one *krośa* extent of the Bharadvājāśrama, and the mileage of which he has omitted to mention, and (2) "Prayāga" being also the name of a particular sacred *tīrtha* having a "Divine Place," which, like a temple could be easily circumambulated, and which was situated at the eastern fag-end of the Prayāga-vana, coming out of which one had to enter the hermitage proper of the Sage Bharadvāja. Thus, according to the present interpretation, the country was open for about 3 miles east of Śrīngaverapura, and between this open country and the Bharadvājāśrama, which according to all the versions extended in a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles), there stood a very big forest, called the Prayāga Forest or "the Forest," serving the purpose of a 'penance forest' and extending over a *yojana* and a half ($13\frac{1}{2}$ miles). It might have required about a *krośa* ($2\frac{1}{4}$ miles) more to reach the summer Confluence from the Bharadvājāśrama in those days.

Thus, both Rāma's party and Bharata's army travelled eastward from Śrīngaverapura to reach the Bharadvājāśrama near the Confluence for about 18-19 miles; and the distance

between Guha's city and the shifting Confluence was about 20-21 miles and in no case exceeded 22 miles. The "No-Man's Land" where recluses practised penance as well as students acquired knowledge, both living under the holy charge of Bharadvāja, extended from East to West as far as the westernmost extremity of the great forest after which lay the prosperous tracts of the Vatsadeśa, and covered about $(22 - 3) = 19$ miles lengthwise. All this holy land comes under the "Prayāga Maṇḍala" of the Purāṇic lore and represents the Divine Land of Sacrifice par excellence, as is meant by the word "Prayāga."

Now it will be quite clear that the direction in question could never be South-west nor the distance between Śṛṅgaverapura and Old Prayāga or the Bharadvājāśrama or the Confluence "about 40 miles more or less," as our honourable leader, Dr. Katju, would expect us to acquiesce in. "The direction in which the Gaṅgā met the Yamunā" in those days has always been the same, *i.e.*, the East from Śṛṅgaverapura or from the large banyan tree in the big uninhabited forest. The distance is the same today as it was then according to links found in the *V.-Rāmāyaṇa*. Old Śṛṅgaverapura, whose identity seems to have been only reluctantly accepted by Dr. Katju and has been disputed by Mr. Mittal, was not different from the modern Singraur. Nor have the rivers materially changed their course. Nor has the Confluence shifted from Rajapur to Allahabad. Nor was the site of the Bharadvājāśrama in old Prayāga very different from that at modern Allahabad.

Reverting to Rāma's journey from the vast *nyagrodha* tree near the lotus lake, 'Sudarśanā,' at the commencement of a big uninhabited forest, we find that the party after passing the night under that *nyagrodha* tree left that place when it was clear Sun-rise (*vimala'bhyudite Sūrye*),¹⁵¹ of course,

¹⁵¹ *N.W.R.*, 58.1; *Vulgate*, 54.1

of a post-winter¹⁵² or pre-summer morning, *i.e.*, about, or just a little before 8 A.M. Having penetrated into a rather big or dense forest, they went on 'towards that *deśa* (country or place, *i.e.*, Prayāga), in which the Yamunā proceeds in face of (*i.e.*, turns to meet) the Bhāgīrathī Gaṅgā,¹⁵³ or 'aiming at the "direction" (*tām diśam-uddiśya*) wherein the holy Bhāgīrathī (Gaṅgā) approaches the Yamunā.¹⁵⁴ Adopting a safe path,¹⁵⁵ or,¹⁵⁶ carefully so as to remain safe,¹⁵⁷ or, 'comfortably,' because they entertained no thought of meeting any people and had not the least doubt or fear, and 'safely' (meaning, so as to keep intact their stock of physical energy), *i.e.*, resting and upstanding in slow degrees at will,¹⁵⁸ they went on, seeing various tracts of land and beautiful places (*deśān*) which they had never seen before and which were full of flowers of various colours: then, just at the sun-set, *i.e.*, about 6 P.M., Rāma said to Lakṣmaṇa (vv. 3-4). "See the smoke uprising in front of Prayāga. It being a mark of the Sacred Fire, I hope the Sage is near at hand, or, is at home (v. 5). We have surely arrived at the auspicious Confluence of the Gaṅgā and Yamunā, as we hear the high sound born of the collision of the waters (v. 6). Firewood is lying cut or torn by those who dwell in the forest and subsist on [the products of] trees; and we see these trees of various kinds in Bharadvāja's hermitage" (v. 7). Having thus gradually or leisurely walked, they or those two archers, at sun-down, reached the abode (*i.e.*, the area lying near the hermitage)

¹⁵² N.W.R., 60.7; *Vulgate*, 56.6—'*Śisīrātyaya*' denotes the close or end of the cold or dewy season, which comprises the two months of Māgha and Phālguna.

¹⁵³ *Vulgate*, 54.2

¹⁵⁴ N.W.R., 58.2.

¹⁵⁵ '*Panthānam Kṣemamāsādyā*.'—N.W.R., 58.4.

¹⁵⁶ '*Yathā-Kṣemeṇa*.'—*Vulgate*, 54.4.

¹⁵⁷ '*Kṣema-betv-avadhānam-anatikramya*.'—Govindarāja's *Bhūṣaṇa*.

¹⁵⁸ *Yathā* (= *Yathā-sukham, janānumāna-saṅkā-bhāvāt*), *kṣemeṇa* (= *upaviśy-otthāya ca, śanaiḥ śanaiḥ svecchā'nurodhena*).—Rāma's *Tīlaka*.

of the Sage, at the Confluence of¹⁵⁹, or, in the *Antarvedi-deśa* (the land included in the [vast Divine] sacrificial Altar) between¹⁶⁰, the Gaṅgā and Yamunā (v. 8). Rāma, on his part, entering the [forest lying near the] *Āśrama*, causing terror [merely on account of his form of an archer, etc.,] to the beasts and birds, and going on the way for a *muhūrta* (i.e., the way which he could cover in a *muhūrta* or 48 minutes),¹⁶¹ reached [in the neighbourhood of] Bharadvāja.¹⁶²

The last reference furnishes an additional proof of the fact that the hermitage proper of Bharadvāja occupied an area of more than two miles ; because after entering its precincts, Rāma, together with Sītā and Lakṣmaṇa had to walk for more than three quarters of an hour before he could reach in the vicinity of the residential quarters of the Sage. Hereby it is also clear that the Sage, though practically in charge of not only the hermitage extending over more than 2 miles but also the whole penance forest called Prayāga-vana which stretched up to the Vatsadeśa in the immediate neighbourhood of Guha's kingdom, had his headquarters at the easternmost corner of the said hermitage. And that was exactly the same place as is even today occupied by the several temples and is called Jogīānā in Colonelganj. It included even the southern part of the Ananda Bhavana and the high ground under the tamarind trees to its south, besides the present Bharadvāja Park and all the high ground East of the present Indian Press inclusive, because it was all in one and the same level before the construction of the channels carrying foul water and the roads dividing these tracts apart. After coming so far with me, my generous readers will be fully convinced with the truth of my remarks made on pp. 192-3 above.

¹⁵⁹ 'Sandhan' = Saṅgame vartamānam.—Bhūṣaṇa.

¹⁶⁰ 'Sandhan' = Antar-vedi-deśe.—Tilaka.

¹⁶¹ 'Muhūrtaṁ' = muhūrta-gamyam.—Bhūṣaṇa,

¹⁶² *Vulgate*, 54.9.

As compared to Bharata's march described above, the above account of Rāma's journey to Prayāga, though representing an amalgamation of the various versions, is very meagre. Nevertheless, it is rather undoubtedly obvious that Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and Sītā travelled quite leisurely, often resting at places and seeing the sights, and covered, on the fourth day, a distance of about 15-16 miles within 10 hours to reach the exact spot where Bharadvāja sat surrounded by his disciples¹⁶³ and ascetics¹⁶⁴, and that on the previous day they could not walk more than about 3 miles in any case. In view of these hard facts projecting in high relief from the perfect workmanship of Valmiki which only a minute research thereof made after a thorough clearing off of the sticking rubbish has revealed, the hollowness, futility and exaggerated nature of the following fantastical, funny and amusing observations of certain learned writers ought to stand fully exposed :—

“After a whole day's journey the night fell and the party stopped under a big tree. The next morning they resumed their journey and by dusk sighted the vicinity of the Bharadvaja Ashram nearby.”¹⁶⁵

“This party was walking not like gods but definitely as human beings, a party of youthful people.”¹⁶⁶

“It took Ram Chandraji two days' travelling to reach the confluence from the place where he crossed the Ganges. Thirty to 40 miles would be about that distance.”¹⁶⁷

“Normally a person walking with a lady would not cover more than 10 or 12 miles a day.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶³ *Vulgate*, 54.11.

¹⁶⁴ *N.W.R.*, 58.13.

¹⁶⁵ Dr. Katju's English article, paragraphs 4-5.

¹⁶⁶ *Loc. cit.*, para. 8.

¹⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*, par. 13.

¹⁶⁸ *A. B. Patrika*, Oct. 4, 1945.—Pandit Shivanath Katju's summary of Dr. K. N. Katju's view-point.

“Singraur (in the Allahabad District) is now considered to be ancient Shringvirpur. This claim seems to be without foundation. The ancient Shringvirpur must have been about 50 miles away from modern Allahabad while Singraur is only 22 miles.”¹⁶⁹

“Therefore, the theory can very well now be proved that the Ashram of Bharadwaj Muni was somewhere near Rajapur at the Sangam, which was about 32 miles from Shringvirpur, where he left his chariot. This distance was quite practicable for Shri Ram, specially with Sita, to travel on foot in two days time.”¹⁷⁰

Pargiter, too, partly misconstruing the *Rāmāyaṇa*, miscalculated the daily journey and misjudged as follows :—

“Journeying through the forest, they reached Prayāga next day.”¹⁷¹

“A yojana-and-a-half, therefore, meant about nine miles, and for that space only beyond Śrīngaverapura was the country open. Beyond that, again, and down to Prayāga, about 13 miles, forest covered the doab It may be noticed that the two days’ journey over these 22 miles, would make the day’s journey 11 or 12 miles, quite as much as Sītā could have travelled on foot.”¹⁷²

Mr. T. Paramasiva Iyer, however, seems to be nearer the truth when he writes on ‘*The Length of the Daily March (in Rāma’s Itinerary) beyond Singraur*’ as follows :—

“From the south bank of the Ganges, *Sītā walks* with Rāma right down to Pañchavati, and the daily march ends by sun-down, Rāma fixing a resting place for the night in advance. The daily march was thus limited to about eighteen miles though Sītā fed on flesh, and was bubbling with the energy of an adolescent girl.”¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ *A. B. Patrika*, Sept. 2, 1945.—Mr. Mittal’s article, parag. 12.

¹⁷⁰ *Loc. cit.*, par. 17.

¹⁷¹ *JRAS*, 1894, p. 237.

¹⁷² *Loc. cit.*, p. 238.

¹⁷³ *Rāmāyaṇa and Lanka*, Part I, chap. XIV., p. 99.

The whole reasoning of Dr. Katju is fictitious and not at all factual so as to be convincing. I have given a long quotation from his article (paragraph 13) in the beginning of section 3. The readers have seen how its contents, too, like his other observations, are unable to stand reason based on facts. His arguments drawing as they do upon speculation, though making a great display of vigour, are life-less and lacking in reality. Such purely conjectural arguments might be effective in entirely philosophical disquisitions. But surely they can have no place in a discussion on historical problems. Mere conjecture proves nothing. Had Dr. Katju made out a case, giving ancient literary, geological and other tangible grounds to establish that the Gaṅgā flowed for forty miles from Singraur on a south-westerly course and made the confluence with the Yamunā at Rajapur, we would have weighed the same against the information I have furnished above from the *V.-R.* itself; and thus his present hypothesis would have assumed the dignity of a theory to hold some ground. But his observations based on the misinterpretation of a single, imperfect, unreliable version of the *V.-R.* and fantastic surmises meant to serve as arguments have only resulted in misleading numerous casual or habitual readers of the Allahabad dailies. Instead of these had he thought it advisable to appeal to the researchers in the field of Indian Archaeology, who alone would be the competent persons to give a sound verdict, he would have surely done a yeoman's service to the cause of the reconstruction and reclamation of our ancient past. If, however, he has been in only "to invite discussion on this most important topic," we have had enough of it; and it is now opportune to compare and exchange notes and come to a settlement.

Now to recapitulate, the following facts have so far emerged from our discussion to weigh against the statements of Dr. Katju and his supporters:—

The royal car, passing through the land of Rama's

maternal uncle, took the party over to the suburb of Śṛṅgaverapura, beyond which they had to walk on foot. For the first three days they lived on water only. Consequently, down to the *nyagrodha* tree on their way to Prayāga they made little progress in their journey, as was also due to their devoting major part of the day to the various activities ending in the crossing of the Gaṅgā and to the hunting affair.

Partly regaining some energy by taking lotus stalks on the third night, the three travellers were enabled to cover the major part of the distance between Singraur and the present Bharadvājāśrama in about 10 hours of the fourth day, repeatedly taking the requisite amount of rest on their 'lonely' way. Their way led almost through the forest, proverbially too dense at places, without any 'open' country as such except the whole small strip of the Vatsadeśa for about 3 miles lying in between Śṛṅgaverapura and the banyan tree on their Prayāgaward way. One *yojana* and a half ($1\frac{1}{2}$ miles) is rather the whole distance of the great Prayāga-vana, that lay after 3 miles east of Śṛṅgaverapura and before the Bharadvājāśrama and contained at its fag-end a "Divine Place" (*deva-sthāna*) like a holy temple which Bharata and others circumambulated before coming out of that forest and entering the precincts of the Bharadvājāśrama, than the 'open country' between Śṛṅgaverapura and the Prayāga-vana as understood by Pargiter. The Bharadvājāśrama occupied an area in more than 2 miles' length which Rāma with his wife and brother traversed in more than 3 quarters of an hour in order to reach Bharadvāja with his residential quarters at the eastern-most corner of the table-land between the two rivers, the present Bharadvājāśrama pointing to the same. The Confluence was at another 2 or 3 miles during the summer but not so far during the rains when both the rivers drew together at the foot of Bharadvāja's residence. Prayāga included the whole land between the two rivers to the east of the Vatsadeśa.

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

ĀTMAN IN PRE-UPANIṢADIC VEDIC LITERATURE. By H. G. Narahari, M.A., M.Litt., Research Fellow, Madras University. pp. xlv + 278. Published by Adyar Library, 1944. Price Rs. 8.

The book under review is the thesis approved by the Madras University for the Degree of Master of Letters. It contains 12 small chapters dealing with the Existence of Ātman known to the Ṛgvedic Seers; Ātman or the Individual Self as distinct from Brahman; The conception of immortality in the Veda; The Vedic doctrine of the worlds above; Devayāna and Pitṛyāna; Theism of the Ṛgveda; Sūktabhājah and Havirbhājah; Prayers and their rewards in the Veda; Ṛgveda, the source of Upaniṣadic Philosophy; Transmigration traced to the Ṛgveda; Sin and hell as understood in the Veda; and Conclusion.

The subject is very interesting. Though great scholars of the West have done good deal of pioneer work in the field of Vedic literature, yet it is difficult to say that there is hardly any work to be done now. Our studies of the literature show that there is a vast field to do original work and also to examine the conclusions of the western scholars from the orthodox point of view. Hardly much has been done in the true spirit of Indian thought.

Mr. Narahari has taken great pains to study the problems from different angles of vision and has given the views of almost all the Vedic scholars. The work deserves careful study and the author is to be congratulated for having taken great pains for maintaining the standard of high scholarship.

EPIGRAPHICAL ECHOES OF KĀLIDASA. By C. Sivaramamurti, M.A., Curator, Archaeological Section, Government Museum, Madras. With a Foreword by the late R. B. K. N. Dikshit. Published by Thompson and Co., Ltd., 33, Broadway, Madras. 1944. pp. xvi+104. Price Rs. 3-8-0.

The book under review is the first number of the *Memoirs of the Archaeological Society of South India series*. The present volume deals with the discussion of such expressions and passages in epigraphical literature as can be traced to have been borrowed or influenced by Sanskrit literature. The title of the work though refers to Kālidāsa, yet the author has made references to Vālmiki, Bhāravi, Bāṇa and Daṇḍin as well. The author has further enlivened the book by reproducing the actual forms of the letters in which the thoughts forming the echoes from Kālidāsa and other poets are embodied, so that the reader may become interested in the interesting world of epigraphy. He has searched the wide range of Indian inscriptions from the 2nd century A.D. to the 12th for the illustrations of this book. He has illustrated it profusely.

Mr. Sivaramamurti has done a great service by drawing the attention of scholars towards the influence of Sanskrit Literature over inscriptions which will help us to fix chronology with much more certainty. The author deserves every encouragement and congratulations of scholars.

PĀTIMOKKHA AND DHAMMASANGAṆI. The former is edited by R. D. Vadekar, Esq., M.A., University teacher in Pali, Fergusson College, Poona, while the latter by P. V. Bapat, Esq., M.A., Ph.D., and R. D. Vadekar, Esq., M.A. Both have appeared in the *Bhandarkar Oriental Series* as Nos. 1 and 2. The former can be had for Re. 1-0-0.

ATTHASĀLINĪ. Edited by Dr. Vapat and Mr. R. D. Vadekar. This is the third book of the *Bhandarkar Oriental Series*.

The Pāli *Pātimokkha* contains rules of discipline for the Buddhists monks and nuns. It is one of the oldest of the Vinaya texts and is very important from the Buddhistic point of view. The editor has taken great pains to compare the texts with the Ceylonese and the Burmese editions and also with that of Oldenberg. It has been very carefully edited. The author has promised to bring out its second part containing translation and useful notes.

Dhammasaṅgāṇi belongs to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and deals with the enumeration of the Dhammas by way of questions and answers. The book is divided into four sections, each of which has got a table of contents called Mātikā. Mrs. Rhys Davids has translated this work and calls it—'*A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics*.' It is a very interesting book and is meant for the use of advanced monks.

Atthasālinī is a commentary on the *Dhammasaṅgāṇi*. This is for the first time that these books have been published in the Devanāgarī script with the help of Sinhalese, Burmese and Siamese texts, found in mss. These are some of the more important texts of Buddhism which were not published in Devanāgarī script before. The editors have spared no pains to make the editions up to date and critical. All possible material has been utilised to make the edition complete.

Both the editors who are experts in Pali and the *Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* deserve our hearty congratulations for bringing out such fine and useful editions of Pali texts.

MITHILĀ-BHĀṢĀ-VIDYOTANA. By Mahāvaiyākaraṇa Paṇ-
ḍita Shri Dīnabandhu Jhā, Published by the Maithilī-
Sāhitya-Pariṣad, Darbhanga. pp. 13 + 300. Price
Rs. 5. (Rs. 4 for the members of the Pariṣad).

Mahāvaiyākaraṇa Pandit Sri Dīnabandhu Jhā's *Mithilā-
bhāṣā-Vidyotana* (published by the *Maithilī Sāhitya Pariṣad*
Darbhanga, 1946) is a remarkable book in many ways.
It is the fullest and most complete grammar of the Maithilī
language that has been ever published in Maithilī, and it
seeks to marshall all the rather complicated facts of this
language, which is current among a population of consi-
derably over ten millions of people. I have found it
conceived in a spirit of frank appreciation of the special
character of Maithilī as contrasted with Sanskrit, although
the author has paid his homage to Sanskrit by compiling
his rules in *Sūtra*-form in Maithilī. The author probably
did this as a *tour de force*, and this certainly indicates his
great scholarship and his critical acumen in the selection
of the essentials, but I would have liked him to employ
it with greater advantage (as I think) for Maithilī grammar
in giving us a larger selections of facts arranged and treated
in the ordinary way. The pronoun-incorporating nature
of the verb in present-day Maithilī has been analysed
carefully, and the various paradigms for both noun
declension and verb conjugation are very usefully and
conveniently tabulated. I only wish the various tense-
forms of the Maithilī verb were given with a little more
fullness. But that does not detract from the great value
of the book: faults of omission like this do not detract
much from its importance and usefulness. The grammar
appears to be the work of a scholar of the type who under-
stands (although he, as is only natural, sees through the
window of Sanskrit so to say) the mechanism of his mother-
tongue, and sets about conscientiously to explain it. I
think the ideal grammar of a New Indo-Aryan language

is to be based on the finding of historical comparative linguistics; but it will be long before really good work in this line will be done. But the works like the present one are also invaluable, and both the author and the learned body which has published it deserve the best thanks of all persons interested in the study of New Indo-Aryan.

Suniti Kumar Chatterji (Calcutta University).

CATALOGUE OF THE ANUP SANSKRIT LIBRARY. Fasciculus II. Prepared by Dr. C. Kunhan Raja and K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, M. O. L. Published by Authority, Bikaner.

The Anup Sanskrit Library is doing admirable service to the cause of Sanskrit learning. The Bikaner State has got quite a large number of valuable Sanskrit Mss. which remained unknown to the scholars outside for a long time. But now through the efforts of Dr. Raja and Shri K. Madhava Krishna Sarma both the Catalogue of the Mss. and the rare works in print are being brought out for the benefit of scholars. The first fasciculus of the Catalogue was published long before and this is the second of the series. It contains the list of Mss. on the *Gītā* and the *Dharmaśāstra*. The Curator hopes that the subsequent parts will follow at an early date. It is very essential that a full comprehensive and scientific catalogue of Mss. and rare works should be published wherever possible. The compilers of this catalogue deserve our congratulations.

THE MUDRA-RAKSHASA-KATHA of Mahadeva—Edited by Dr. V. Raghavan M.A., Ph.D., Saraswati Mahal Series No. 1. Published by the Administrative Committee of the Maharajah Serfoji's Saraswati Mahal Library, Tanjore. Pages viii + 92 + 40 + xlii. 1946. Price Rs. 2-8-0.

The Maharaja Serfoji's Saraswati Mahal Library at Tanjore contains a unique collection of rare manuscripts in Sanskrit, Telugu, etc. It is to be congratulated that an attempt has been made towards a systematic publication of the rare finds in the library and the book under review is the 1st of the series to be published as the *Saraswati Mahal Series*. The work under review is a Sanskrit prose work in 40 pages and contains a clear and succinct summary of the famous Sanskrit drama *Mudrā-Rākṣasa* by Viśākhadatta. Baffling literary critics in its absence of Śṛṅgāra, *Mudrā-Rākṣasa* will stand as the unique political drama of Sanskrit Literature and its characters have a permanent appeal. As the plot is intricate such a publication, as the present one, is welcome. Its prose is simple, elegant and grand.

Dr. Raghavan is to be congratulated for the way in which he has edited the work and has translated it with notes, and useful appendices. All this has added to the utility of the work. It will prove very useful if the students go through this book before studying the drama in original.

OUR RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE.—A STUDY IN TRUE PSYCHOLOGY. By Swami Abhedananda. Published by the Calcutta Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajakrishna Street, Calcutta. Pages xxvi + 208. Price Rs. 6.

The book under review contains the nine lectures with an appended chapter on questions and answers systematically delivered by Swami Abhedananda in America in 1920 and is now offered as No. 2 of the *Abhedananda Memorial Series*. The work is a study in true psychology and is named after the title of the 9th lecture in the book "*Our Relation to the Absolute*."

The book is written in simple and direct style and has a powerful appeal. The racy fluency is preserved throughout the work in explaining difficult psychological and philosophical Vedantic truths even to laymen.

The Swami states that though the word psychology has been derived from the term *psyche* or soul, it is now used in the west in the sense of the physiological origin and ordering of the mind. He takes us elaborately in several lectures through the meaning of consciousness, powers of the mind and power of concentration. The other chapters are on individuality and personality and on the three states of existence of the mind. He has established in these lectures that there is an अत्मा, the soul, behind the physical mind.

In the last chapter he has clearly shown that all relations could be classified under three heads. In the first stage we think that we are servants of the Lord and in the second that we are part of the One stupendous whole, in the third and last stage when we feel our real Ātman we think that we are one with the Infinite Ocean of existence, intelligence, bliss and love.

The *Calcutta Ramakrishna Vedanta Matha* is to be congratulated on this memorial production along with useful footnotes and a learned preface of 14 pages setting out the various views of the Absolute in western Philosophy. The book is useful for general readers of Vedanta.

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- CRITICAL WORD-INDEX TO THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ. By Rao Bahadur P. C. Divanji, M.A., LL.M., Retired Judge, Advocate (O. S.) with a Foreword by Dr. S. M. Katre, Poona. Published by New Book and Co., Ltd., 188-190, Hornby Road, Bombay, 1946.

The *Bhagavadgītā* is one of the most popular books in Indian Literature. It is the source of inspiration to persons.

of all shades of opinion. It gives us in brief the Sublime teachings of the Upaniṣads and makes clear that Action combined with Knowledge alone leads a true devotee to the realisation of the highest aim of life, religion and philosophy. Though the book is so very important, yet not much scientific work has been done on it. Rao Bahadur P. C. Diyanji deserves our congratulation for making an attempt towards this direction by preparing a word-Index of it on a novel plan. He has separately dealt with the various recensions of the book. A brief meaning of each word is also given. The task of Indexing is very dull and uninteresting, but at the same time it is very important and difficult too. We congratulate the Rao Bahadur for this hard task even in his old age. The book is indeed a useful addition to the literature of the *Gītā*.

THE ANCIENT WISDOM OF WALES. By D. Jeffrey Williams.

Published by the Adyar Library Madras. Pages 54.

1945. Price Rs. 1-4-0.

The *Theosophical Society* at Adyar is interested in collecting the ancient wisdom of the east and of the west and hence has published the book under review. The first half of the book contains extracts from 'Barddas' which are the fragments of the Drvidical wisdom of Wales. The real question is as to how this ancient wisdom had been preserved all along until it was published by the *Welsh Manuscripts Society* in 1862. There is a strong opinion that the text is the forgery of Tolo Morganweg and the dispute still goes on in Welsh literary and academic circles. Nevertheless, the wisdom is given here in English for the benefit of scholars. The matter given is certainly interesting. The second half of the book contains papers by D. Jeffrey Williams based on a study of the ancient wisdom of Wales.

The book affords ample matter for the historian of the world's philosophy.

THE IDEAL OF EDUCATION. By Swami Abhedananda pp. xiv + 91. Published by the Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajkrishna street, Calcutta, 1945. Price Re. 1-0-0.

The book contains 4 lectures of the Swami delivered in India and America. The lectures are intended to spread the real ideal of education among the people. In lecture I occupying one half of the book, the Swami traces briefly and accurately the greatness of the Hindu ideal of education and explains how the ancient Hindus were great in every department including mathematics and other sciences. The second lecture is on practical education and it lays special emphasis on the necessity of learning the Sanskrit language which is shown to be perfect. In the 3rd lecture on female education, the author shows that the nation which produced Gārgī, Maitreyī and others in the past could not lag behind in the education of "women who are the representatives of the Divine Mother, the Śakti, the Mother of the universe-Jaganmātā." The 4th lecture is an address to an educational-conference in America. Here the author emphasises that the essential characteristics of each cultural civilisation should be placed before the west for their study. Students will find the book quite useful and interesting.

LIFE BEYOND DEATH.—A CRITICAL STUDY IN THE MYSTERY OF PSYCHE AND SPIRITUALISM. By Swami Abhedananda. pp. 15 + 292. Published by Ramakrishna Vedanta Math, 19B, Raja Rajkrishna Street, Calcutta, 1944. Price Rs. 6-8-0.

Swami Abhedananda delivered from time to time a number of lectures on Spiritualism in response to the invita-

tions from well known institutions of culture during his stay in America. These lectures have now been brought together and published in this book under the name of '*Life beyond death*' as the first contribution to the *Abbedananda Memorial Series*.

The book under review contains in a brief compass what all has been said on the subject from the earliest times of the dawn of religion up to modern times in all the Religions of the world and by almost all the important philosophers of the various countries including the votaries of modern spiritualistic societies and the society of Psychical Research in America and England.

As a great Indian philosopher put it, throughout the vast length and breadth of the universe there never was, there is not and there never will be, even one sentient and thinking being in whose mind the great question of the *Kāthopaniṣad*—अस्तित्वेके नायमस्तित्वेके (some hold that there is Ātman after death while others deny it)—has never arisen and the enquirer has never clamantly insisted on an answer. The book under review shows how the great problem has been answered by the religions and philosophies—ancient, medieval and modern.

One of the best chapters of the book is chap. XI—'*Spiritualism and Vedānta*' where the author clearly points out that modern spiritualistic societies endeavour to communicate with the dead and that the truths obtained from them cannot be perfect or absolute. The Vedānta has clearly established that those spirits are in the Pitr-loka and vain should be the result of the spiritualists who expect to know the absolute truth from earthbound spirits. The realisation of the absolute truth or the attainment of God-consciousness can come only from Vedānta and not from the fathers or ancestors who are dwelling in the Pitr-loka. It is Vedānta alone which shows the way by which we can reach the ultimate goal of all religions, manifest Divinity in

the actions of our daily life, and becoming free from selfishness and being independent of physical and mental conditions we may live as a living God. The book concludes that the wise ones will never be afraid of death but always remember that there is an eternal life for every body and no soul will be lost ; and those who have attained the highest spiritual realisation will eventually come face to face with the Infinite and attain that peace and happiness which have been attained by Śrī Kṛṣṇa, Buddha, Christ, Ramakrishna, and by all the other saviours of the world. The book is written in easy, elegant and interesting style. It deserves careful reading.

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
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